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ABSTRACT 
 
People’s experiences throughout their lives influence their later thoughts and 
actions, including thoughts and actions about politics. This straightforward logic 
motivates attention to childhood political socialization, habitual voting, and a host of 
other phenomena. Yet, when it comes to studies concerning the political behaviors of 
immigrants to the United States, the scholarly norm has been to assume that these 
individuals entered the nation as political blank slates; that is, we ignore the possible 
influence of experiences in immigrants’ nations of origin. By contrast, this study 
develops and tests a theory of imported socialization in an effort to understand how 
immigrants’ political socialization experiences before they left their countries of origin 
shape the way they view the new polity after migration; the extent to which this imported 
socialization affects their degree of post-migration political engagement; and finally for 
how long the content of immigrants’ political suitcases remains consequential during 
their civic lives in their new home. Specific questions examined include the extent to 
which immigrants’ political baggage affects the intensity and the directionality of that 
post-migration political engagement. My findings suggest that political suitcases indeed 
play a key role on the political acculturation of the newcomers.  
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CHAPTER 1 
IMMIGRANTS’ POLITICAL SUITCASES: 
A THEORY OF IMPORTED SOCIALIZATION 
From 1965 to 2000, international migration flows more than doubled. Estimates 
show that during this period, roughly 100 million people migrated from their countries of 
origin to a new home. These migration flows were far from steady over this period of 
time. Indeed, fifty-five percent of those 100 million left their homelands between 1990 
and 2000 (Ueda 2007). At the end of the twentieth century, clearly migration flows were 
on the rise.  
Amazingly, at least one in four of those 100 million individuals chose the United 
States as their new host country. This influx of immigrants over the past forty years made 
the United States the leading destination for the second consecutive century in terms of 
total of immigrants received. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, by 2006, the foreign-
born population in the United States had increased to 37.5 million, accounting for 12.5 
per cent of the total. In spite of this fact, there are noteworthy gaps in our knowledge 
about this important population. For instance, the literature on immigrants’ political 
attitudes and behaviors dwells on post-arrival patterns in America. There is much to be 
learned about whether and how political experiences before migration influence these 
individuals’ decision to become political actors after they have crossed nations’ borders. 
The United States is a nation of immigrants, a nation in which the cultural and 
political contours have been shaped and defined by its policies regarding large-scale 
waves of immigration. For instance, in 1965, the United States radically redefined 
immigration policies by abolishing national origin quotas, establishing new criteria for 
selecting immigrants, and providing for an unlimited number of family reunification 
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visas. In debate on the floor of Congress, no one admitted to believing that the 
Immigration and Nationality Act would have a marked effect on the ethnic makeup of 
America. Just the same, the reality was an unprecedented influx of immigrants from Latin 
America, the Caribbean, and Asia (Pachon and DeSipio 1994; Gerstle and Mollenkopf 
2001; Ueda 2007). As a consequence, the Caucasian proportion of the population has 
been in steady decline, and, indeed, is on pace to lose its majority status in the next fifty 
years.  
 Immigrants represent an increasing group of recruits (DeSipio 1996) for the 
American polity. In other words, they are “prospective citizens” who will decide either to 
engage or to ignore the ebb and flow of the political tide in their new home. Their 
engagement in politics, however, need not wait until they are eventually enfranchised 
through naturalization. In a nation with norms of robust free speech and free assembly, 
public demonstration is a tactic open not only to citizens, but to all residents. In the spring 
of 2006, for instance, congressional debate on immigration reform spawned protests and 
demonstrations. Participants included many individuals who had not lived long in the 
United States, let alone obtained citizenship. In addition to joining demonstrations, non-
citizens also can volunteer on behalf of political campaigns, attend political meetings, 
participate in community groups, and so on. In short, political participation is not the 
exclusive privilege of the citizen. 
Not long ago, there was skepticism regarding the relevance of this topic in 
contemporary American politics. Today, though, following the events of 2006 and 
beyond, it has become much easier to make the case that immigrants provide a unique 
opportunity to revisit and further analyze key questions in the social sciences, including 
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those concerning the foundations of political participation and the origins of political 
attitudes. Immigrants, after all, are individuals whose world views were learned from and 
nurtured by experiences in their countries of origin. Whether the imprint brought by these 
experiences endures following migration is the key empirical question pursued in this 
study.  This work, in fact, is one of the first efforts of what seems to be an emerging 
academic interdisciplinary movement, one that attempts to untangle culture from other 
factors in attitude formation (see Luttmer and Singhal 2009) by acknowledging the key 
role of pre-migratory forces and by incorporating these factors into our 
conceptualizations and models of behavior. 
 Regarding attitude formation, for instance, psychological attachments toward 
political parties in the new host country may develop among some of these individuals 
shortly after their arrival in America. The Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family 
Foundation 2004 National Survey of Latinos: Politics Engagement (NSL 2004) shows 
that more than half of first-generation immigrants (54 percent) who have spent three 
years or less in the United States already claim to hold a partisan attachment with either 
the Democratic or the Republican parties. If we turn our attention to the National Bank of 
Mexico’s Division for Economic and Sociopolitical Studies 2003 Mexican Values Survey 
(MVS 2003), the same pattern holds. More than half of first-generation immigrants (53 
percent) who have spent three years or less in the United States already claim to think of 
themselves as either Democrats or Republicans.  
How might we account for this partisan attachment? One explanation is that 
political assimilation takes place quite rapidly. The immigrant enters the United States as 
a political blank slate, and yet is transformed into a partisan affiliate in the short space of 
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three years. But note that the data change only slightly when one focuses only on 
immigrants who have been in the United States one year or less. According to the NSL 
2004, more than half of these brand new residents (54 percent) already identify as either 
Republicans or Democrats. The proportion is not that different (44 percent) when 
analyzing the MVS 2003.  
Although it is possible that blank slates experienced a hyper-assimilation process, 
that transformed political novices into partisan affiliates in only months, one must 
consider the alternate thesis that the proclivity toward political engagement was at least 
partly in place before these individuals ever set foot in the United States. Specifically, I 
ask whether it is plausible that along with their cultural baggage, immigrants travel with 
political suitcases that shape their attitudes toward the new host political system. Hence, 
this study should contribute new insight to the broad literatures on topics fundamental to 
our discipline such as political socialization, political trust, partisanship, ideology and 
political participation.  
Protesters and partisan identifiers illustrate the point that immigrants can and do 
engage in political action well before they obtain citizenship and the right to vote. This 
should be sufficient to derive and support two initial considerations. First, one must 
acknowledge political engagement by immigrants is not a rare occurrence. Second, one 
should wonder what drives such seemingly fast-paced engagement. In other words, this 
engagement signals a need for reconsideration of the familiar accounts of immigrants’ 
political attitudes and behaviors.  
4 
Why Study Pre-Migration Politicization? 
Scholarly efforts to understand the immigrant’s journey of acculturation and 
political incorporation to the United States are by nature multifaceted. Social scientific 
accounts range from examinations of family memoirs of individuals coming from very 
different regions in the world (e.g. Dublin 1993) to more systematic monographs 
regarding particular immigrant groups with shared ethnic backgrounds and shared host 
communities (e.g. Mondello 1980; Pinderhughes 1987; Morris 1991; Anderson and 
Blanck 1992). The main goal, though, has been to explain the similarities and 
dissimilarities in acculturation patterns given the backgrounds of particular individuals or 
groups. 
In approaching acculturation, up until recently, scholarly expectations were driven 
by the idea that immigrant groups to the United States should assimilate as monolithic 
blocs. In other words, immigrants from any given country of origin were generally 
expected to relinquish their cultural backgrounds in order to adjust and perform more and 
more like mainstream Americans at the same rate (e.g. Park 1930). The scholarly notion 
of assimilation, though, has evolved considerably. Recent work suggests that assimilation 
processes take place “at different rates within different ethnic and racial groups, so that 
within the same ethnic group there is very considerable variation in the extent of 
assimilation” (Alba and Nee 2003, 38). However, what has yet to be explored is whether 
the extent to which the pace at which acculturation occurs relates to pre-migration 
political experiences. It is my contention that attention to pre-migration factors holds the 
potential to improve our understanding both within and across different immigrant 
groups. 
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In political science, pioneering explanations of immigrants’ political behavior 
have heavily focused on post-arrival factors such as mobilization efforts (Garcia and de la 
Garza 1985), immigrants’ minority status, levels of economic advancement and foreign 
policy concerns (Cain, Kiewiet and Uhlaner 1991). More recent work on this post-arrival 
tradition addresses the role of English language skills, media exposure to politics (Wong 
2000), the naturalization process and the relevance of the political atmosphere 
(Michelson and Pallares 2001), and dual nationality (Jones-Correa 1998; Staton, Jackson 
and Canache 2007). Although these factors surely do contribute to patterns in political 
behavior, it is important to note that these forces may be influenced by both the migration 
and the pre-migration experiences themselves. With regard to the former, immigrants’ 
self-sense of identity in the new land is profoundly influenced by the experience of 
crossing one or multiple borders (Garcia Bedolla 2005). As to the latter, I contend that 
immigrants do not enter the United States as political blank slates. Instead, pre-migration 
political experiences may shape or modify the effects of these post-migration factors.  For 
instance, if an individual emigrated from a country in Latin America where the views on 
U.S. foreign policy were generally negative, one should not assume that pre-arrival 
attitudes will vanish once the person arrives in the United States. In fact, McClain et al.’s 
(2006) findings suggest that Latino immigrants’ pre-arrival knowledge of their own 
countries’ racial hierarchies may be coloring to some extent their attitudes once in 
America.  
Another line of research has studied the impact of pre-arrival factors such as 
ethnic or national backgrounds. Under this framework, attention has focused on 
comparisons across national and even regional or pan-ethnic groups (e.g. Wilson 1973; 
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Black 1987; Pachon and DeSipio 1994; Lien 1994; Wong 2000; Ramakrishnan 2005). 
Although national and ethnic backgrounds are of importance for immigrants’ political 
behavior, much remains unknown regarding the nature of these background effects.  
Immigrants’ backgrounds encompass a broad set of potential explanatory factors that 
remain unexplored. Most critically, by focusing on general differences across countries of 
origin, we gloss over what may be important differences within those countries.  
Some past works have considered, in fact, the possible impact of political 
experiences in the countries of origin on post-migration political behavior. Noteworthy 
works in this tradition include Wilson (1973), Black (1982, 1987), Gitelman (1982), 
Finifter and Finifter (1989), and White et al. (2008). Unfortunately, none of these studies 
addresses immigrants to the United States. Wilson (1973) and Finifter and Finifter (1989) 
study immigrants to Australia. Gitelman (1982) evaluates the experience of Americans 
and Soviets following migration to Israel. Black (1982, 1987) and White et al (2008) 
scrutinize immigrant groups to Canada. Thus, any lessons learned from these works may 
be of only indirect relevance to the American case. Moreover, whereas all of these 
scholarly efforts coincide in that pre-migration experiences matter for post-migration 
political behavior their conceptual and methodological approaches could be improved 
substantively, in my view, with two additional steps. The first of these steps would be to 
walk away from the emphasis on immigrants’ political re-socialization process following 
migration. This is to say that the main focus of analyses should privilege the process of 
transference or “importation” of political attitudes itself over the process of political 
acculturation/assimilation that follows. For instance, Gitelman does expect differences in 
political assimilation patterns between Soviets and Americans following migration to 
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Israel given these individuals’ political backgrounds, namely “socialist authoritarian” and 
“capitalist democratic” backgrounds, respectively. However, in the words of this author, 
his main goal is to explain these immigrants’ experience in terms of “a process of 
resocialization, specifically, adult political resocialization” (1982: 14). Furthermore, 
although the in-depth interviews conducted for this research project provide important 
insights into these individuals’ experiences, they are not well suited to detect systematic 
differences on post-migration attitudes generated by divergent pre-migration experiences 
across individuals within the same country of origin.  
On this latter point, Wilson (1973) did have survey data available. This work even 
tries to establish what causes differences in patterns of individuals’ participation in the 
country of origin when contrasted with those found among these individuals following 
migration to the new host country. The analyses, though, are limited to comparisons 
across immigrant groups, namely, the British and the Italians to Australia. Also, when 
differences across individuals from the same country of origin are approached, these 
differences are explained in terms of socioeconomic status and educational effects. In 
other words, these immigrants’ backgrounds are conceptualized and measured from an 
individual perspective but leaving out a whole set of pre-migration forces such as the 
political context. The idea that perhaps Italians from the North and Italians from the 
South (Putnam 1993) have been exposed to opposing political contexts is simply glossed 
over. 
In sum, prior scholarly accounts have mostly focused on post-arrival factors. 
Among those scant seminal works in which pre-migration experiences are acknowledged 
as an important factor producing post-migration behaviors, the main analyses are 
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conducted through comparisons across groups such as British vs. non-British (Black 
1982); British, South Europeans, East Europeans, and West Indians (Black 1987); or 
immigrants coming from “industrial democracies” vs. “other countries” (White et al 
2008). At least, in the latter account, the idea is to test whether industrial democracies 
provide other host nations with prospective citizens who are better equipped to adapt 
politically to the new context. However, under any of these approaches, one is still left to 
wonder the extent to which the shared pre-migration experiences produced differences 
across individuals within the same country of origin.  
Given some of these prior findings and the speed at which immigrants’ political 
hearts and minds seem to develop, one has to allow for the possibility of an additional 
explanation. This is a critical distinction between my perspective and past research. As 
stated earlier, prior work has focused almost exclusively on factors that operate after 
migration. Again, post-migration factors make sense as a starting point. However, there 
has not yet been widespread recognition of the possibility that experiences before 
migration might shape political behavior once the person arrives in the United States. For 
instance, typically the immigrant from Nicaragua is viewed identically regardless of 
whether this person came of political age under the Somozas, the Sandinistas, or during 
the post-Sandinista presidencies of Violeta Chamorro or Arnoldo Alemán. My approach, 
in contrast, calls attention to the possible significance of pre-migration experiences. I 
contend—and test empirically—that differences in pre-migration political experiences 
such as those represented by exposure to politics in Nicaragua’s recent eras may 
influence patterns of political behavior following migration to the United States.   
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Toward this end, this dissertation seeks to understand how immigrants’ political 
experiences in their countries of origin shape the way they view the new polity; the extent 
to which immigrants’ political baggage affects their degree of political engagement and 
the direction of that engagement; and finally for how long the content of immigrants’ 
political suitcases remains consequential during their civic lives in America. The present 
inquiry focuses on Latino immigrants to the United States. A great deal of the analyses is 
conducted by focusing only on first generation Mexican immigrants, the largest 
immigrant cohort during the past 40 years.  In fact, as of 2000, Mexican immigrants 
accounted for roughly 30 percent of the foreign-born population of the United States 
(Bloemraad 2006). However, there is no reason to believe that the findings of this 
research project are necessarily limited to this immigrant group alone. To the contrary, 
this research should shed light on processes that may operate on multiple immigrant 
groups in the United States.  
The Intuitive Notion of Imported Socialization 
In order to lay out the straightforward logic and intuitive notion behind the core 
concept of this dissertation, let me begin with an illustration. Let us consider the 
experiences of a hypothetical immigrant, “Mr. Mitote.”1 Mr. Mitote, a native of Mexico, 
lived in Mexico in the era of the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party’s (PRI) 
dominance. Thus, in contrast with what he later experienced in the United States, Mitote 
came of age in a very different context, a less democratic one characterized by single-
party dominance. In that context, Mitote did learn about the electoral process even if not 
about partisan political competition. After all, although non-competitive in nature, 
                                                 
1 “Mitote” is a slang form of Spanish to denote a “public meeting” or a “public demonstration.” 
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elections under the one-party regime were recurrent and were always referred to as the 
“heart” of the Mexican political system.  
Let us imagine Mr. Mitote migrating from Mexico to the United States, pursuing 
the American dream. Immigration certainly has the potential to involve a very complex 
psychological process that can be expected to produce lifelong effects on an individual’s 
identity. Among these effects, immigration processes may involve identity 
transformation; at the very least, cultural identity transformation (Akhtar 1999). 
However, it is less clear at what pace the transformation will occur for different 
individuals, let alone across and within different immigrant groups. Thus, whereas it is 
true that an immigration process is one that demands some loss of cultural identity, the 
immigration process in and of itself does not necessarily wipe out all of the baggage that 
an immigrant carries over from the country of origin. Moreover, the content of such 
baggage may account for great differences across individuals’ attitudes and behaviors 
once in the new host country.  
 Given the political context that Mr. Mitote experienced in Mexico during his pre-
adult socialization years, one might speculate that he should be less likely to become 
politically engaged once in the United States than an immigrant who comes from a highly 
democratic context. However, Mr. Mitote should still be more likely to become 
politically engaged than an immigrant who experienced a militarized authoritarian regime 
during his pre-adult socialization years. Figure 1.1 illustrates this point. This figure 
represents the predicted post-migration political behavior for three hypothetical 
immigrants to the United States. The first came to the United States from an authoritarian 
nation. Having had no prior practice in democratic politics, this person is projected to 
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have a low likelihood of engagement once in the United States. The second person is Mr. 
Mitote, who came from a nation with a relatively less authoritarian context than the first 
person. For instance, given its exposure to recurrent elections rather than to military rule, 
Mr. Mitote is expected to have relatively higher likelihood of engagement in politics than 
the first hypothetical immigrant after both of them cross borders. Finally, the third person 
came from a democratic nation. Hence, this third person is the one expected to have the 
highest likelihood of engagement in politics following migration to the United States.  
Why does pre-migration context account for the differences suggested here? It is 
because past experience possibly has engrained in the immigrant a sense of the value of 
political engagement, and perhaps even practice in actual political activity. Critically, I 
contend that these lessons are not forgotten once the person arrives in the United States. 
One must consider the possibility that the prior context helps in shaping an individual’s 
cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations toward politics, and therefore these 
orientations should remain with this individual and, perhaps more importantly, should 
travel if the individual becomes an immigrant to a new country. If an individual decides 
to migrate to a different country, that person will be packing and bringing along these 
cognitive, affective, and evaluative political orientations. These orientations then may 
help the person to make sense of the new political sphere. 
To demonstrate that this hypothetical example is neither abstract nor unrealistic, 
let me offer a real-life illustration. Between September and November of 2005, I 
conducted a series of in-depth face-to-face interviews with Mexican immigrants in the 
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Urbana-Champaign area.2 Here is a quotation from one of those encounters. This 
individual commented regarding his partisan ties in the United States: “In Mexico I 
consider myself to the left of the scale, especially about social issues […] Here (in the 
U.S.) I would never be a Republican just like I would never be a Panista3 there (in 
Mexico)”. According to an accompanying questionnaire, he actually leans towards the 
Democratic Revolution Party (PRD) and also finds that the Institutionalized 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) resembles the Democratic party the most. This immigrant also 
claimed: “Republicans do not represent my interests here, and even though I have doubts 
about the Democrats (they resemble the PRI), I cannot find another option.”  
Figure 1.2 illustrates visually the latter statements from the common immigrant 
from Champaign-Urbana. On the bottom, one can see the logos of the three main parties 
in Mexico (the country of origin). The logos are lined up from left to right according to 
this immigrant’s perception of these parties’ placement along the left-right continuum of 
social issues. The immigrant’s ideological stance on the same continuum is denoted with 
a yellow star, right above the PRD logo, which is the party of his preference regarding 
Mexican politics. Bidirectional red arrows are drawn from both the PRI logo to the 
Democratic Party logo and from the PAN logo to the Republican Party logo accounting 
for the analogies offered by the immigrant to make sense of the American political arena. 
                                                 
2 This pilot study offered an opportunity to provide some qualitative insights for this 
dissertation project. All of the interviews were questionnaire-based and had an average 
length of 38 minutes. Given that, in my view, the ten participants included in this pilot 
study resemble in several ways those twelve “common men of Eastport” interviewed for 
Lane’s (1962) Political Ideology, I came to refer to them as the ten common immigrants 
of Urbana-Champaign. All of these immigrants are men. They are 27 years old on 
average. Their education levels range from elementary school to college studies. They 
also show considerable differences in terms of how many years they have lived in the 
United States: from a very few months up to 19 years. 
3 “Panista” stands for PAN partisan. PAN stands for National Action Party. 
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There are three main features to highlight in this immigrant’s words, as illustrated 
by Figure 1.2. First, he is directly translating the ideological stance he assumed in his 
country of origin to the ideological stance he displays once in the United States. Second, 
that ideological stance helps him find which American party he identifies with the most. 
Finally, he uses his attachments and dislikes of Mexican political parties to make sense of 
the American ones.  
  These examples support my initial claim that any comprehensive account of post-
migration political behavior demands attention to pre-migration experiences. Treating 
immigrants as identical blank slates washes away an entire array of possible explanatory 
forces. Again, this research project strives to bring attention to these pre-migration 
factors. Of course, the claims will be empirically tested later in this dissertation, but 
before examining these, the conceptual framework of imported socialization is presented 
in the following section. 
A Theory of Imported Socialization 
Ever since it entered our discipline during the 1960s, the term “political 
socialization” has occupied a fundamental role in our discipline, particularly for those 
scholars interested in understanding the formation of political attitudes, and more 
generally, interested in political behavior. In spite of its centrality (or perhaps due to it), 
there is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes a “socialization” process. 
As a starting point, let me define “political socialization” in the following terms. A 
political socialization process starts taking place when an individual learns about one’s 
role and the role of authority in a given polity through regular direct or indirect exposure 
to certain political information, stereotypes, and practices. Political information can be 
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obtained from family (parents), school teachers, college professors or peers, or from more 
formal sources such as newspapers, radio and television, but can also be acquired through 
discussion partners within individuals’ social networks. Simple exposure to dramatic 
events may leave lasting imprints on the political learning process of an individual. 
Practices relevant to political socialization include, of course, activities such as signing a 
petition, joining a rally or voting. However, there are other activities, not necessarily 
political in nature, that nevertheless provide individuals with skills that can become 
politically consequential, such as becoming an active member of a club, church or 
organization. Continuous exposure to political information, stereotypes, and practices 
should lead to familiarity, familiarity to engagement (or lack thereof), and if engagement 
is the choice, socialization processes should supply individuals with a sense of 
directionality. Individuals then rely on both that intensity and directionality when 
confronted with recurring political situations. 
Some scholars would argue that “virtually every aspect of adult political behavior 
can be studied in terms of its pre-adult antecedents” (Greenstein 1965: 128).4 Other 
scholars, of course, offer more moderate views on the effects of pre-adult socialization. 
Even these more moderate views, however, advance that mere exposure to political 
events such as presidential elections are conducive to sizeable gains in political learning 
and attitude formation during the pre-adult socialization years (Sears and Valentino 
1997). If “regular” events have the potential to leave lasting imprints during the pre-adult 
years of socialization, “dramatic” events such as the Watergate scandal have even greater 
chances to generate an impact on any individual’s political views during this individual’s 
                                                 
4 For an alternative approach on pre-adult antecedents, see for instance Alford and Hibbing 2004 
and Alford et al 2005.  
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pre-adult years and beyond (Dennis and Webster 1975; Hawkins et al 1975; Rodgers and 
Lewis 1975).    
The vast literature on political socialization is far from being a monolithic body. It 
accommodates diverging views on several topics. For one, it offers different points of 
view concerning which agents during the pre-adult socialization years are the most 
consequential in attitude formation. Some scholars argue that parents play the key role 
during the socialization process, leaving to peers merely a reinforcing role (e.g. Tedin 
1974, 1980). By contrast, another line of research advances that, under certain 
circumstances, peers’ influence can actually trump that of the parents (e.g. Sebert et al 
1974).  
Another stream of the socialization literature that encompasses diverging views is 
the one focusing on “political education.” There appears to be consensus regarding the 
critical role of schools in providing young individuals with political education. For 
instance, schools are key agents when it comes to the formation of attitudes towards 
authorities (e.g. Hess and Torney 1967). However, some scholars have contended that 
schools’ emphasis on political education varies as a consequence of the nature of times 
(Bereday and Stretch 1963). In addition, some scholars question whether the content of 
political education equips individuals with the proper tools for political participation 
(Niemi and Junn 1998).     
There is also ample debate in the literature regarding whether socialization 
processes are ever “complete.” Suffice it to illustrate with the contrast between scholarly 
efforts on early childhood socialization vs. adult socialization. The former view argues 
that children’s political views start taking shape well before individuals enter elementary 
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school and are expected to become major determinants of their adult behavior (e.g. 
Easton and Hess 1962; Greenstein 1965). The latter view does not deny that socialization 
starts at an early stage of life. However, under this other framework, individuals continue 
updating their political orientations throughout their lives given a changing environment 
(e.g. Verba and Nie 1972; Jennings and Niemi 1974, 1981).    
After a brief perusing of the literature, one thing is clear: political socialization is 
a wide-ranging and multifaceted concept, and consequently one that is somewhat elusive. 
Although the diverse streams of literature on socialization may disagree on how the 
socialization process matters, there is no disagreement as to whether pre-adult 
socialization years influence individuals’ adult political behavior.  
Theoretical guidance on this point comes from multiple perspectives. Indeed, it 
would be difficult to make a strong theoretical case that prior experience should not 
matter. I have not yet encountered a compelling rationale for why everything a person 
experienced for years should vanish from memory simply because the person has crossed 
an international border. The central claim of this dissertation is consistent with the 
guiding tenets of research on socialization. As stated above, in that literature it is posited 
that learning in one’s early years helps to shape the person’s values, attitudes and actions, 
producing effects that may endure throughout life. However, one can also conceive of 
this central thesis in more psychological terms. For one, early experiences inform the 
construction of cognitive frameworks. Subsequently, we process new information and 
make sense of new situations with guidance from the relevant considerations we can 
bring to mind. One particular mechanism, exemplified with the quotation from one of the 
“common immigrants from Urbana-Champaign” in-depth interviews (Figure 1.2), is 
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analogical reasoning. People cope with novel situations in part by drawing parallels to 
past experiences. Political elites make sense of novel foreign policy situations --such as 
those presented by international crises but not limited to them-- by drawing on past 
conflicts as analogies (e.g. Khong 1992; Houghton 1996, 1998; Hemmer 1999). If elites 
rely upon analogies to make sense of the political world under crises, it certainly seems 
reasonable that individuals who are facing a critical process such as the immigration 
process would rely upon analogies, too. All of these various theoretical perspectives point 
to the conclusion that prior experience matters, and our intuition should do the same. For 
example, when we move to a new city, one way that we engage the new locale is through 
comparison with our prior home. We are not blank slates when moving from Urbana or 
Bloomington to Lincoln, and we should not expect immigrants to be blank slates merely 
because their moves crossed national borders. 
In other words, in the case of immigrants who underwent political socialization 
processes in their countries of origin, one should expect that along with their cultural 
baggage they will bring political suitcases (attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors) that shape 
their behavior once they unpack in their new home. It should be regular expectation of 
the political scientist and not the exceptional one that immigrants’ attitudes about politics 
back in their countries of origin will be used (consciously or not) to make sense of the 
new political landscape. If the content of these suitcases provides the individual with a 
sense of intensity and directionality establishing analogical links between views of 
immigrants’ old and new political worlds, it can be said that an imported socialization is 
present. 
18 
An Expanded View of Political Behavior 
Cultural psychologists describe an immigrant’s experience as one involving dual 
realities that constantly interact. After all, immigrants are exposed to cultural practices 
from both the country of origin and cultural practices from the new host country. Hence, 
the interaction of the two worldviews is what defines how these immigrants come to 
understand the context of the new home and the way they adapt to it (Mahalingam 2006). 
In political terms, this idea can be better understood using Lippmann’s (1922) concept of 
pseudo-environments. Several decades ago, Lippmann posited that a vast majority of the 
public can only experience the political world in an indirect fashion, and that in so doing, 
their conceptualizations of the political world (their political worldviews) could be 
described as pseudo-environments. These pseudo-environments do not necessarily match 
the “reality” of the political world. In fact, these perceptions of the political world could 
be confidentially held even if they are mismatched to the available facts (Kuklinski et al 
2000). In spite of this latter point, pseudo-environments are the mental representation 
individuals rely upon when processing new political information. Immigrants’ political 
attitudes are nurtured both by the pseudo-environment resulting from their exposure to 
the political system before they left their countries of origin and by the pseudo-
environment derived from their civic lives after they have settled in the new host country. 
As stated before, a comprehensive account, which incorporates immigrants’ pre- 
migration pseudo-environments (experiences and perceptions) to understand these 
individuals’ post-migration attitudes and behaviors is still lacking.  
Take for instance the pioneering and path-breaking work by Cain, Kiewiet and 
Uhlaner (1991) referenced earlier in this chapter. These authors used Fiorina’s (1981) 
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model to explain the acquisition of partisanship among first generation Latinos and 
Asians in California. Fiorina’s argument has two key components. In this framework, two 
factors underlie partisan preferences. One represents a direct comparison of the parties, 
and thus constitutes a summary of past experiences or views of those parties. The second 
is a socialization component, but a component that captures only socialization that took 
place here in the United States. Implicit in this framework is the view that accumulating 
direct experiences eventually will dominate the impact of prior socialization. Thus, these 
authors posit that when citizens first attain political awareness in the United States, the 
socialization process might indeed dominate partisan attachments, but as time goes by 
such attachments should come to reflect more and more the current conditions that 
surround individuals. The distinction between the socialization component and the 
updating component (understood as exposure to new political information available to the 
individual during one’s adulthood) of Fiorina’s argument seems crucial, especially in the 
case of first-generation immigrants, because many of them were socialized in a different 
country. 
From this perspective, one can devise a full account of the immigrant’s political 
behavior in the United States without ever contemplating experiences in the nation of 
origin. In other words, immigrants are political blank slates. And this, of course, differs 
fundamentally from my perspective. I contend that we must not assume that immigrants 
are political blank slates. We need to incorporate in our accounts a new concept, one I 
have labeled imported socialization. This concept is intended to represent the enduring 
effects of political experiences for the individual in the country of origin, including, but 
not limited to, past political experiences regarding political parties and ideological 
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perspectives in the home country, and, more broadly, encounters with different forms of 
political regimes.  
The Dual Dimensionality of Imported Socialization 
One should expect that socialization processes lead, at the very fundamental 
stage, to the eventual decision of individuals to either engage or not to engage in political 
matters. In other words, socialization processes are conducive to “engagement” (or lack 
thereof), but perhaps more consequentially, engagement (both psychological and 
physical) is a matter of both intensity and direction. Thus, once the decision regarding 
“how much engagement” an individual considers appropriate, political socialization 
processes are also conducive to decisions regarding “which side to take” on the political 
landscape. In other words, pre-migration experience may influence political attitudes and 
behavior on two dimensions: intensity and directionality. Hence, in order for this study to 
offer a comprehensive account, both of these dimensions will be incorporated into the 
analyses. For example, in considering the possible influence of pre-migration experiences 
on partisanship, I will assess both the existence of immigrants’ partisan attachments in 
the United States, and, for those immigrants who do view themselves as affiliates of an 
American party, the direction of that affiliation. 
Overcoming the Obstacles to Approaching Imported Socialization 
The claim that immigrants bring political views with them to their new nations 
holds powerful intuitive appeal. Nonetheless, as I have noted earlier, scholarly attention 
to this possibility has been scant. In part, the problem has been a simple lack of data. The 
ideal data to test this thesis would include pre-migration observations of individuals’ 
political attitudes and actions in their nations of origin, coupled with corresponding post-
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migration data once they have settled in their new countries. Simply put, the set of 
expectations that will be advanced in the following chapters of this dissertation would be 
ideally tested with panel data. With a three-wave panel, for instance, it would be possible 
to monitor individuals’ political attitudes and political engagement prior to migration, 
soon after migration, and then some years later once these immigrants have become more 
fully entrenched as residents of the United States. Acquisition of such data, though, 
would be an extraordinary undertaking, both for its magnitude and for the many years 
that respondents would need to be tracked before meaningful and instructive results could 
be obtained. Absent such ideal data, one must utilize the viable alternatives that are 
available.  
Given the pioneering nature of this study, a variety of pre-migration experiences 
must be assessed. For instance, it may be that the most consequential experiences trace to 
the individual’s youth. Thus, we would need a measure that can capture pre-adult 
socialization experiences. Alternately, actual political attachments exhibited in adulthood 
may be more consequential. Casting the net widely, both forms of prior political 
experience will be considered here. Indeed, the greatest support for this dissertation’s 
core thesis would be found if strong effects of imported socialization can be identified 
using starkly different specifications of pre-migration political experience.  
The effects of imported socialization are tested utilizing two fundamentally 
different approaches. Under the first approach, imported socialization is operationalized 
as immigrants’ political attitudes and beliefs in the country of origin. Specifically, pre-
migration experiences will be operationalized based on survey respondents’ self-reports. 
Under the second approach, imported socialization is operationalized indirectly via data 
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on the degree of democracy (or lack thereof) that the individual was exposed to during 
the pre-adult socialization years in the country of origin. This latter approach is based on 
external indicators regarding the political context in the individual’s country of origin. 
Although more coarse than respondents’ self-reports, these external indicators regarding 
the political context do not suffer the limitations with respect to causal inference that are 
characteristic of data drawn solely from cross-sectional surveys. Once again, if consistent 
results emerge from such disparate tests, support for my core thesis should be much more 
compelling than if only one form of data was available. 
Empirical Tests before and after Migration 
Another innovative manner in which this study attempts to overcome the lack of 
ideal data is by offering the empirical analyses in two stages, namely before and after 
migration. That is, by taking advantage of both newly available data and original data 
collection efforts, I offer before migration sections in both Chapters Two and Three.5 I 
utilize two different national random samples of Mexicans currently living in Mexico, 
one of which allows me to account for each respondent’s likelihood of migration to the 
United States. For the after migration section, I utilize four different datasets, which 
allow me to test the link between pre-migration political experiences and post-migration 
attitudes and behaviors. 
The rationale for incorporating the before migration analyses is straightforward. 
An argument can be made regarding the possibility that something about the immigration 
experience altered respondents’ views of Mexican politics while already living in the 
United States. As a means to address this latter possibility, this study compares the views 
                                                 
5 Data availability did not allow me to structure Chapter Four’s empirical analyses in the same 
manner. 
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of Mexicans now living in the United States with those who still reside in Mexico. The 
comparisons control for key demographics. Also, the analyses control for individuals’ 
likelihood of migration to the United States. If these individuals’ attitudes about Mexico 
(while still living in Mexico) are found to be connected with those concerning the United 
States political arena, the results would strongly suggest that views of Mexican politics 
are indeed causally prior to political engagement in the United States.  Moreover, recall 
that the second approach to imported socialization in the after migration portions of the 
analyses will entail modeling survey respondents’ pre-migration political experiences 
with data on the political climate in their nations of origin at the time that they left for the 
United States. For instance, does it matter for future political behavior if a Nicaraguan 
migrated during authoritarian rule, socialism or democracy? This approach should render 
a less precise account of individuals’ political views than does the one survey-based 
method. However, this alternate also offers a strong response to questions of causal order, 
as it cannot be, to take one example, that a person’s post-migration voting behavior in the 
United States caused the individual to flee the Somoza regime in the mid 1970s. Also, 
this approach would allow one to test whether democratic regimes equip individuals any 
better than authoritarian ones to become politically engaged after migration. Political 
engagement can be measured beyond electoral participation by incorporating other 
political acts as dependent variables. By the same token, this alternative approach would 
allow one to test whether democratic regimes produce citizens who are more likely to 
trust political institutions than their counterparts who are faced with authoritarian rule.   
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The Roadmap for the Study of Immigrants’ Political Suitcases 
The thesis outlined here is tested in the following chapters. Specifically, Chapters 
Two to Four are concerned with better understanding the process of immigrants’ 
imported socialization. The empirical tests developed and reported in each of these 
chapters address different facets of political behavior. Chapter Two is designed to 
provide a better understanding of the impact of the imported socialization process on 
immigrants’ political attitudes. Chapter Three aims for the same goal but concerning 
political predispositions, whereas Chapter Four focuses on political participation. The 
final chapter, Chapter Five, is divided into three sections. The first of these sections is 
meant to provide the reader with a brief review of this dissertation’s main findings and 
contributions to the discipline. However, the review of findings, rather than a mere 
summary, is an effort to suggest a broader framework regarding how the imported 
socialization process should shed light on (and help us reconsider) key concepts central to 
the study of individual political behavior. The second section advances my insights 
regarding what the following steps under this research agenda should be considering this 
study’s findings. I offer my thoughts as to how this study’s claims can be further tested 
and enhanced via subsequent inquiry. Finally, I conclude by discussing a few policy 
implications derived from the findings offered in the empirical chapters and the potential 
ways in which these findings may alter how political actors in the United States–and 
other immigrant nations--think of and approach the immigration and naturalization 
processes. My hope, of course, is that ultimately these findings will inform policy 
makers’ decisions, which in turn may result in improved institutions that facilitate and 
encourage the political acculturation of immigrants to this nation and around the globe. 
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Immigrants are living witnesses to the existence of an imported socialization 
process, and it is time to inform our understanding of this phenomenon with systematic 
empirical evidence. In his foreword to Barrio Ballots (de la Garza et al 1994), Sidney 
Verba points out that the recent waves of immigration to the United States are a “major 
natural experiment,” and yet, I claim, we have not taken full advantage of this social 
experiment to enhance our understanding regarding fundamental topics of relevance in an 
increasingly globalized world. The dissertation constitutes one key step in conducting 
research of the sort Verba envisions.  
The challenge of studying the effects of prior political socialization is 
considerable. My assessment is that development of a full account of how immigrants’ 
past experiences influence political behavior in the United States will require multiple 
complementary studies using multiple methodological strategies. Admittedly, the present 
dissertation is but one among the very many efforts required for the task at hand. 
However, my intention is that the following pages will join with contributions from other 
scholars to test more comprehensively the claims advanced here. If the reader finds the 
content of this dissertation an important first step in establishing clear links between 
views of immigrants’ old and new political worlds, my main goal when I first started on 
this research project will have been reached. 
26 
CHAPTER 2  
LOST IN TRANSLATION? 
IMMIGRANTS’ POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
  
The preceding chapter offers a theoretical rationale for why one should take into 
account immigrants’ political experiences in their countries of origin if one’s aim is to 
develop a complete understanding of these individuals’ political attitudes and behaviors 
once in their adopted homes. By introducing the concept of imported socialization, I 
intend to call scholarly attention to a relevant topic, which has remained largely 
underexplored mainly due to the combination of the prevalence of theories that center on 
post-migration experiences and the lack of ideal data to account for pre-migration factors. 
In the preceding chapter, I took the first steps toward development of a theory of political 
behavior that incorporates pre-migration factors. It also should be clear from the 
preceding chapter that overcoming the lack of ideal data in creative ways is in order. In 
the present chapter, I begin empirical exploration of the possible significance of pre-
migration experiences. The initial focus of attention is immigrants’ political attitudes. 
Specifically, I test the extent to which prior political experiences affect one’s political 
attitudes toward the United States government. Also, I assess whether this effect is of 
enduring or of fleeting nature.   
The present chapter is divided into three sections. The first offers my expectations 
regarding the connection between pre-migration political attitudes, such as trust in one’s 
country of origin, and immigrants’ political attitudes toward the U.S. government. The 
second section offers empirical tests devoted to understanding the effects of trust in 
Mexican political institutions on political attitudes towards American politics before 
migration. These empirical tests take place in a two-step process. First, I assess the extent 
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to which individuals’ trust in the U.S. government is explained by these individuals’ trust 
in the Mexican government. Next, I conduct a test to assess the extent to which trust in 
Mexican political institutions in general produces positive attitudes toward key political 
figures in the American political arena. The third section focuses on the post migration 
side of the story. First, I test whether immigrants’ levels of trust in the American 
government are indeed driven by in political institutions in a given individual’s country 
of origin. Second, I test whether individuals who are socialized under a more democratic 
context display higher levels of trust than their counterparts who were socialized under 
more authoritarian conditions. Following these analyses, I lay out some final 
considerations concerning the impact of prior political experiences on immigrants’ 
political attitudes towards the U.S. government. 
Can Political Attitudes Be Imported? The Expectations 
Scholars have long observed that attitudes toward government are politically 
consequential (e.g. Citrin 1974; Miller 1974; Citrin and Green 1986; Chanley et al 2000; 
Hetherington and Globetti 2002; Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Rudolph and Evans 
2005; Keele 2007; Rudolph 2009). Individuals who display higher levels of trust in 
government, for example, are more likely to hold more positive orientations toward 
elected officials (Hetherington 1998), which in turn makes these individuals more likely 
to become and remain engaged in the ebb and flow of the political system. The existence 
of relatively positive attitudes toward government translates into better prospects for 
engaged input from the citizenry to governing elites in a democratic setting. This is not to 
say that it never can be reasonable for citizens to hold critical views of government. In 
fact, some scholars would argue that a certain amount of skepticism is required for a 
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healthy democratic system to be in place. In other words, without skepticism, there is a 
risk that elites will take advantage of naively trusting citizens and misbehave (For an 
illustration, see Levi 1998). 
In the case of the American context, positive orientations toward government 
reached a high mark during the 1960s, but with the exception of a short window 
immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, public views of 
government have been much more negative ever since (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001; 
Hetherington 2005). This trend is present not only among the native-born population of 
the United States, but also among the first-generation immigrant cohorts (Michelson 
2007). The fact that first-generation immigrants display the same pattern of increasingly 
negative orientations toward the new host political system as their native-born 
counterparts is interesting for at least two reasons. First, one might wonder whether the 
United States’ political system is failing to provide these “recruits” (De Sipio 1996) with 
enough/proper institutional means to feel politically embraced by their new host country. 
Second, and more importantly for the core of my expectations in this study, the general 
pattern of decreasing trust begs the question whether it is possible that these immigrants’ 
political experiences before migration are coloring the way they come to understand and 
assess the institutions of the new political context after they crossed nations’ borders.  
Take as an illustration the concept of political trust. Michelson (2003, 2007) 
shows that there are different mechanisms through which Latino immigrants can become 
distrustful of American government. However, we still need to know what these 
immigrants’ baseline values of trust are as they enter the American polity. In other words, 
were these individuals already distrustful of political institutions in general when entering 
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the nation? Also, and not mutually exclusive, were they specifically distrustful of 
American government given their political experiences in their countries of origin?  
Political trust can be defined as “the degree to which people perceive that 
government is producing outcomes consistent with their expectations” (Hetherington 
2005: 9).6 Under this conceptualization, political trust encompasses two elements: 
expectations about government performance and the assessment of government 
outcomes. Although these two elements certainly can be updated as new events unfold 
and new information becomes available to individuals later in their lives once in 
America, both immigrants’ expectations about government performance and the 
standards by which immigrants assess government’s performance are potentially nurtured 
by their pre-migration political experiences.7
It is my central contention that immigrants do not cross nations’ borders as 
political blank slates. Instead, pre-migration political experiences may shape or modify 
the effects of political acculturation processes (Wilson 1973; Black 1987; Finifter and 
Finifter 1989).  If an individual immigrated to the United States from a country in Latin 
America where the views on U.S. foreign policy were generally negative, one should not 
                                                 
6 As pointed out by this author himself, Hetherington’s (2005) definition of political trust is in 
line with those works of Stokes (1962) and Coleman (1990). 
7 An argument can be made that Hetherington’s definition of trust is one which stresses the 
dynamic nature of trust by focusing on two elements that require individual’s information 
updating. Alternative definitions of political trust, such as Bianco’s (1994), stress out that trust is 
supposed to be present when constituents hold positive evaluations of their representatives 
regardless of the connection between actual outcomes and expectations. However, it should be 
noted that even when trust is conceptualized and characterized with the most dynamic nature, one 
cannot rule out a priori that the way immigrants form trusting/distrusting judgments of their new 
political home may be colored by their pre-migration political experiences.     
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assume that those pre-arrival attitudes will fade away easily just because the person now 
resides in the United States.8
A handful of hypothetical illustrations should help clarifying the logic of my 
argument and the empirical expectations of this chapter. Let me introduce you to some 
hypothetical immigrants who currently live in the United States. “Jose” and “Juan” were 
both born in Mexico, in the town of Los Mochis, in the State of Sinaloa. Jose grew up in 
the 1960s under the dominance of the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI). There 
was certainly political activity in Los Mochis, where he lived all of his life until he 
decided to migrate“al otro lado.”9 However, all of the political activity Jose encountered 
centered on only one party, the PRI. By contrast, Juan grew up during the Mexican 
transition to democracy. This stage of Mexican political history was marked by the urge 
for and need of political change. Electoral vibrancy and heightened expectations of 
political competitiveness were the norm rather than the exception. In fact, Juan actually 
witnessed the PRI losing some elections at the local and the state levels before he 
migrated to the United States. Now, let me introduce you to “Nacho.” Nacho was also 
born and grew up in Los Mochis in the 1960s.  However, Jose and Nacho have a 
significant political dissimilarity. Jose was an active member of the local PRI youth 
organization before migrating, whereas Nacho never became engaged in party politics at 
all. The political socialization Jose experienced, although authoritarian in nature, still 
may have allowed him to believe that he could trust the political system. This is a belief 
                                                 
8 While it is plausible that the individual’s political knowledge could have increased and sources 
of information could have changed, one cannot assume a priori that individual’s pre-arrival 
attitudes will necessarily fade. 
9 “Al otro lado” is a very common phrase used among Mexican immigrants to the U.S.: it refers 
to the fact that they have crossed “to the other side” (literal translation of “al otro lado”) of the 
border.  
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that Nacho did not develop. This latter example illustrates the first of this chapter’s 
prediction regarding the impact of imported socialization on an immigrant’s political 
attitudes towards the political institutions in a new nation following migration. Higher 
levels of trust in the political institutions of their countries of origin increase the 
likelihood that immigrants to the U.S. will exhibit political trust in the American 
government. 
After considering their backgrounds, one can say that our hypothetical immigrants 
“Jose” and “Nacho” were socialized under a more authoritarian context than the one 
under which “Juan” grew up. Immigrants are exposed to and socialized under different 
political contexts depending upon their age and countries of origin. Countries do not 
necessarily remain stable over time. Particularly, countries with transitions to democracy 
and political upheavals may provide their citizens with very different political 
experiences even within relatively short periods of time. As outlined in the introductory 
chapter, immigrants from the same country of origin may display differences in attitudes 
toward politics, differences that largely hinge upon the degree of democracy under which 
they were first politicized. In turn, exposure to more or less democratic regimes could 
bring differences in individuals’ levels of trust in the country of origin’s political 
institutions, which in turn might have an effect on levels of trust toward American 
political institutions once immigrants have landed and unpacked in their new home.  
In general, one should expect that immigrants coming from more democratic 
contexts should display lower levels of trust towards American political institutions than 
their counterparts coming from more authoritarian contexts for at least two reasons. First, 
consider the novelty element. People coming from less democratic contexts, such as 
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Nacho, might have hopeful expectations regarding their civic life in the new host country. 
They might even have chosen the United States as a migration destination precisely on 
the basis of aspirations of more political freedom. This element should not be present 
among individuals, like Juan, who already have been exposed to the benefits (and 
disappointments) of the workings of democracy. Second, there is a skepticism factor to 
be considered as well. Immigrants who were socialized under more democratic regimes 
might be relatively more aware of the fact that democratic systems –let alone a 
transitional regime- have problems of their own, and that even in a well-greased 
democracy political outcomes are achieved in a rather slow-paced fashion. Thus, 
arguably, immigrants who come from more democratic contexts should be more likely to 
be skeptical of American political institutions from the very moment they enter this 
nation. This contextual effect experienced in their country of origin might in turn affect 
Juan’s and Nacho’s individual levels of political trust. If this is indeed the case, all else 
being equal, Nacho should display higher levels of trust in American political institutions 
than Juan does. Simply put, immigrants who come from more democratic contexts should 
be less trustful of American political institutions than their counterparts coming from 
more authoritarian democratic contexts. 
The two different conceptualizations of imported socialization outlined here 
follow the theoretical framework offered earlier in the introductory chapter. It is 
important to recall, however, that these two different approaches are not mutually 
exclusive. Thus, it could be that both regime type and trust in one’s country of origin’s 
political institutions matter once the individual migrates to the United States. Moreover, 
although different in nature, both approaches –individually and combined— attempt to 
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provide strong support for this dissertation’s central contention: immigrants’ prior 
political experiences are consequential for these individuals’ attitudes and behaviors once 
in the United States. 
Another glance to our hypothetical immigrants’ experiences will reveal additional 
insights regarding key aspects of the imported socialization process. The following 
illustration concerns not the process itself but rather for whom this process works. I 
contend that the impact of pre-migration factors on post-migration political behavior 
should be strongest for immigrants with relatively lower levels of education or political 
sophistication. Recall the discussion in the introductory chapter regarding the psychology 
of socialization, where I interpreted socialization in terms of cognitive efficiency. 
According to this framework, it should follow that trying to make sense of politics in a 
second, or post-migration, national context should be made easier and more efficient by 
drawing on lessons from prior political experiences. In other words, the impact of pre-
migration experiences should be greatest for those individuals who are most in need of 
assistance in making sense of politics in their new nation. Whereas immigrants who are 
highly educated and/or highly sophisticated should be able to decide whether or not to 
trust the U.S. political institutions on their own terms and rights, immigrants with lower 
levels of education are expected to be more prone to engage in analogical reasoning, thus 
directly translating their levels of trust from one context to the other. 
Finally, if one acknowledges that political trust is an attitude which can 
experience change over time, one should not expect –at least not a priori— that the initial 
levels of trust displayed by immigrants as they enter the United States will remain intact 
as these individuals’ civic lives unfold in their new host nation. Take for instance the case 
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of our hypothetical immigrants. Nacho should be the most hopeful of the three of these 
hypothetical immigrants in terms of novelty of the U.S. political system. In other words, 
Nacho is the most hopeful granted two conditions. First, he was disengaged from politics 
in Mexico precisely due to his disappointment in the way politics were conducted there, 
in his country of origin. Second, now that he has crossed the border to the United States, 
Nacho’s expectations on the American political system are high because in his mind, U.S. 
politics are very novel to him; they seem to be conducted in the most different way when 
contrasted with Mexico’s politics and therefore his expectations in his new host country 
are driving a sense of hope regarding both the new political setting and the way his own 
engagement in politics might be worthy. If as time goes by, and contrary to his 
expectations, Nacho finds himself exposed to a political setting with imperfections that 
trigger memories of why he was disengaged from politics in Mexico in the first place, 
one should expect him to start displaying lower levels of trust with the passage of time.  
In contrast with Nacho, Juan might be the most skeptical at the beginning of his 
civic life in America, for at least two reasons. On the one hand, although Juan 
experienced electoral vibrancy and shifts in power during the Mexican transition to 
democracy, this exposure could have led him to believe that corruption was a problem 
that not only pertained to the former single-ruling-party, the PRI, but also to politics in 
general. On the other hand, Juan might have come to believe that Mexican democracy 
reached a stage that not even the U.S. democratic system has to offer him. For instance, a 
multi-party system might look more attractive than a two-party system after so many 
years of PRI rule. Under the first scenario, Juan’s expectations regarding the U.S. system 
should not be as high and therefore disappointment is less likely to occur. Under the 
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second alternative, Juan might come to realize that the two-party system works just fine. 
Note however that, taking into consideration their prior political experiences, under either 
of these two routes, Juan should be expected to have relatively higher levels of trust than 
Nacho as years go by. In sum, the effects of political experiences in one’s country of 
origin on political trust in the United States are likely to attenuate over time. 
If we ask “can political attitudes be imported?” our intuitive answer should be 
yes. I would certainly expect that all of our hypothetical immigrants, Jose, Juan, and 
Nacho, consciously or not, packed their suitcase of political trust and brought it along 
when they crossed the border and entered the United States. Hence, by accounting for 
variance in pre-migration attitudes and experiences, I contend that we will be able to 
develop more comprehensive accounts of immigrants’ political attitudes and actions in 
the United States.  
The empirical analyses offered below are divided into two main sections: before 
and after migration. For the before migration section of this chapter’s analyses, I utilize 
two different national random samples of Mexicans currently living in Mexico, one of 
which allows me to account for each respondent’s likelihood of migration to the United 
States. For the after migration section, I utilize the MVS 2003. I begin with pre-migration 
data, with tests regarding both trust in the U.S. government and opinion about President 
Bush.  
Attitudes towards the U.S. Government before Migration 
According to the National Bank of Mexico’s (Banamex) Division for Economic 
and Sociopolitical Studies 2003 Mexican Values Survey (MVS 2003), the Mexican public 
mostly revealed having “no trust at all” in the U.S. Government (42.7 percent of 
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respondents) or trusting it “not very much” (35.1 percent); roughly two out of ten 
respondents expressed trusting the U.S. government “somewhat” (18.2 percent), and only 
a handful (4.0 percent) revealed trusting it “a great deal.” In Table 2.1, we see that these 
data seem to suggest a connection between attitudes towards the Mexican Government 
and attitudes towards the U.S. government. The first empirical task of this chapter is to 
pursue this matter in further depth.  
Trust in the U.S. Government before Migration 
As I have argued, there is reason to believe that individuals who display higher 
levels of trust in their own country’s political institutions will display higher levels of 
trust elsewhere. In fact, my core thesis posits that by holding positive political attitudes in 
one nation the person will become relatively likely to form positive orientations in other 
contexts following migration. In short, one should expect individuals who hold higher 
levels of trust in any country to be more likely than their counterparts who hold lower 
levels of trust to develop relatively higher levels of trust in American political 
institutions.  
The MVS 2003 sample of Mexicans living in Mexico contains one item asking 
respondents about their levels of trust in the U.S. government. This item permits me to 
test whether those individuals who hold any sort of trust in the Mexican government are 
more likely to exhibit higher levels of trust in the U.S. government even before 
migration. Specifically, respondents were asked “how much trust” they have in a number 
of institutions, including the U.S. government. The dependent variable is constructed as 
follows. Responses are recoded, with a value of 0 indicating that the respondent 
expressed “no trust at all” in the U.S. government (42.7 percent of respondents), 1 
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indicating that the respondent trusts the U.S. government “not very much” (35.1 percent), 
2, that the respondent trusts it “somewhat” (18.2 percent), and 3 that the respondent has 
“a great deal” of trust (4.0 percent). 
 The chief independent variable in this model is an index of trust in the three 
different levels of government in Mexico. Table 2.2 displays the descriptive statistics for 
the three items included on the survey regarding trust in the three levels of government in 
Mexico. The striking similarity suggests that respondents perhaps did not differentiate 
greatly across levels of government. A factor analysis was then run to assess whether all 
of the items could be used to build an index of trust in the Mexican government. The 
items loaded on a single factor, with a minimum factor loading of 0.86; the items 
combine to form a reliable scale with an alpha of 0.92. A simple additive index was 
constructed, adopting a minimum value of zero and a maximum of nine, where zero 
indicates the lowest level of trust and nine stands for the highest level of trust. The 
expectation here is that respondents who are more trusting in the Mexican government 
will be relatively more likely to display higher levels of trust in the United States 
government. Additional variables included in the model are attentiveness to the news, 
interpersonal trust, efficacy, age, education, income, and frequency of attendance at 
religious services. An interaction between attentiveness to the news and the index of trust 
in Mexican levels of government is also included in the model. This interaction is 
included in recognition of the possibility that exposure to information will influence the 
respondent’s propensity to link views concerning different national governments. With 
more information, people should be less likely to connect views of the Mexican and U.S. 
political systems. 
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Interpersonal trust is measured with an indicator variable to account for whether 
each respondent believed “most people” can be trusted, coded 1 (9.9 percent) for yes and 
0 if otherwise.10 This is an important control variable, because it helps me to account for 
the possibility that people vary in their general tendencies to be trusting. Inclusion of this 
control therefore minimizes the risk that any association detected between trust in the 
Mexican and U.S. governments is spurious, tracing to a general inclination rather than a 
specific linkage between the two political trust judgments.11 Efficacy is measured with an 
item in which respondents were asked to assess whether citizens can have an influence on 
government by engaging in different political activities. The item is a four-category 
response one, where 1 indicates the lowest level and 4 indicates the highest level. 
Attentiveness to the news is measured with an additive index, which ranges from 0 to 12, 
built with data from four different four-category response items concerning TV, radio, 
newspapers, and talk with others. Income reflects estimates of respondents’ household 
income in thousands of pesos per month. The mid point of the range of every category 
was the value assigned for every respondent. The resulting variable contains some 
measurement error, but I have no reason to believe it to be systematic. And the variable is 
now in a metric with interval and ratio properties. In the case of education, the variable 
values reflect the number of completed school years by every respondent. Upper cap 
values were assigned when any given level was indicated as complete. However, if 
                                                 
10 The original item’s answers in the survey are “yes” or “no.”   
11 The control variable is helpful in this regard, but it should be clear that even with the control 
for interpersonal trust, caution will be needed in interpreting the coefficient on the Mexican trust 
variable. First, given the skewed distribution on the control, coupled with the fact that it is a 
dichotomous measure, it clearly does not provide an ideal representation of the general tendency 
to be trusting. Second, and less problematically, I cannot rule out the possibility of reverse 
causality. It is possible—but certainly not likely—that respondents in Mexico draw on their 
attitudes about the U.S. government when forming appraisals of the Mexican political system, 
thereby reversing the causal arrow. 
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respondents indicated truncated studies at the elementary level, they were assigned with 
the mid point value between no studies and completed elementary. The same coding rule 
was applied to all subsequent levels. Religious attendance was also recoded following the 
logic of the income and education categorical variables and produced a measure that 
provides an estimate number of days per year the respondent attended religious services. 
For instance, if respondents indicated attending once a week they were assigned a value 
of 52. Table 1 in Appendix D displays the descriptive statistics for all of the variables 
included in the model.  
As shown in Table 2.3, the results of the ordered logit regression analysis indicate 
that trust in the U.S. government is indeed driven, as expected, by individuals’ levels of 
trust in the Mexican government. In other words, the coefficient for Trust in the Mexican 
Government is positive, and statistically significant. This result holds after controlling for 
levels of interpersonal trust and efficacy. Figure 2.1 illustrates the impact of trust in the 
Mexican government on trust in the U.S. government in yet a clearer manner. Among 
those individuals with the lowest levels of trust in the Mexican government, the predicted 
probability of holding any level of trust in the U.S. government is just above 40 percent. 
This figure more than doubles, reaching 90 percent among those individuals with the 
highest levels of trust in the Mexican government. In short, holding the highest level of 
trust in the Mexican government makes individuals over twice as likely as their 
counterparts with the lowest level of trust in the Mexican government to display any kind 
of trust in the U.S. government before migration.   
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Opinion on President Bush before Migration 
Thus far, I have focused my attention and analyses on political trust. However, the 
rationale of my theoretical framework applies equally well to a broader set of political 
attitudes. Let us turn our attention to another political attitude concerning American 
politics: an individual’s opinion regarding the president of the United States. According 
to a national survey of the Mexican public’s political attitudes conducted by Reforma 
newspaper’s Department of Survey Research during November of 2007 (Reforma 2007), 
roughly six out of every ten respondents expressed an unfavorable opinion about 
President George Bush (59.9 percent), one of out ten expressed a neutral opinion (11.0 
percent), and the rest expressed a favorable opinion (29.1 percent).12 My second 
empirical task in this chapter is to test the extent to which this opinion is influenced by 
levels of trust in Mexican political institutions. 
 The dependent variable for this portion of my analyses is built using this item. 
Responses were originally coded in a scale that ranges from 0 to 10, where a value of 0 
was used to indicate the most unfavorable opinion and a value of 10 indicates the most 
favorable opinion. The descriptive statistics for this dependent variable are offered in 
Table 2 in Appendix D. 
 The main independent variable in this model is an index of trust in different 
political institutions in Mexico, namely: the Supreme Court, the Senate, the Chamber of 
Deputies, the Federal Institute of Elections, and political parties in general. The five 
original survey items each included four response options. These were recoded, assigning 
                                                 
12 Responses to this item were originally coded in a scale that ranges from 0 to 10, where a value 
of 0 was used to indicate the most unfavorable opinion and a value of 10 indicates the most 
favorable opinion. For the sake of simplicity, in the above summary, I am taking 0-4 to mean 
unfavorable, 5 to be neutral, and 6-10 to mean favorable. 
 
41 
a value of 0 to indicate the lowest level of trust and a value of 3 for the highest level. 
Table 2.4 displays the descriptive statistics for these five items. I ran a factor analysis to 
assess whether these five items could be used to build an index of trust in Mexican 
political institutions. The items loaded on a single factor, with a minimum factor loading 
of 0.54; the items combine to form a reliable scale with an alpha of 0.83. A simple 
additive index was constructed, adopting a minimum value of zero and a maximum of 
fifteen, where zero indicates the lowest level of trust and fifteen stands for the highest 
level of trust. The expectation again is that respondents who are more trusting in Mexican 
political institutions will be relatively more likely to display more positive attitudes 
toward  United States politics, in this case specifically toward President George Bush. 
The model also includes a measure of likelihood of migration, in order to account for the 
possibility that individuals who are more likely to migrate to the United States may be 
inclined to be more trusting of the U.S. presidency. Additional variables included in the 
model are attentiveness to the news, age, education, income, and frequency of attendance 
at religious services. In this case, of course, a control for presidential approval in Mexico 
is deemed important. Also, an interaction term between attentiveness to the news and the 
index of trust in Mexican political institutions is included in the model. A measure of 
interpersonal trust was not available in this dataset.  
Originally, likelihood of migration13 is a self-assessed four-category response 
item that ranges from “not at all likely” to “very likely.” This item was recoded to be 
incorporated in the model as three different indicator variables: “very likely,” “somewhat 
likely,” and “not very likely.” The reference category is “not at all likely.” Attentiveness 
to the news is measured with an additive index, which ranges from 0 to 15, built upon 
                                                 
13 For a detailed account of the validity of this measure, please see Appendix A. 
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five different four-category response items concerning TV, radio, newspapers, talk with 
others, and the internet. Income again reflects estimates of respondents’ household 
income in thousand of pesos per month. The mid point of the range of every category was 
the value assigned for every respondent. In the case of education, the variable values 
reflect the maximum number of completed school years by every respondent. Religious 
attendance was recoded producing a measure that provides an estimate of the number of 
days per year the respondent attended religious services. Table 2 in Appendix D displays 
the descriptive statistics for all of the variables included in this model.  
As shown in Table 2.5, the results of the OLS regression analysis indicate that 
trust in Mexican political institutions influences individuals’ opinion about President 
George Bush. The coefficient for the Index of Trust in Mexican Political Institutions is 
positive, and statistically significant. Moreover, this result holds after controlling for 
approval of the Mexican president and for likelihood of migration. Figure 2.2 illustrates 
the impact of trust in Mexican political institutions on individuals’ opinion concerning 
the president of the United States. Among those individuals with the lowest levels of trust 
in Mexican political institutions, the expected score for President Bush on the eleven-
point favorability scale is 2.63. By contrast, the expected opinion on President Bush 
among those individuals with the highest levels of trust in Mexican political institutions 
reaches a mark of 5.87. In short, there is an effect of more than three full points.  
Up to this point, I have provided empirical evidence in support of my contention 
that even before migration individuals’ political attitudes toward their country of origin’s 
political institutions influence their orientations toward the U.S. political stage and actors. 
First, I showed how trust in the Mexican government indeed helps account for levels of 
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trust in the U.S. government. Next, I showed how trust in Mexican political institutions 
affects individuals’ opinion about the president of the United States. In the following 
section, I offer the empirical tests regarding the after migration side of my core story.    
Attitudes towards the U.S. Government after Migration 
The analyses in this section rely upon the National Bank of Mexico’s (Banamex) 
Division for Economic and Sociopolitical Studies 2003 Mexican Values Survey (MVS 
2003). The next subsection will focus only on Mexican immigrants. The following one 
will shift attention to Latino immigrants in general, as data availability permits me to do 
so. The analyses offered in both of portions of the analysis approaches the imported 
socialization phenomenon by studying the same key dependent variable, namely political 
trust in the U.S. government.  
Political trust in both subsections is operationalized as an index of immigrants’ 
levels of trust in the three different levels of government in the United States. However, 
the effects of imported socialization are tested utilizing two different approaches. Under 
the first approach, imported socialization is operationalized as immigrants’ levels of trust 
in the country of origin’s government. As noted before, data availability restricts my 
analyses to only the Mexican immigrants’ subsample. Under the second approach, 
imported socialization is operationalized as the degree of democracy (or lack thereof) that 
the individual encountered during the early years of childhood and those of young 
adulthood in the country of origin. In this case, given data availability, the analyses are 
conducted considering the full sample of Latino immigrants. 
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Political Trust: Echoes from Abroad 
The MVS 2003 includes three items regarding trust in government in the United 
States (at the federal, state and local levels) as well as a measure of trust in the Mexican 
government.14 Table 2.6 displays the descriptive statistics for the three items regarding 
trust in the United States. Just as in the case of Mexicans still living in Mexico, the 
Mexican immigrants in the sample apparently did not differentiate greatly across levels of 
government as suggested by the striking similarities of the distributions of these 
variables.15 A factor analysis was then run to assess whether all of the items could be 
used to build an index for trust in American government. The items loaded on a single 
factor, with a minimum factor loading of 0.81; the items combine to form a reliable scale 
with an alpha of 0.90. A simple additive index was constructed, adopting a minimum 
value of zero and a maximum of nine16, where zero indicates the lowest level of trust and 
nine stands for the highest level of trust. This additive index of “Trust in U.S. 
Government” is the dependent variable used in the following empirical tests.  
                                                 
14 First-generation immigrants were administered the survey questionnaire in their language of 
preference, namely, either Spanish or English. Roughly seven out of ten preferred to be 
interviewed in Spanish (69.8 percent). In Spanish, the question wording utilizes the term 
“confianza,” which properly translated into English should be “trust.” However, the English 
version of the questionnaire incorporated the term “confidence.” In an effort to determine whether 
this question wording may have altered the results, I compared the distribution of the dependent 
variable across groups. The distributions are substantively similar. In addition, I re-ran the 
analyses incorporating an indicator variable to account for the preferred language for the 
interview, with a value of 1 to indicate if the interview was conducted in English and a value of 0 
if it was conducted in Spanish. Although, the sign of the coefficient was negative, which is in line 
with other research suggesting that acculturation (measured here with English language skills) 
generally leads to more distrusting attitudes toward the U.S. government, the coefficient for this 
indicator variable did not attain statistical significance.    
15 In a related paper, Tom Rudolph and I explore these three items as different dependent 
variables and also explore a different manner to account for acculturation and the interaction 
between imported socialization and acculturation processes. Please, see Wals and Rudolph 
(2008).  
16 Responses to the three original items were arbitrarily coded 1 “none at all” through 4 “a great 
deal.” They were rescaled to range from 0 to 3 and then summed, giving a final range from 0 to 9.   
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 Trust in the Mexican government, the key predictor, is measured with responses 
from a four-category item. This item was recoded to obtain a set of indicator variables:  
“A Great Deal”, “Somewhat”, and “Not Very Much” – using “None at All” as the 
reference category. 
Considering the possibility that the impact of pre-migration political experiences 
attenuates over time, the initial models, reported in Table 2.7, include a count of years 
spent in the United States. In a second round of tests, depicted in Table 2.8, the count of 
years spent in the United States is included along with interactions between this variable 
and the set of indicator variables of trust in the Mexican government. Regarding the 
possibility that the impact of pre-migration political experiences is strongest among the 
least educated, the model in Table 2.7 includes interaction terms between education and 
the set of indicator variables accounting for different levels of trust in the Mexican 
government. Additional variables included in the models are age upon arrival, 
interpersonal trust, efficacy, income, education, and frequency of attendance at religious 
services.  
Here again, interpersonal trust is measured with an indicator variable to account 
for whether each respondent believed “most people” can be trusted, coded 1 for yes and 0 
if otherwise. Efficacy is measured with a four-category response item, where 1 indicates 
the lowest level and 4 indicates the highest level. Income reflects estimates of 
respondents’ household income in thousand of dollars per year. The mid point of the 
range of every category was the value assigned for every respondent. In the case of 
education, the variable values reflect the number of completed school years by every 
respondent. Upper cap values were assigned when any given level was indicated as 
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complete. Religious attendance17 was also recoded to obtain an estimate number of days 
attended per year for every respondent. In order to account for language skills two 
indicator variables were operationalized, bilingual and English dominant at home, where 
the reference category is Spanish dominant at home. These indicators are included in the 
analyses as proxies for immigrants’ acculturation in the new communities. Table 3 in 
Appendix D displays the corresponding descriptive statistics for all of the variables 
included in the models.  
As I have contended elsewhere, immigrants who express trust in the government 
of their country of origin will be more likely to express trust in their new nation following 
migration. Also, I have argued that this effect should be strongest among immigrants with 
relatively lower levels of education or sophistication. Finally, I have posited that the 
effect of trust in one’s country of origin’s government is likely to attenuate over time. 
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 present results of three OLS regression models designed to test these 
predictions. The first two models, included in Table 2.7, offer the central test. The third 
one, included in Table 2.8, is an attempt to account for the possibility of attenuation of 
effects over time, acknowledging the limitations of the cross-sectional nature of the data 
at hand. Results demonstrate that political experiences travel with immigrants. In other 
words, immigrants do import their political attitudes. The inclusion of an “Interpersonal 
Trust” control variable in the model boosts confidence regarding this claim. A logical 
counterargument to my interpretation of the core finding is that more trusting people in 
any given setting will be more trusting elsewhere once they have crossed nations’ 
                                                 
17 This variable was recoded in two different ways. The first procedure is denoted in the body of 
the text. The second one was a binary option, where regular attendants are differentiated from 
non-regulars. Regular attendants are here defined as those who attend religious services one or 
more times per week. Regardless of the two different recoding schemes, this control variable 
rendered substantively similar and statistically identical results. 
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borders18. However plausible this explanation may be, the persistence of my finding after 
controlling for interpersonal trust suggests that individuals who came to trust political 
institutions in their countries of origin are indeed more likely to become trusting of 
political institutions in the United States (or another host country) regardless of any 
variance in their more general tendencies to be trusting.    
Recall that the dependent variable has values ranging from 0 to 9. Trust in the 
Mexican government, the key independent variable, is coded as a set of indicator 
variables for distinct (ordered) responses, namely: “A Great Deal”, “Somewhat”, and 
“Not Very Much”, with “”None at All” as the reference category. Thus, as can be seen in 
Figure 2.3, as trust in the Mexican government rises from its lowest to its highest 
category, the predicted trust in government in the United States increases by more than 
one full point on the nine-point scale. Contrary to my expectations, though, the model in 
Table 2.8 reveals no evidence whatsoever that this effect diminishes over time. This is 
easily confirmed when contrasting the predicted levels of trust in the U.S. government for 
immigrants who have spent one year in the United States with the predicted levels of 
those immigrants who have spent already 17 years in their new home, as also depicted in 
Figure 2.3. Also, contrary to my expectations, the results in Table 2.7 provide no 
evidence that the effects of imported political trust are any stronger for immigrants with 
                                                 
18 Consistent with my thesis, some research on social capital (Putnam 1995; 2000) suggests a 
possible transference of trust across contexts. My argument is that this transference occurs 
because the effects of prior socialization experiences endure following migration. An alternate 
possibility is that trust is partly rooted in forces apart from socialization, such as personality (e.g., 
Mondak and Halperin 2008). Controlling for interpersonal trust addresses any general tendency 
of some individuals to be more trusting than others. Importantly, note that even if trust is 
influenced by factors such as personality, the implication would be the same regarding my 
general thesis that immigrants do not come to the United States as political blank slates. 
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relatively low levels of education when contrasted with their counterparts who hold 
higher levels of education.   
Political Trust: Democratic vs. Authoritarian Socialization 
The key independent variable in the models included in this section’s analyses is 
the construct of “imported socialization.” The challenge is then apparent: if we are to find 
any relationship between immigrants’ political attitudes toward the U.S. government and 
the political context under which these individuals were politicized, how are we to 
capture the country of origin’s political context? Here, I define immigrants’ imported 
socialization via context in terms of gradations of democracy (Elkins 2000). In order to 
measure such gradations, the analysis draws upon the Polity IV dataset scores.  
The measure of “imported socialization” was constructed by calculating, for every 
respondent, an average of the Polity scores for their country of origin, factoring in their 
age upon arrival and the year of arrival in the United States. In order to reflect only the 
earlier socialization process, the measure only takes into consideration Polity scores for 
up to the first 18 years of the respondent’s life. It should be clear that with this 
construction, the measure is intended to capture the effects of pre-adult socialization. 
However, given data availability constraints for the study of pre-migratory political 
experiences’ effects on post-migration attitudes and behavior, this construct offers an 
important opportunity to shed light on a yet much unexplored area of our discipline.  
An alternative to measure pre-migratory context could have been the use of a 
hierarchical linear model analysis with focus on a fixed indicator of context, but the 
individualized measure, I argue, is a better approach for at least two reasons. On the one 
hand, the n of some countries of origin is very small and one cannot simply assume that 
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individuals from those nations are necessarily representative of the immigrant groups 
coming from those countries of origin; on the other hand, the imported socialization 
construct tries to capture the lasting imprint that the context surrounding these 
immigrants during their early socialization experiences left on them. This individual 
imprint should be best captured by individualized scores rather than country-level ones 
because respondents differ in both year of birth and year of migration. Table 1 in 
Appendix B displays how much variance the imported socialization construct 
encompasses among immigrants from the same country of origin for each of the 19 
countries of origin available in the MVS 2003 survey. Although this variable has a 
conceptual minimum value of zero and a maximum of 20, the actual observed values, 
range only from 1 to 20.  
In order to keep the results of these models, shown in Table 2.9, comparable to 
the models offered earlier in the preceding subsection of this chapter, additional variables 
include a count of years spent in the United States, interpersonal trust, efficacy, age upon 
arrival, income, education, and frequency of attendance at religious services. An 
interaction term between the imported socialization measure and the count of years spent 
in the United States is included to test for the possibility of attenuation effects over time. 
Finally, the two indicator variables bilingual and English dominant at home, where the 
reference category is Spanish dominant at home, were included to account for language 
skills and as a proxy for immigrants’ degree of acculturation. 
The results of the OLS regression analysis displayed in Table 2.9 provide support 
for my original expectations. The negative sign on the coefficient for imported 
socialization indicates that individuals who are politicized under more democratic 
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contexts are indeed more likely to display relatively lower levels of trust in the U.S. 
government than their counterparts who are politicized under more authoritarian 
conditions. However, the coefficient of imported socialization does not attain statistical 
significance in the model without interactions. When the possibility of attenuation of 
effects over time is considered, the coefficient still possesses a negative sign, as expected, 
and it reaches statistical significance. Moreover, the interaction term between the count of 
years spent in the United States and the construct of imported socialization has a positive 
sign and it attains statistical significance as well. In other words, both the expectation 
regarding the impact of imported socialization on trust in the U.S. government and the 
expectation concerning attenuation of effects receive corroboration. 
Figure 2.4 illustrates the latter points even further. Let us focus on immigrants 
who have arrived recently in America, first. Among those individuals who were exposed 
to the most democratic conditions during their early socialization years, the expected 
level of trust in the U.S. government is 3.81. Recall that the scale ranges from 0 to 9. By 
contrast, the expected level of trust in the U.S. government among those individuals who 
were politicized under the most authoritarian conditions is 5.49. This is to say that there 
is a difference of almost two full points on a ten-point scale between individuals whose 
prior political experience was starkly different. Once again, the clear lesson is that 
immigrants do travel with political suitcases. Next, consider the expected levels of trust 
in the U.S. government among those immigrants who have spent an average of 17 years 
in their new host country. Although the pattern remains the same, the gap between 
expected levels of trust for immigrants who were politicized under the most democratic 
conditions versus those who were politicized under the most authoritarian conditions 
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narrows to only .40 of a point: the expected levels of trust is 5.06 and 5.46, respectively. 
Although this result is in line with my expectation regarding potential attenuation effects 
over time, it is admittedly a result which contradicts one of the processes through which 
the attenuation was expected to occur: the novelty effect. Whereas it is true that among 
“new arrival” immigrants one can say that the most hopeful are the ones with 
authoritarian backgrounds, one also need to acknowledge that precisely among these 
individuals with authoritarian backgrounds their levels of trust in the U.S. government 
look remarkably similar regardless of how many years they have spent in the United 
States.   
Conclusions 
The main thesis posited in this work is that immigrants’ political experiences 
concerning their countries of origin will influence post-migration political attitudes, 
predispositions and behaviors once these individuals cross nations’ borders. This thesis 
encompasses multiple facets of political life. The first one of those facets has been 
examined in this chapter, namely political attitudes. I examined whether levels of trust in 
the country of origin’s government influences an individual’s broader views of the 
political sphere, including trust in the U.S. government. Also, I tested whether prior 
political experiences, defined in contextual terms, have an impact on levels of trust in the 
U.S. government.  
In this chapter, I showed that trust in one’s country of origin’s government 
increases the prospects of becoming more trusting of the American government following 
migration. Acknowledging the limitations of the cross-sectional nature of the data, the 
analyses presented hints to the possibility that the “imported trust” effect might not wane 
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with the passage of time. Results also provided support for this chapter’s contention that 
trust in the U.S. government is at least partially explained by the level of democracy 
encountered during the socialization process in one’s country of origin. Immigrants who 
were socialized under highly democratic regimes exhibit less trust in government once 
they arrive in the United States. Bearing in mind these initial findings regarding political 
attitudes, let me focus now on another matter: whether an immigrant’s political 
predispositions in the country of origin influence the prospects that the individual will be 
politically engaged once in the United States. 
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CHAPTER 3  
TRAVELING HEARTS AND MINDS:  
IMMIGRANTS’ POLITICAL PREDISPOSITIONS 
 
 Partisanship and ideology long have stood as cornerstones of American politics. 
Scores of scholars have devoted decades of effort to understanding the antecedents and 
consequences of ideological preferences and partisan attachments. Although the 
significance of these phenomena is well established, our understanding of the origins of 
both ideology and partisanship potentially could be improved. My interest, of course, is 
in the development of ideological preference and partisan attachments among immigrants 
to the United States. In the previous chapter, we saw that immigrants’ levels of political 
trust in the United States are influenced by trust in their nations of origin. In short, trust is 
at least in part imported. Building on this same logic, the present chapter considers 
whether ideology and partisanship in one’s nation of origin influence an immigrant’s 
political views and level of political engagement once the person comes to the United 
States.  
The rationale motivating the analyses reported in this chapter will be outlined here 
with focus on partisanship, but it should be clear that a very similar perspective also 
applies to ideology. Under the same logic by which an immigrant relies upon imported 
trust, and as outlined in the introductory chapter, I hypothesize that the immigrant also 
might utilize (consciously or not) imported partisan attachments. In fact, it is hard to 
imagine the opposite situation, where all of what an individual learned regarding political 
parties in the country of origin suffers a sudden black out by the mere act of migrating to 
a new nation. Here, I argue that the immigrant might draw on partisan attachments in the 
nation of origin in both a general (intensity) and a specific (directionality) manner.  
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Concerning intensity, the immigrant who held a partisan attachment in the country 
of origin, regardless of the party’s ideological placement on the political continuum, 
should hold the role of parties in a nation’s political life in relatively high regard. 
Therefore, the presence of a partisan attachment in the country of origin should make this 
immigrant more likely to develop a sense of attachment with one of the parties in the new 
setting. In short, in general terms, the person who is a partisan in one country is expected 
to once again become a partisan following migration; conversely, the individual who 
refrained from developing a partisan affiliation in the nation of origin should be relatively 
unlikely to become a partisan following migration. 
Regarding directionality, by developing partisan affiliations, people place 
themselves on a political continuum. A partisan attachment both summarizes and 
organizes the individual’s political views. In the extreme case, I believe it would be 
illogical to suppose that a person who supported a leftist party before migration would be 
equally likely to side with a party on the left, right or center once in a new nation. But if 
we view immigrants as political blank slates, then we must acknowledge no continuity in 
their political views as they move from one nation to another. My thesis stands at odds 
with the depiction of immigrants as blank slates. In terms of directionality, I predict that 
the partisan in one nation will gravitate toward a party espousing similar views following 
migration. 
The present chapter is divided into five sections. The first offers a brief recount of 
the theoretical rationale for why one should pay attention to pre-migration political 
predispositions in order to understand more fully immigrants’ partisan preferences once 
in the United States. The second and third sections offer empirical tests devoted to 
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understanding the effects of Mexican partisan attachments and ideological 
predispositions on preferences regarding American parties before migration. More 
precisely, it is tested whether a partisan attachment helps explain an individual’s potential 
to become politically engaged with the American parties. These empirical tests occur in 
two steps. The second section focuses on intensity, whereas the third section takes up the 
issues of directionality. The fourth and fifth sections explore the extent to which partisan 
attachments and ideological predispositions among Mexicans after migration to the 
United States predict patterns in electoral participation in American elections. The 
analyses again differentiate between intensity and directionality, with intensity the 
subject of the fourth section, and directionality the subject of the fifth. Following these 
analyses, I offer some brief conclusions regarding the impact of prior political 
experiences on immigrants’ prospects for engagement in American partisan life. 
Imported Political Predispositions: The Expectations 
Historically, scholars have construed partisanship either as an affective 
attachment or as a rational calculation of party performance. From the former 
perspective, citizens’ partisan identifications come to life through a socialization process. 
These social identities remain remarkably stable over time (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and 
McPhee 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960; Green, Palmquist and 
Schickler 2002).19 From the latter perspective, citizens react to short-term party 
performances and choose to identify with the party that better represents their interests. In 
                                                 
19 Admittedly, the inclusion of Green et al (2002) in the “socio-psychological” school is open to 
debate. I decided to include them for two main reasons: the authors’ claim of partisan 
identification as a social identity and the further implication of stability over time that the social 
identity theory embraces. That said, Partisan Hearts and Minds is the most integrationist of all 
the scholarly efforts. Thus, not surprisingly, it is the one that departs the most from the other two 
socio-psychological schools and the one that shares a set of common assumptions with the 
rationalist approach. 
56 
this case, partisan attachments change as performance and “party differentials” vary 
(Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981). 
The two “classic” approaches to the study of partisan identification, which apply 
largely to native U. S. citizens, offer only limited insight into the attitudes and 
predispositions of immigrants. That said, we should not assume that a single process 
account for the development of partisan attachments among all immigrants. Those who 
come to the United States at a very early age may simply inherit their parents’ American 
partisan attachments. Immigrants who arrive in the country as adults cannot experience 
such a process. Among these adult immigrants one possibility is that they import the 
sense of (non-) partisanship that they already held in their countries of origin to the new 
polity.20 After all, partisanship is a rather enduring and consistent attachment across time 
(Berelson et al 1954; Campbell et al 1960; Sears and Funk 1999), and partisanship can be 
an important predictor of political behavior in emerging democracies such as Mexico 
(Moreno 2003), just as it is in the United States. Therefore, one should expect that 
immigrants’ partisan affiliations may endure after the migration process. More 
importantly, partisanship may help immigrants make sense of the new political 
landscape. In other words, immigrants may pack pre-migration partisan views in their 
political suitcases, and then draw on these contents later to help navigate American 
politics.  
As outlined before, two aspects of partisanship must be distinguished, 
directionality and intensity. Directionality refers to the individual’s preference among 
parties—for most Americans, whether one identifies with the Democrats or the 
                                                 
20 Therefore, it will be important to account for age upon arrival in the analyses conducted 
throughout this chapter. 
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Republicans. As argued below, pre-migration experiences may matter for directionality, 
although it should be clear that there rarely will be a perfect match between party systems 
in a person’s old and new nations. Intensity involves the strength of attachment. Partisans 
of all stripes can hold weak, moderate or strong attachments to their preferred parties. 
What is most pertinent for present purposes is that a person’s tendency to hold a partisan 
attachment is expected to endure from pre to post migration.21
Partisan attachments developed in one’s country of origin should survive the 
migration process, even if the individual was socialized under relatively more 
authoritarian conditions. Take for instance the case of Mexican children under the single-
party era: among fifth-graders, on average, seven out of ten expressed their willingness to 
participate in elections when they reached voting age. Among ninth-graders the average 
almost reached the ninety percent level (Segovia 1975). To reinforce the latter point, 
consider that in two former Soviet republics, Russia and Lithuania, the highest levels of 
turnout after the communist breakdown have occurred among those citizens who were 
socialized into the habit of voting under utterly non-competitive but regular elections. 
These symbolic elections seem to have created positive political experiences for these 
older cohorts of the electorate, and induced a habit of participation (Chernykh 2007). 
A few hypothetical examples should help again to demonstrate the key logic of 
this perspective. Let us recall “Jose” and contrast him with “Nacho.” Both of them were 
born in Los Mochis in the 1960s. However, Jose and Nacho have a significant political 
dissimilarity. Remember that Jose was an active member of the local PRI youth 
organization before migrating, whereas Nacho never became engaged in party politics at 
                                                 
21 Due to data constraints, the following analyses’ tests regarding intensity are limited to the 
dichotomy attachment/non-attachment, as distinction between weak and strong partisans was not 
available for the U.S. context in either of the datasets.   
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all. The political socialization Jose experienced, even if authoritarian in nature, may have 
allowed him to develop a sense that “party matters,” which Nacho plainly cannot have, at 
least not to the same extent as Jose. This first example illustrate the logic motivating this 
chapter’s first prediction regarding the impact of imported socialization on an 
immigrant’s likelihood of engaging in political activity in a new nation following 
migration: holding a partisan attachment in one’s country of origin increases the 
likelihood of political engagement following migration to the United States. 
In this first illustration, note that prior political experience is defined purely in 
terms of the individual’s own self-reported engagement in the home country. As an 
alternative, in contrast with the first prediction, the second illustration considers prior 
political experience in terms of individual’s encounter with the political context in the 
nation of origin. Put differently, here the key construct is defined in a manner that is 
wholly external to the individual. Let us contrast “Jose” with “Juan.” Remember that 
Juan grew up in a context of electoral vibrancy and change, during the Mexican transition 
to democracy. This first-hand experience fueled Juan’s sense of personal efficacy, which 
in turn made him more likely to engage politically. One facet of this political engagement 
may be the development of a partisan attachment. It should follow that immigrants who 
were socialized under more democratic contexts are more likely to be politically engaged 
once in the United States than their counterparts who were socialized under more 
authoritarian contexts.  
Following the structure of my empirical tests in the preceding chapter, the 
conceptualizations of imported socialization outlined by this chapter’s first two 
expectations clearly are quite different. Note again, however, first, that they are not 
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mutually exclusive. That is, it could be that both regime type and prior partisan affiliation 
matter once the individual migrates to the U.S. Second, although very different, both 
hypotheses speak squarely to this study’s contention that immigrants do not come to the 
United States as political blank slates. 
A third expectation does not concern how imported socialization operates, but 
rather for whom. Consequently this prediction acts as a refinement to both of the first 
two. Recall that I argue that the impact of pre-migration factors on post-migration 
political behavior will be strongest for immigrants with low levels of education because it 
is less costly for them to try to make sense of life in a next context by drawing on lessons 
from elsewhere. It should follow that immigrants who are highly educated or highly 
sophisticated will be able to engage politics in the United States on its own terms, 
whereas immigrants with lower levels of education will be more inclined to rely upon 
analogical reasoning. 
Finally, if one acknowledges that partisan attachments are rather enduring ones, it 
should follow that both “Jose” and “Juan” have an advantage over “Nacho” if the three of 
them decide to engage in politics once in the United States. Intuitively, both “Jose” and 
“Juan” have a sense that party matters, which Nacho simply lacks. Therefore, even if the 
three of them walk in darkness regarding the specifics of the American parties, both 
“Jose” and “Juan” may have an easier way in coming to trust or identify with either the 
Democrats or the Republicans. “Nacho” may simply stay on the sidelines of the political 
arena, continuing to perceive, as he did when in Mexico, that party politics is not worth 
his time.  
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One caveat is that the scenarios suggested in these examples may change over 
time. If pre-migration experiences influence post-migration behavior, the strength of that 
influence may become diluted as the immigrant spends years, and even decades, in the 
United States. In the case of my specific examples, “Nacho” will be exposed to a new 
socialization process once he enters the United States, a process that can reshape his 
initial attitude towards political parties. Under this hypothetical scenario, “Nacho” may 
eventually come to identify with either the Democrats or the Republicans. However, this 
new socialization experience also will be available to both “Jose” and “Juan.” In their 
case, they were already more likely than Nacho to engage in partisan politics and given 
the enduring effects of partisan attachments one can safely expect that “Jose” and “Juan” 
will become even more likely to engage in partisan politics as years go by in their new 
host country. In other words, imported partisan attachments are expected to provide a 
baseline that will exert enduring effects even among immigrants with many years in the 
new country. In other words, it should be expected that the impact of partisan affiliation 
in an immigrant’s country of origin on post-migration political engagement will persist 
even for long-term residents of the new host nation.  
Thus far, the expectations have focused on partisanship. However, as noted at the 
outset of this chapter, a very similar logic applies with respect to ideology. When 
thinking about ideology, one can also expect both intensity and directionality effects. 
Here, at question is whether ideological predispositions developed in the country of 
origin exert effects that endure following migration. Concerning intensity, for instance, in 
general it should be expected that immigrant “ideologues” will have an advantage over 
their “non-ideologue” counterparts in adapting to the new political system and in 
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developing political attitudes and affiliations. After all, “ideology” provides the 
individual with a cognitive organizing device. This device allows the individual “to make 
sense of a wider range of (political) information” than one would find possible in the 
absence of such device (Converse 1964: 214). Regarding directionality, the story is more 
complex. It also has been argued that in order for an individual to use ideological labels 
or terms in an efficient manner, the individual “must bring a good deal of meaning to the 
term” (Converse 1964: 214). In an important sense, ideological labels find their political 
meanings in particular and specific contexts. For instance, although the use of “left” and 
“right” is widespread worldwide, the specific meanings attached to those labels by 
different individuals in diverse party systems may vary. Moreover, there is no reason to 
assume that the range of ideological continuums is constant across nations. Thus, if an 
individual seeks to make sense of politics in a new nation by drawing on a sense of 
ideology developed in the country of origin, some adaptation may be needed. 
The first possible need for adaptation hinges upon the differential between ranges 
of ideological continuums in the country of origin and the new host country. The 
ideological continuum in the American context might appear truncated to most observers 
when contrasted with other countries’ continuums. That is, the Democrats and the 
Republicans may be viewed as center-left and center-right to individuals from nations 
where much more divergent parties gain salience in mainstream politics. If indeed it is 
the case that the “radical” options from both the “left” and the “right” are absent in the 
American setting, one should expect individuals who were moderates (“center”) in their 
respective countries of origin to be more likely to adopt partisan attachments in the 
United States. Conversely, ideologues with more extreme views are expected to find little 
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to embrace in the American two-party system. This prediction captures my general 
expectation regarding the impact of ideological predispositions in one’s country of origin 
on post-migration political engagement. This initial expectation perhaps requires 
refinement. In some nations, the ideological continuum might extend well to the left of 
that in the United States, but not to the right. The opposite pattern is possible in other 
nations. For instance, when comparing the ideological continuums of Mexico and the 
United States, the U.S. continuum might appear truncated only on the left side given its 
lack of “socialist” options. The Republicans on the right side of the spectrum can offer a 
likeable match to both the PRI and the PAN followers depending upon the historical 
context under which these individuals were politicized. 
The second source of potential adaptation is based upon the specific meanings 
individuals attach to ideological labels. To illustrate this point, let me introduce two new 
immigrants, “Pedro” and “Miguel.” “Pedro” and “Miguel” both were born in Mexico in 
the early 1970s. They both grew up in households with strong opposing views to the PRI-
led one-party system. Pedro’s family was supportive of the PAN. Miguel’s family was 
supportive of the PMS (Mexican Socialist Party), and eventually got engaged with the 
PRD by the time Miguel reached voting age. Given that the two families’ main political 
goal was to oppose the political status quo, the two families considered their parties to be 
on the “left” of the political arena. Although Pedro stands to the “right” of Miguel on 
most social and political issues, Pedro still considers himself on the “left” of the political 
continuum. In other words, both “Miguel” and “Pedro” may perceive themselves as 
residing on the “left” in ideological terms in spite of the fact that the there remains a 
difference in the ideological positions of their respective preferred parties. In short, 
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ideological proximity between a person’s preferred political party in the country of origin 
and the preferred political party in the new nation following migration will increase the 
likelihood of post-migration political engagement. 
Now, let us focus only on “Miguel.” He was a PRD supporter in Mexico and he 
was socialized by a family with “socialist” political orientations. This background might 
lead Miguel to two plausible scenarios. On the one hand, “Miguel” might use his “leftist” 
ideological label as a cue and follow a direct translation pattern, in which case he is very 
likely to come to identify with the Democratic Party. On the other hand, he might feel 
himself out of options in the American setting given that neither of the main two political 
parties supports a “socialist” agenda. Under this scenario one should expect “Miguel” to 
have a harder time engaging with either of the mainstream parties once in the United 
States. However, this situation might change over time. As Miguel learns more about the 
new political context, he might experience a process of adaptation either by attaching 
new meanings to his prior ideological label or by simply moderating his original 
ideological stance. There is no reason to believe that these two mechanisms of adaptation 
are mutually exclusive. If any of these processes (or both) take place, one should expect 
“Miguel” to become more likely to acquire a partisan attachment with the American 
parties as time goes by. This said one should expect that the effect of one’s country of 
origin’s ideological predispositions on one’s political engagement following migration is 
likely to decrease with the passage of time. 
As noted in Chapter One, the set of expectations posited in this dissertation would 
be ideally tested with a different kind of data, namely panel data. With a three-wave 
panel, for example, it would be possible to monitor political attitudes and political 
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engagement prior to migration, soon after migration, and then some years later once the 
person has become more fully entrenched as a U.S. resident. However, in light of the lack 
of such ideal data, a series of functional alternate tests must be devised. The logic of the 
empirical analyses reported below follows the same structure as in the second chapter. 
The analyses are again divided under two main sections: before and after migration. For 
the before migration section of this chapter’s analyses, I utilize a national random sample 
of Mexicans currently living in Mexico and the analyses are conducted accounting for 
each respondent’s likelihood of migration to the United States. For the after migration 
section, I utilize three different datasets: the MVS 2003, the NSL 2004, and the LNS 2006. 
I begin with pre-migration data, with tests concerning both the intensity and directionality 
of partisan attachments and ideological predispositions.  
Political Predispositions before Migration 
As shown in both of the first two chapters, many citizens around the world have 
formed conceptions of U.S. politics even though the vast majority of these individuals do 
not have the slightest intention of migrating to the United States. According to a national 
survey of the Mexican public’s political attitudes conducted by Reforma newspaper’s 
Department of Survey Research during November of 2007 (Reforma 2007), the Mexican 
public revealed being either somewhat (19.2 percent of respondents) or very interested 
(12.1 percent) in the 2008 U.S. presidential election. According to the same survey, more 
than half of respondents expressed a specific preference for either the Democrats (36.0 
percent) or the Republicans (19.0 percent) to win the 2008 presidential election. In Table 
3.1, we see that nearly 50 percent of Mexican non-partisans either had no preference in 
the U.S. election or were indifferent between the Democrats and Republicans, whereas 
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the comparable mark among Mexican partisans is just over 40 percent. At least at first 
glance, these data suggest a connection between politicization in Mexico and engagement 
with American politics. My first empirical task in this chapter is to pursue this matter 
more closely.  
Intensity of Political Engagement before Migration 
Typically, when individuals are categorized by the intensity of their partisan 
attachments, the outcome of this exercise is a dichotomy: weak and strong partisans. As 
acknowledged earlier in the chapter, given data constraints my analyses here will be 
limited to a different dichotomy, namely attachment/non-attachment. In other words, 
intensity of political engagement will be operationalized in order to reflect whether or not 
an individual possess an attachment with a political party, regardless of whether the 
attachment is a weak or a strong one.  
There is no reason to believe that individuals holding a partisan attachment in 
their own country necessarily will display strong preferences regarding the specifics of 
party politics in the United States. That is, it is logically possible for one to be a strong 
partisan in Mexico and yet utterly unconcerned about U.S. politics; likewise, the Mexican 
non-partisan conceivably still might follow the news about U.S. politics to an extent 
sufficient for a preference to be formed. However, as outlined above, my thesis holds that 
by holding a partisan attachment in one nation the person will become relatively likely to 
form partisan preferences in other contexts. In other words, all else equal, one should 
expect partisans in any country to be more likely than non-partisans to express a 
preference towards either the Democrats or the Republicans when contemplating 
American politics. By the same token, one should expect ideologues in any country to be 
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more likely than non-ideologues to express an opinion regarding the American parties. 
One caveat regarding this thesis concerns individuals who support ideologically extreme 
parties in their home countries. A person on the extreme left or extreme right might view 
the Democrats and Republicans as relatively indistinct. If so, this person would not be 
inclined to express a partisan preference in the American context.  
The Reforma 2007 survey contains one item asking respondents about their 
preferred outcome regarding the 2008 U.S. presidential election. This item permits me to 
test whether those individuals who hold any sort of partisan attachment in Mexico are 
more likely to exhibit preference for either of the two main American parties. I have 
argued that holding partisan attachments and ideology in one’s country of origin 
increases the likelihood that the person will be politically engaged once in the United 
States. I believe my argument will be supported by showing that even before migration, 
and controlling for the respondent’s likelihood of migration to the United States, partisan 
attachments and ideology in the country of origin help explain preference for either the 
Democrats or the Republicans. The dependent variable used to test this is a measure of 
preferred electoral outcome in the United States. Specifically, respondents were asked 
what would be more advantageous for Mexico, “that the next U.S. presidential election is 
won by a candidate of the Republican party or by a candidate of the Democratic party?”22 
Responses are recoded, with a value of 1 used to indicate that the respondent would 
prefer either of the two main parties’ candidates to win (55 percent of respondents), and 0 
used to indicate that the respondent would not have a preference (45 percent). 
                                                 
22 Admittedly, this is an item which does not necessarily measure personal preference. However, 
it is the only item available in the original survey questionnaire and I decided to use it here as a 
proxy. 
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 The first key independent variable in this model is an indicator variable for 
whether each respondent had an attachment with any of the three main Mexican political 
parties, coded 1 (58.7 percent) for yes and 0 if otherwise. The expectation is 
straightforward: respondents who are engaged in politics in Mexico to a sufficient extent 
that they hold partisan attachments will be relatively more likely to display a clear 
preference for either of the two major political parties in the United States. The second 
key group of predictors is a set of indicator variables to account for both intensity and 
directionality of ideology. The original ten-point ideology item included in the survey 
ranges from 1 (left) to 10 (right). I recoded it to produce indicators for “non-ideologues,” 
“extreme left,” “center left,” “center right,” and “extreme right,” keeping “centrists” as 
the reference category.23 Additional variables included in the model are the same as the 
controls included in the before migration analyses offered in Chapter Two, namely: 
likelihood of migration, attentiveness to the news, age, education, income, and frequency 
of attendance at religious services. Interaction between attentiveness to the news and 
Mexican partisan status is included in the model. 
Recall that likelihood of migration24 is a self-assessed measure, which is recoded 
to be incorporated in the model as three different indicator variables: “very likely,” 
“somewhat likely,” and “not very likely.” The reference category is “not at all likely.” 
Again, attentiveness to the news is measured with an additive index, which ranges from 0 
                                                 
23 “Non-Ideologues” are all of those respondents who failed to place themselves on a left-right 
continuum. Only respondents who considered themselves a 1 were assigned to the “Extreme 
Left” category. By the same token, only those respondents who considered themselves a 10 on 
that scale were assigned to the “Extreme Right” category. “Center Left” includes respondents 
who placed themselves on the 2, 3, and 4; “Center,” 5 and 6;  “Center Right,” 7, 8, and 9. Also, I 
tried a different coding scheme where the extremes included the two most extreme categories. 
Results, however, were statistically similar and substantively the same. 
24 For a detailed account of the validity of this measure, please see Appendix A. 
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to 15, built upon five different four-category response items concerning TV, radio, 
newspapers, talk with others, and the internet. Income reflects estimates of respondents’ 
household income in thousand of pesos per month. The mid point of the range of every 
category was the value assigned for every respondent. In the case of education, the 
variable values reflect the number of completed school years by every respondent. Upper 
cap values were assigned when any given level was indicated as complete. However, if 
respondents indicated truncated studies at the elementary level, they were assigned with 
the mid point value between no studies and completed elementary. The same coding rule 
was applied to all subsequent levels. Religious attendance was also recoded following the 
logic of the income and education categorical variables and produced a measure that 
provides an estimate number of days per year the respondent attended religious services. 
For instance, if respondents indicated attending once a week they were assigned a value 
of 52. Table 2 in Appendix D displays the descriptive statistics for all of the variables 
included in this model.  
As shown in Table 3.2, the results of the logistic regression analysis indicate that 
preference for either of the two main American parties is driven, as expected, by 
individuals’ partisan attachments to the Mexican parties. That is, the coefficient for 
Mexican Partisan is positive, and statistically significant. Moreover, this preference is not 
affected by these individuals’ likelihood of migration to the United States. The 
coefficient of the interaction term between Mexican partisan status and likelihood of 
migration, though positive, does not reach statistical significance. Also, as expected, non-
ideologues are less likely than ideologues, in general, to express a preference for either of 
the two American parties. Figure 3.1 illustrates this point even further. Every single 
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category of the ideologues outnumbers the non-ideologues, in a ratio of at least two to 
one, when it comes to probabilities of indicating a preference for either of the American 
parties. Older generations are less likely to display a clear preference for either 
Democrats or Republicans than their younger counterparts, suggesting that younger 
cohorts in Mexico are more interested and engaged in the political events taking place in 
their neighbor to the north.  
Directionality of Political Engagement before Migration 
Thus far in this chapter, using the case of the Mexican public, I have shown that 
partisan attachments as well as ideological predispositions in one’s home country 
increase the prospects for intensity of political engagement with either of the two main 
American parties before migration. Next, I explore whether or not these partisan 
preferences and ideological predispositions in one’s country of origin account for 
directionality of political engagement as well. In other words, it will be tested whether a 
specific attachment to the PRD, or the PRI, or the PAN makes individuals more or less 
likely to develop a specific preference for either the Democratic or the Republican parties 
before migration. By the same token, it will be tested whether an ideologue from the left 
is more or less likely to develop an attachment to either the Democrats or the 
Republicans. 
The dependent variable used to test this relies upon the same measure of preferred 
electoral outcome in the United States. However, given the focus on directionality rather 
than on intensity, a different recoding was necessary. Responses are coded to retain all 
original values of the survey item, with a value of 0 used to indicate that either the 
respondent holds no opinion on the matter or sees no difference between a victory by the 
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Democrats and one by the Republicans (45.0 percent of respondents), a value of 1 if the 
respondent would prefer a candidate from the Democratic party to win the U.S. 
presidential election (36.0 percent), and a value of 2 if the respondent would prefer a 
candidate of the Republican party to win the race (19.0 percent). 
 The first set of key independent variables in this model are indicator variables to 
represent the respondent’s attachment with any of the three main Mexican political 
parties, namely the PRD (13.1 percent of respondents), the PRI (22.0 percent), and the 
PAN (23.7 percent). The reference category is non-partisans (41.2 percent). The 
expectations here are not as straightforward given that it would be naïve to expect a 
perfect match between the U.S. and Mexican party systems. However, given the history 
of party politics in Mexico, I would expect the PRD to provide individuals with the most 
likely baseline to develop an affinity for the Democrats. By the same token, I would 
expect the PAN to provide its partisans with the strongest impetus to become Republican 
followers. The second key independent variable is a set of indicator variables to account 
for both intensity and directionality of ideology: “non-ideologues,” “extreme left,” 
“center left,” “center right,” and “extreme right,” with “centrists” as the reference 
category. Variables also included in the model are the same set of controls used in the 
intensity analysis: likelihood of migration, attentiveness to the news, age, education, 
income, and frequency of attendance at religious services. 
Multinomial logistic regression estimates are reported in Table 3.4. As expected, 
PRD partisans are more likely to develop affinity with the Democrats. Also, PAN 
partisans provide suitable basis for affinity with the Republicans, but so do PRI partisans 
and even PRD partisans. In fact, it is the PRI partisans who display the highest levels of 
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specific preference for the Republicans, followed by the PAN partisans in second place, 
and finally the PRD partisans in a surprisingly not so distant third place. Regarding 
ideology, on the one hand, extreme leftists rather than center leftists are more likely to 
develop affinity with the Democrats. On the other hand, center right ideologues are more 
likely to develop affinity with the Republicans.  
Attentiveness to the news reaches statistical significance for every category under 
analysis (expected Democrat, and expected Republican), thus suggesting corroboration 
that, while still in their country of origin, individuals’ preference about American parties 
will be heavily influenced by the amount of attention these individuals devote to political 
news. This is an intuitively satisfying finding. Absent exposure to the news, it should be 
difficult for respondents to develop preferences among the U.S. parties. The strong 
findings for the news attention variable support this view. 
Predicted probabilities derived from these results are reported in Figure 3.2. 
Results are disaggregated by Mexican party affiliation and ideological predispositions. 
Two key points should be highlighted from these figures. First, generally speaking, 
individuals holding a partisan attachment to any of the three main Mexican parties are 
more likely than their non-partisan counterparts to prefer either the Republicans or the 
Democrats than to say that there is no difference between these two political options in 
the United States. Second, these results should be considered a call for further data 
collection and study to have a better understanding of these partisan and ideological 
translations. More importantly, it is yet to be explored whether or not these patterns hold 
among Mexican individuals who have crossed nations’ borders. After all, the main focus 
of this dissertation is on political behavior after migration.       
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Political Predispositions after Migration 
The analyses in the section devoted to intensity of political engagement rely upon 
three different datasets: the National Bank of Mexico’s (Banamex) Division for 
Economic and Sociopolitical Studies 2003 Mexican Values Survey (MVS 2003), the Pew 
Hispanic Center/Kaiser family Foundation 2004 National Survey of Latinos (NSL 2004), 
and the Latino National Survey 2006 (LNS 2006). Intensity still is conceptualized and 
operationalized as a dichotomy, differentiating between attachment and non-attachment 
with regard to the two main American parties. The effects of imported socialization are 
tested utilizing two different approaches. Under the first approach, and using the MVS 
2003, imported socialization is operationalized as immigrants’ partisan attachments in the 
country of origin. Under the second approach, and using the NSL 2004 and the LNS 2006, 
imported socialization is operationalized as the degree of democracy (or lack thereof) that 
the individual was exposed to during the early years of childhood and young adulthood in 
the country of origin. The analyses regarding directionality rely only upon the MVS 2003 
dataset. For intensity, the availability of two different types of tests is highly 
advantageous. Pre-migration experiences will be operationalized in two fundamentally 
different manners, one based on survey respondents’ self-reports and one based on 
external indicators regarding the political context in the individual’s country of origin. If 
consistent results emerge from such disparate tests, support for my thesis would be much 
more compelling than if only one form of data were available. 
Intensity of Political Engagement after Migration 
The MVS 2003 has one key advantage for the purpose of this chapter. This 
original study is, to the best of my knowledge, the only one available that includes 
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questions on vote intention in both countries (Mexico and the U.S.) for its sub-sample of 
399 first-generation U.S. residents who were born in Mexico. Such questions do not 
provide ideal representations of partisan preferences. However, particularly given the 
scarcity of data such as these, the vote intention measures certainly provide reasonable 
proxies.  
The vote intention items permit me to test whether those immigrants who held 
any sort of partisan leaning in Mexico are more likely to exhibit American partisan ties. 
Specifically, I have posited that holding a partisan attachment in one’s country of origin 
increases the likelihood that the person will be politically engaged in the United States. 
The dependent variable used to test this hypothesis is a measure of expected electoral 
participation in the United States. Respondents were asked if “elections were held today,” 
would they expect to vote for a Democratic candidate, a Republican, a candidate other 
than a Democrat or a Republican, or would they opt not to participate. These responses 
are recoded, with a value of 1 used to indicate that the respondent would expect to vote 
(64.7 percent of respondents), and 0 used to indicate that the respondent would not expect 
to vote (35.3 percent). 
 The chief independent variables are two set of indicator variables. The first set 
accounts for whether each respondent had an attachment with any Mexican political 
party, coded 1 (57.4 percent25) for yes and 0 if otherwise. Again, my expectation is that 
respondents who were politicized in the country of origin to a sufficient extent that they 
held partisan attachments will be relatively more likely to become politically engaged 
once in the United States. The second set of indicator variables accounts for both 
                                                 
25 Note how the proportion of partisans among Mexican immigrants in the U.S. resembles the 
proportion of partisans in the national sample of the Mexican public; it is 57.4 percent for the 
U.S.-based sample, versus 59.5 percent for the national sample of the Mexican public. 
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intensity and directionality of ideology: “non-ideologues,” “extreme left,” “center left,” 
“center right,” and “extreme right,” with “centrists” as the reference category. Here, the 
expectation is that if ideological spectrums in the two countries are similar in range, 
centrists should be more likely to engage politically than their extremist counterparts. 
However, if the American ideological continuum appears truncated to the Mexican 
immigrants, I would expect individuals from the extreme left to be the least likely to 
engage politically once in the United States. 
In addition to conducting tests of my core hypotheses, a second round of tests will 
be run to gauge whether the impact (if any) of pre-migration political experiences 
attenuates over time. To consider this possibility, models include a count of years spent in 
the United States, along with interactions between this variable and the indicators of 
Mexican partisan attachment and ideological predispositions. Other variables included in 
the models are age upon arrival, indicators of language skills, income, education, and 
frequency of attendance at religious services. Income reflects estimates of respondents’ 
household income in thousand of dollars per year. The mid point of the range of every 
category was the value assigned for every respondent. In the case of education, the 
variable values reflect the number of completed school years by every respondent. Upper 
cap values were assigned when any given level was indicated as complete. Religious 
attendance was also recoded following the logic of the income and education categorical 
variables and produced a measure that provides with an estimate number of days attended 
per year for every respondent. Again, to account for language skills two indicator 
variables were operationalized, bilingual and English dominant at home, where the 
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reference category is Spanish dominant at home. Table 3 in the Appendix D displays the 
corresponding descriptive statistics for all of the variables included in the models.  
Table 3.5 presents a simple cross-tabulation of the item gauging expected U.S. 
electoral participation and the measure of Mexican partisan identification. A strong 
relationship is evident. Among Mexican partisans, nearly 81 percent expect to hold a 
partisan vote preference in the U.S. elections; conversely, among Mexican non-partisans, 
nearly 55 percent indicate that they likely would not vote were the U.S. elections held 
today. At the bivariate level, these results offer solid corroboration of my core 
expectation. Pre-migration politicization predicts patterns of post-migration political 
engagement. 
To test whether this same effect emerges when other factors that also predict 
participation are considered, Table 3.6 presents results from two logistic regression 
models. The first model offers the central test, whereas the second model adds an 
interaction between years in the U.S. and Mexican partisanship as well as years in the 
U.S. and ideological predispositions to account for any possible attenuation of 
socialization effects over time. In Table 3.6’s initial model, the coefficient for Mexican 
partisan affiliation attains statistical significance. Thus, even with a battery of control 
variables, the evidence still provides corroboration for my core expectation. Politicization 
in one’s home country—captured here with a measure of prior partisan attachment—
predicts post-migration political engagement. Immigrants are not political blank slates 
when they enter the United States. Instead, their prior experiences yield effects that 
resonate across national borders. Further, the second model in Table 3.6 provides no 
evidence that this effect evaporates over time. The coefficient on the interaction term is 
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statistically insignificant, and, contrary to the logic of an attenuation effect, its sign is 
positive.  
A follow-up question begs for an answer: are partisan attachments from all over 
the ideological spectrum in one’s country of origin equally likely to provide immigrants 
to the United States with enduring suitcases? Intuitively, as laid out earlier in this chapter 
my answer is no. Immigrants whose prior political views were extreme relative to those 
of mainstream Democrats and Republicans in the United States may find little that 
engages them following migration. These matters, however, will be addressed later on the 
directionality section of this chapter.  
Arguably, immigrants’ ideological self-placements on the American political 
continuum were not necessarily learned in the new host country, but rather in these 
individuals’ countries of origin. In order to justify the inclusion of the set of indicator 
variables accounting for ideological predispositions in my analysis, I conducted an 
experiment26 among Mexican immigrants to the United States to determine the extent to 
which these individuals differentiate between the two ideological continuums. For now, it 
is sufficient to note that nearly seven out of every ten immigrants (68.1 percent) do not 
make distinctions between ideological continuums. Moreover, roughly six out of ten of 
the remaining immigrants that do adjust their placement on a context-specific basis do so 
to only a moderate extent.27 Thus, in the vast majority of cases, ideology as constituted in 
a person’s country of origin strongly anchors ideology in the United States following 
migration. 
                                                 
26 For a full explanation of the experiment conducted among Mexican immigrants currently living 
in the United States regarding ideology differentials, please see Appendix C.  
27 “Moderate” adjustment is here defined as the distance between ideological continuums up to 
three points in a ten point scale.  
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As Table 3.6 shows, the coefficient for non-ideologues also attains statistical 
significance. Its negative sign indicates that non-ideologues are less likely than 
ideologues in general to engage politically once in the United States. Among ideologues, 
immigrants on the center right and right of the spectrum are more likely to engage 
politically. Figure 3.3 highlights both of these points even further. Roughly two out of ten 
immigrants who held no partisan attachment and who place themselves at the center of 
the ideological spectrum in their countries of origin will decide to participate electorally 
in the United States. This proportion doubles for their counterparts who actually held 
some sort of partisan attachment. The pattern is substantively the same for both 
immigrants who have arrived recently in the United States and for those who have spent 
an average of 17 years in their new host country. In short, prior partisan attachments not 
only make immigrants approximately twice as likely to be politically engaged once in the 
United States, but also provide them with an enduring political suitcase, with content that 
does not vanish with the passage of time.  
In the case of ideological predispositions, the enduring nature of the suitcase 
hinges upon the individuals’ self-placement along the political continuum. Figure 3.3 
highlights that both among non-partisans and partisans, immigrants who recently arrived 
in the United States see their probabilities of engaging politically increase as they move 
from left to right on the spectrum. However, as can be seen in the same figure, this 
pattern is lost as time goes by. After 17 years of life in the United States, an average stay 
for these individuals, the predicted probabilities of political engagement look pretty much 
the same for immigrants all across the spectrum, non-ideologues included.   
78 
Recall that I argue that it should be expected that the impact of pre-migration 
factors on post-migration political behavior are strongest for immigrants with low levels 
of education. In order to test this, an interaction term between partisan status in Mexico 
and education levels was included in the model shown in Table 3.6. The coefficient of the 
interaction term is negative as expected. However, the coefficient does not attain 
statistical significance, which means that the imported socialization effect is present for 
both immigrants with relatively low and relatively high levels of education.28 Figure 3.4 
illustrates this point further. Immigrants who held a partisan attachment in their country 
of origin are twice more likely to be politically engaged than their non-partisan 
counterparts, regardless of their education levels. In short, thus far, contrary to my 
expectations, immigrants who are highly educated or highly sophisticated do not seem to 
engage politics in the United States on its own terms. Regardless of educational status, 
immigrants seem prone to engage in analogical reasoning. 
Intensity of Engagement: Democratic vs. Authoritarian Socialization 
Recall that I posit that immigrants who were socialized under more democratic 
contexts will be more likely to participate in American politics than their counterparts 
who were socialized under more authoritarian contexts. Under this expectation, as noted 
earlier in this chapter, prior political experience is defined purely in terms of the 
individual’s encounter with the political context in the nation of origin. The construct of 
“imported socialization”29 used here is the same as the one in the preceding chapter. 
                                                 
28 In Figure 3.4, relatively “low” and relatively “high” levels of education were calculated by 
subtracting/adding one standard deviation to the mean, respectively. 
29 For a full description of the construction of this measurement, please see the corresponding 
section in the preceding chapter. Also, see Appendix B for more details regarding the distribution 
of the imported socialization scores by country of origin and by dataset utilized in this study. 
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Here, I also define the immigrant’s prior political context in terms of gradations of 
democracy, by taking advantage of the Polity IV dataset. The Polity-based indicator is 
now integrated with data from two surveys, the Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser family 
Foundation 2004 National Survey of Latinos (NSL 2004) and the Latino National Survey 
2006 (LNS 2006). These two other datasets were chosen for the analysis given the 
sizeable sub-samples of first-generation Latino immigrants (1,068 and 5,653, 
respectively) and the availability of items on both surveys regarding partisan attachments 
in the United States. See Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix B for further detail regarding the 
descriptive statistics of the construct by country of origin for each one of the datasets.  
The dependent variable in this portion of the analysis defines political 
engagement as partisan attachment with either of the two main parties in the United 
States. In other words, the dependent variable uses a binary scale where 1 denotes 
identification with either the Democratic or the Republican parties (67.7 percent for the 
NSL 2004, and 36.5 percent for the LNS 2006), and 0 denotes otherwise. The chief 
independent variable, imported socialization, ranges from 0 (most authoritarian context) 
to 20 (most democratic context). Recall that this measure provides an indicator that is 
specific to the individual. For example, if two respondents both came to the U.S. from 
Chile and both migrated at age 18, my measure scores them very differently if one was 
born in 1955, and thus lived in Chile under democracy, while the other was born 20 years 
later in 1975 just after Pinochet rose to power. 
Table 3.7 presents the results of the estimated logistic regression models where 
the dependent variable is partisan affiliation in the United States, and independent 
                                                                                                                                                 
Table 2, in the Appendix, contains the information on the NSL 2004. Table 3 contains the details 
regarding the LNS 2006.  
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variables include a series of individual-level controls, plus the respondent-specific 
measure of imported socialization. The coefficient of the key independent variable is 
positive and reaches statistical significance under every specification in both data sets. 
The results are summarized graphically in Figure 3.5, where I report predicted 
probabilities of partisan affiliation. The vertical axis in each case is the predicted 
probability and the horizontal is the respondent-specific Polity-based measure of 
imported socialization. All other variables are held constant at their mean or at their 
modal category in the case of indicator variables. The estimates provide strong 
corroboration of the core expectation. Simply put, immigrants who were exposed to more 
democratic contexts during their pre-adult socialization years are more likely to become 
partisans in the United States than their counterparts who grew up under more 
authoritarian conditions.  
Depending upon which dataset, the construct of imported socialization reveals 
that being socialized under the most democratic conditions (contrasted with the most 
authoritarian ones) increases the probability of an immigrant’s partisan affiliation in the 
United States by at least 42 per cent points (LNS 2006) or by 81 per cent points (NSL 
2004). The effects are noticeably sharper in one dataset, where, due to sampling 
differences, the overall level of politicization among respondents is higher. However, the 
pattern is substantively similar in both cases, and as stated before, statistically significant 
in both.  
The model in Table 3.7 includes an interaction term between the construct of 
imported socialization and education. The coefficient of the interaction term in both 
datasets is negative as expected. However, the coefficient attains statistical significance 
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in only one of the datasets. Figure 3.6 help illustrate the results of the model. The 
predicted probabilities of political engagement among immigrants with higher levels of 
education are nearly constant across the full range of the imported socialization measure 
in both datasets. This is to say that immigrants with higher levels of education have a 
tendency to develop partisan attachments regardless of the nature of the political system 
under which they were socialized. However, and although present in only one of the 
datasets (NSL 2004), there is one pattern that cannot go without mention. Among those 
immigrants with relatively lower levels of education, those who were socialized under the 
most democratic conditions are almost twice more likely to be engaged politically than 
their counterparts who were socialized under the most authoritarian conditions.  
An interaction term between the imported socialization measure and age upon 
arrival was included in models two and three in Table 3.7. The sign of the corresponding 
coefficient is negative under every specification for both datasets, suggesting that 
immigrants who arrived in the United States at a relatively younger age will be the ones 
displaying the strongest effects of imported socialization. In other words, immigrants 
who arrived at an early stage of their lives and who were socialized under a more 
democratic context will be more likely to engage politically than their counterparts who 
were socialized under more authoritarian conditions. However, this effect only attains 
statistical significance in one of the datasets, the LNS 2006.   
A couple of final remarks should be made regarding the results offered in Table 
3.7. First, the coefficient of the interaction term between the imported socialization 
construct and years spent in the United States does not reach statistical significance in 
either of the two datasets analyzed here, thus suggesting enduring effects of prior political 
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socialization. Also, as acknowledged in the preceding chapter, in spite of the rudimentary 
nature of the construct of imported socialization, this construct has provided strong 
evidence in support of the core hypotheses of this study. Improved measures can only be 
expected to establish stronger relationships between prior political experiences and 
immigrants’ political behaviors once in the new host country.    
Directionality of Political Engagement after Migration 
   The final round of tests included in this chapter concern the directionality of 
political engagement once in the United States. Recall that the MVS 2003 includes 
questions on vote intention in both countries (Mexico and the U.S.) for its sub-sample of 
399 first-generation U.S. residents who were born in Mexico. On these final analyses, I 
rely on these items but with a different coding scheme.  
The dependent variable is constructed as follows. Respondents were asked if 
“elections were held today,” would they expect to vote for a Democratic candidate, a 
Republican, a candidate other than a Democrat or a Republican, or would they opt not to 
participate. For these final models, these responses are recoded, with a value of 0 used to 
indicate that the respondent would opt not to participate (34.1 percent of respondents) or 
that the respondent would vote for a candidate other than a Democrat or Republican (1.2 
percent), with a value of 1 used to indicate that the respondent would expect to vote for a 
Democratic candidate (44.6 percent), and 2 used to indicate that the respondent would 
expect to vote for a Republican candidate (20.1 percent). 
 The first key independent construct in these analyses is represented via a set of 
indicator variables that account for each respondent’s attachment with any of the three 
main political parties in Mexico, the PRD (8.0 percent of respondents), the PRI (17.0 
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percent), or the PAN (30.8 percent). The expectation is that Democrats should be 
nurtured by the PRD partisans, the PRI partisans, and the PAN partisans in that order. By 
the same token, Republicans should be nurtured by the PAN partisans, the PRI partisans, 
and the PRD partisans, in that strict order. Table 3.8 displays the bivariate relationship 
between the dependent variable and the key independent variable described above. As it 
should be evident from that table, the expectation regarding preference for the 
Democratic Party might hold. However, the expectations regarding the Republican 
identification seem to be set up for a surprising result.  
 The second key independent construct is included via the set of indicator variables 
accounting for both intensity and directionality of ideology: “non-ideologues,” “extreme 
left,” “center left,” “center right,” and “extreme right,” with “centrists” as the reference 
category. Here, the expectation is that if ideological spectrums in the two countries are 
similar in range, centrists on the left should be more likely to display an affinity with the 
Democrats whereas centrists on the right should be more likely to display an affinity with 
the Republicans. However, if the American ideological continuum appears truncated to 
the Mexican immigrants, I would expect individuals from the extreme left to be the least 
likely to engage politically once in the United States. 
In an effort to keep models comparable throughout my analyses, other variables 
included in the models both in Table 3.9 and Table 3.10 are age upon arrival, two 
indicator variables accounting for language skills (Bilingual and English, with Spanish as 
the reference category), education, income, and frequency of attendance at religious 
services. In order to test whether or not the impact of pre-migration factors on post-
migration political behavior are strongest for immigrants with low levels of education, an 
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interaction term between partisan attachments in Mexico and education levels was 
included in the models on Tables 3.9 and 3.10. Also, in Table 3.10 I explore possible 
attenuation effects, therefore the model includes not only the count of years spent in the 
United States, but also the corresponding interactions between this variable and the set of 
key indicator variables accounting for Mexican partisan attachments (with the PRD, the 
PRI, and the PAN) as well as with ideological predispositions.  
 Results from the multinomial logistic regression analysis on Table 3.9 suggest 
that, though to varying degrees, all of the three main partisan identifications in Mexico 
provide an important baseline to become engaged with either of the two main political 
parties in the United States. This result to a certain extent is striking, but is in line with 
previous findings in the before migration analyses of this chapter. If indeed this is the 
case, these two sets of results together strongly suggest that translation of partisan 
attachments from one’s country of origin to the new host country are rather complex, and 
further studies are in order to understand the underpinnings of such a translation process. 
It is clear, though, that non-ideologues are less likely than ideologues in general to 
become politically engaged with either of the two main American parties. Moreover, 
results from Table 3.10 displayed in a graphic manner in Figure 3.7 deserve some final 
consideration. First, with the only exception of non-ideologues and according to my 
expectations, immigrants who held a partisan attachment with the PRD in Mexico are 
consistently more likely, in a proportion of at least two to one, to hold a preference 
toward the Democratic Party in the United States than to hold a preference toward the 
Republican Party. The pattern described above is observed among immigrants who are 
considered “new arrivals,” individuals who have spent one year or less in the United 
85 
States. By the same token, with the only exception of individuals who place themselves 
to the center-left of the ideological continuum, immigrants who held a partisan 
attachment with the PRD in Mexico and who have spent an average of 17 years in their 
new home experience a decline in their probabilities of holding a preference toward the 
Republican Party. The average magnitude of this decrease over time, though, is rather 
negligible. In fact, all things considered this result is politically striking and potentially 
consequential. 
  Concerning the predicted probabilities of becoming either a Democrat or a 
Republican voter for PRI partisans who have migrated to the United States, the pattern is 
not that dissimilar to that one found for PRD partisan immigrants. However, two key 
differences deserve consideration. First, non-ideologue PRI partisans seem to undergo a 
dramatic re-socialization process by which their predicted probabilities of developing an 
attachment with either the Democrats or the Republicans experience a sharp increase over 
time. On average, the predicted probabilities more than double for both Democratic and 
Republican preferences. These predicted probabilities move from 0.07 to 0.22 and from 
0.22 to 0.37, for expected Democrats and expected Republicans respectively, in the first 
17 years of life of PRI partisans in the United States. Second, although the gap between 
the predicted probabilities of holding a Democratic preference vs. the predicted 
probabilities of holding a Republican preference is narrower than for PRD partisans, as 
expected, the wider gaps are found precisely on the right categories of the ideological 
spectrum rather than on the left ones.  
 Finally, let us consider immigrants who held partisan attachments with the PAN 
in Mexico. The pattern is strikingly similar to that one found for PRI partisan immigrants. 
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First, non-ideologue PAN partisans seem to experience a dramatic re-socialization 
process as well. Their predicted probabilities of developing an attachment with either the 
Democrats or the Republicans increase from 0.07 to 0.33 for the Democratic option and 
from 0.16 to 0.42 for the Republican camp in their first 17 years in the new host country. 
This is, the first figure more than quadruples whereas the second one more than doubles. 
Second, in the case of PAN partisans, with the exception of those in the center-left, the 
predicted probabilities of developing an attachment with the Republicans does not 
experience substantial changes with the passage of time. Finally, it is to be noted that, on 
average for the three main partisan identifications in Mexico, the gap between the 
prospects of becoming either a Democrat or a Republican is at its narrowest among PRI 
partisans rather than among PAN partisans. 
 These latter results call for a follow-up study and more in-depth analysis of the 
translation of partisan attachments from one context to the other. Needless to say, the 
study should take time seriously (Mitchell 2008), and it should try to encompass partisans 
not only from Mexico but from other sending countries around the globe. Details 
regarding suggested follow-up studies are explained in further depth in the final chapter 
of this dissertation. If present findings were to be corroborated, these latter results in the 
current chapter would have some potentially relevant political implications for the 
American parties’ strategies of engaging the immigrant population in a more active civic 
life in the United States. These speculations are also offered in the concluding chapter of 
this dissertation. 
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Conclusions 
The core thesis advanced in this dissertation is that immigrants’ political 
connections and attitudes with regard to their countries of origin will influence post-
migration political predispositions and behaviors once these individuals have settled in 
the United States. This thesis incorporates multiple specific components. Two of those 
components have been examined thus far. Specifically, in the preceding chapter I 
examined whether levels of trust in the country of origin’s government influences an 
individual’s broader views of the political sphere, including trust in American politics. 
Second, in the current chapter, I have considered whether an immigrant’s attachment with 
a political party in the country of origin influences the likelihood that the individual will 
be politically engaged in the United States. The analyses reported here offer strong 
evidence to support both of these hypothesized effects. Using our hypothetical examples, 
it seems fair to say that what happens in Los Mochis does not stay in Los Mochis. 
Instead, immigrants pack their prior political experiences and views in their political 
suitcases, later bringing them to bear when those immigrants try to make sense of the new 
context they face: the American political arena.  
Had I ignored survey respondents’ prior political experiences, findings thus far 
establish that our understanding of post-migration political engagement would have been 
incomplete both in terms of their trust in American government and in their partisan 
attachments once in the United States. To a substantial degree, what these individuals 
encountered in their nations of origin shape how they approach the American political 
system. When immigrants are treated as political blank slates, we completely overlook 
these important components of political behavior. Building on these findings, the final 
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matter to be considered is whether pre-migration experiences also matter for patterns in 
post-migration political participation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
BRINGING DEMOCRACY ALONG? 
IMMIGRANTS’ POLITICAL PARTICIPATION  
 
In democracies, mass participation in politics plays a central role in ensuring 
political accountability and the effective representation of citizens’ interests. 
Accordingly, students of political behavior have long recognized the importance of 
research on the antecedents of participation. The literature on political participation has 
widely documented the relevance of socioeconomic status, mobilization efforts and civic 
skills (Verba and Nie 1972; Leighley and Nagler 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; 
Verba et al 1993; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Pioneering explanations of 
immigrants’ political behavior embraced this framework focusing on such post-arrival 
factors, as well as immigrants’ minority status, economic advancement, and foreign 
policy concerns (Cain, Kiewiet and Uhlaner 1991). However, as outlined in the preceding 
chapters, this line of research fails to acknowledge that all of those post-arrival factors 
can be directly influenced by the immigration experience itself, thus falling short of 
linking how pre-migration political experiences may be coloring not only those post-
arrival factors, but also post-migration behaviors themselves.   
In the present chapter, I conclude the empirical exploration of the impact of pre-
migration experiences on post-migration attitudes and behaviors. This chapter shifts 
attention from attitudes to behaviors, by studying immigrants’ political participation after 
migration. Specifically, I test the extent to which prior political experiences affect one’s 
engagement in political activities once in the United States. The analyses presented in this 
chapter focus on a wide range of political activities, some of which can be performed by 
any immigrant to the United States, such as participating in a public meeting or 
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demonstration, and some of which can be performed only by naturalized immigrants such 
as the act of voting. The idea is to test whether the imported socialization process helps 
us understand immigrants’ political behaviors in general, regardless of these individuals’ 
migratory status in their new host country. Of course, as in the previous two chapters, I 
also test whether the impact of pre-migration experiences fades over time.   
The present chapter is divided into three sections. As in the preceding two 
empirical chapters, the first section offers the expectations regarding the connection 
between pre-migration political attitudes, measured here with the pre-adult imported 
socialization construct, and immigrants’ political engagement –measured in this chapter 
as participation in political activities. However, given data availability, this chapter’s 
empirical tests are devoted only to after migration analyses.  
The second section of the chapter offers empirical tests devoted to understanding 
the effects of imported socialization on political activities such as contacting officials, 
contributing money to political campaigns, working for candidates, attending public 
meetings or demonstrations, and attending political party meetings. In this section, the 
analyses are conducted considering the full sample of first generation immigrants. The 
results should help us understand whether pre-migration political experiences affect post-
migration political participation in activities that do not require citizenship in the new 
polity.  
The third section focuses on immigrants’ participation at the polls; that is, 
whether immigrants vote in American elections. Thus, the tests are conducted restricting 
the analyses to only those immigrants who report having become American citizens. The 
idea here is to test the extent to which immigrants’ prior political experiences affect their 
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propensity to vote in elections taking place in the U.S. context. I conclude this chapter 
with some general considerations concerning the impact of prior political experiences on 
immigrants’ political participation. 
The Impact of Imported Socialization on Political Participation: The Expectations 
In Participation in America, Verba and Nie (1972) argue that individuals’ 
decisions to participate in politics hinge upon social circumstances, which they label as 
“life space,” including factors such as education, race, the place they live and what they 
do for a living. My argument is that, for immigrants, we must account not only for the 
person’s present life space, but also for the prior life space—that is, for aspects of the 
context in the immigrant’s nation of origin. Indeed, in order to better understand first 
generation immigrants’ political behavior once in the United States, such prior life space 
is key to making sense of their decisions to be politically engaged. After all, although 
they are facing a different life space from the one in which they were originally 
socialized, it surely is not the case that all memory and impact of the prior life space will 
vanish at the moment of migration. Furthermore, if pre-migration experiences are posited 
to influence post-migration patterns in political participation, then the persistence of the 
effects of those effects also deserves thoughtful inquiry. 
In another classic work, The Civic Culture, Almond and Verba (1963) explore 
how differences in political systems lead to different kinds of cognitive, affective, and 
evaluative orientations towards politics in general. They conducted cross-national survey 
research in five nations and classified political systems into three subtypes,30 two of 
                                                 
30 The three subtypes are the following: parochial, subject and participant. Parochial cultures refer 
to those found in tribal societies or autonomous local communities. Under subject political 
cultures, Almond and Verba argue, the individual “is aware of specialized governmental 
authority; he is affectively oriented to it, perhaps taking pride in it, perhaps disliking it; and he 
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which will be particularly relevant for the discussion to come, namely: the subject and the 
participant subtypes. Although these authors acknowledge that political systems display 
degrees of heterogeneity in the kind of individuals that integrate them, all else equal, 
citizens of subject political systems are expected to show a more passive role whereas 
those from participant ones are more likely to display a more active role in the polity. In 
short, these authors find that certain political systems have the potential to better equip 
their citizens to deal with the task of navigating and engaging in the political world. 
Evaluating the findings of these two major works from the American and the 
Comparative subfields of our discipline, some implications follow that deserve further 
consideration. At the most obvious level, one needs to acknowledge that “context” (life 
space) is fundamental to understanding individual political behavior. However, this is 
already a very widely documented claim in the discipline (e.g., Huckfeldt 1986; 
Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Huckfeldt et al 1995; Canache 1996; Kuklinski and Quirk 
2001; Gay 2004; Gimpel and Lay 2005; Zuckerman 2005; McClurg 2006; Cho et al 
2006; Mutz and Mondak 2006; Cho and Rudolph 2008). But if context is so 
consequential when accounting for an individual’s attitudes, beliefs and behaviors, one is 
certainly left to wonder why so little attention has been paid to the role of pre-migration 
political context once individuals cross a nation’s borders. 
As illustrated in earlier chapters, the social and political situations in immigrants’ 
original contexts potentially could have changed over time, providing individuals from 
                                                                                                                                                 
evaluates it either as legitimate or as not. But the relationship is toward the system on the general 
level […] it is essentially a passive relationship, although there is […] a limited form of 
competence that is appropriate (for the individual) in a subject culture” (1963: 17-18). Finally, 
under the participant culture, individuals are aware of both the system a a whole as well as of the 
political and administrative processes. Moreover, individuals tend to display an “activist” role of 
the self, which can range from acceptance to rejection.  
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the very same country with different conditions and experiences. As should be clear by 
now, as posited in the introductory chapter, the immigrant from Nicaragua should not be 
viewed identically regardless of whether this person came of political age under the 
Somozas, the Sandinistas, or during the post-Sandinista presidencies of Violeta Chamorro 
or Arnoldo Aleman. In other words, and as shown empirically in the two preceding 
chapters, one should expect that pre-migration political experiences should affect post-
migration political engagement, but also that those influences will be best understood if 
we account for nuance. Socialization under different gradations of democracy in one’s 
country of origin has a lasting imprint on an individual’s decision to navigate politics 
once in the United States. Thus far, I have tested this claim with focus on political 
attitudes and beliefs. Following the same straightforward logic, let me turn the discussion 
now to political behaviors. So now the question seems obvious: is it indeed the case that 
individuals who were politicized in a more authoritarian context are necessarily ill 
equipped to perform any kind of political activity once they migrate to a more democratic 
context? Is it indeed the case that individuals who were exposed to more democratic 
contexts during their pre-adult socialization years will outperform their counterparts who 
were exposed to more authoritarian backgrounds in terms of political participation? Are 
individuals with more authoritarian backgrounds just as likely as their counterparts with 
more democratic backgrounds to engage in a public demonstration but not as likely to 
turn out to vote? By addressing these questions, the present chapter’s empirical analyses 
delve into the question of how democracy (or the lack thereof) affects individual political 
behavior. Recall that in the words of Sidney Verba, the recent waves of immigration to 
the United States are a “major natural experiment” (1994). Building upon this idea, I 
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argue that taking pre-migration political experiences into account allows us to uncover 
whether differences in political participation patterns are due to the fact that some 
individuals received the “treatment” of exposure to democratic contexts whereas other 
individuals simply didn’t. 
In order to start addressing these questions concerning the effects of imported 
socialization on political participation, let me use some hypothetical examples one final 
time to lay out the empirical expectations of this chapter. Recall “Jose,” “Juan,” and 
“Nacho.” Both Jose and Nacho grew up under the dominance of the hegemonic party 
system in Mexico whereas Juan grew up under more democratic conditions. Jose and 
Nacho’s opportunities to participate in politics were limited to the specific channels 
allowed and provided by the PRI regime. By contrast, Juan’s pre-migration political 
experiences encompassed witnessing political efforts from the opposition to the 
hegemonic system, which eventually resulted in PRI defeats in local elections. If one 
considers that political participation has potential to form habitual behaviors only when 
individuals engage in activities in more democratic contexts, then, all else equal, fueled 
by this pre-migration experience, Juan should be expected to be more likely to participate 
in politics following migration than Jose and Nacho. In other words, under this 
consideration, one should expect that immigrants coming from more democratic contexts 
should be more likely to become politically active in the American political arena than 
their counterparts coming from more authoritarian contexts. 
An argument has been made in earlier chapters, though, that certain authoritarian 
regimes might have attempted to socialize individuals into political participation for 
legitimacy-seeking purposes. That is indeed the case of the old regime under the single-
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party dominance in Mexico, where from the very foundation of the PRI in March of 1929 
(PNR at the time of its foundation – National Revolutionary Party), one of this party’s 
main goals was to build up a rather complex system produced by individuals and 
organizations from very diverse sectors of society such as peasants, factory workers, and 
bureaucrats, and their corresponding unions and associations (Garrido 1982, for related 
work also see Davis 1976). These individuals, unions, and associations were used to 
bring about “ideological” cohesiveness within the party’s rank and files, thus facilitating 
more effective leadership and means of mass mobilization during the electoral processes. 
but it is not exclusive to the experience of this country alone. Also in Chapter Two, I 
showed that, all else equal, immigrants coming from more democratic contexts display 
relatively lower levels of trust toward American political institutions than their 
counterparts coming from more authoritarian contexts. Think again of Nacho. Among 
these three hypothetical immigrants, Nacho is the one who arguably holds the highest 
expectations regarding the workings of the U.S. political system. He may find it so 
dissimilar to the Mexican one on account of both competitiveness and efficacy that, in 
spite of background in an authoritarian political context, Nacho may decide to engage in 
politics given that this time the venture seems worth the effort. Thus, one cannot rule out, 
at least not a priori, the potential effects of being exposed to political activities 
experienced by individuals in their countries of origin even if they took place under 
relatively authoritarian conditions.  
Now, let me introduce two final hypothetical immigrants, “Pablo” and “Pancho.” 
First, Pablo, just like Juan, experienced the novelty and upheavals associated with the 
vibrancy of the Mexican political transition to democracy. However, unlike Juan, Pablo’s 
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sense of personal efficacy was not heightened by this pre-migration experience. To the 
contrary, his original expectations regarding political change in Mexico after Vicente 
Fox’s victory were shattered. Pablo became highly disappointed in national politics after 
the PRI was kicked out from Los Pinos,31 which seemed, in his view, to indicate that 
Mexico was back to business as usual. Pablo’s disappointment made him walk away from 
politics in general, in spite of the unprecedented changes that were taking place before his 
own eyes. Under this scenario, one should expect Pablo to be the least likely to engage in 
politics following migration to the United States. It is a matter of empirical test whether 
Pablo can be as likely to engage in political activities as Juan once in America.  
Pancho is a close friend of Jose. In fact, Pancho and Jose met back in their days as 
members of the PRI youth organization. Pancho was a very active member who 
constantly participated in street demonstrations and party meetings. Unlike Pablo, Pancho 
was not affected by the fact that politics looked to be “more of the same”32 after Vicente 
Fox took office. Pancho still participated in public demonstrations called by the PRI. In 
other words, the only real change that took place for Pancho was that these 
demonstrations were no longer massive displays of support for the PRI administrations, 
but rather demonstrations against the newly elected Fox administration. This experience 
could make Pancho at least as likely as Juan to be engaged in certain political activities 
following migration to the United States. Thus, as a refinement to my first expectation, 
                                                 
31 Los Pinos is the presidential house in Mexico City – equivalent to the White House in the 
United States or la Casa Rosada in Argentina. The phrase is a direct reference to the famous 
motto promoted by Vicente Fox on the campaign trail. Fox repeatedly said that true change in 
Mexico had to start by “kicking out the PRI from Los Pinos.” In Spanish: “Vamos a sacar al PRI 
a patadas de Los Pinos.” 
32 One of the slogans run by the opposition to the PRI during the 2000 campaign asked the voters 
whether they wanted six years of “more of the same,” or as it was originally aired in Spanish: seis 
años “más de lo mismo.” 
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immigrants coming from highly democratic contexts should be just as likely as those 
coming from authoritarian contexts to become politically active in the American political 
arena. 
Recall here that in the preceding chapters I have advanced an expectation 
regarding for whom the imported socialization process operates the strongest. This 
prediction posits that the impact of pre-migration factors on post-migration political 
attitudes, beliefs and behaviors will be strongest for immigrants with low levels of 
education. Thus far, this expectation has found little empirical support. However, given 
the widely documented role of education on political participation, it seems especially 
important to test for the possibility that immigrants with relatively lower levels of 
education may engage in analogical reasoning when it comes to deciding whether to 
participate in American politics.  
Finally, let me lay out one last expectation, which has been discussed earlier at 
length. The effects of imported socialization may not remain stable over time. Thus, just 
as in the preceding chapters, it will be necessary to test for potential attenuation effects. 
Up to this point, I have found little evidence in support of attenuation effects, suggesting 
that the content of imported political suitcases does not fade as time goes by. However, it 
remains an empirical question whether that is indeed the case when it comes to political 
participation. 
Making Their Voices Heard and Known 
Recall that in general one should expect that immigrants who were socialized 
under more democratic contexts will be more likely to participate in American politics 
than their counterparts who were socialized under more authoritarian contexts. However, 
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a revised version of this expectation reads as follows: individuals coming from both 
highly democratic contexts as well as those coming from authoritarian contexts should be 
more likely to become politically active following migration than their counterparts 
coming from transitional contexts. Under either of these expectations prior political 
experience is again defined purely in terms of the individual’s encounter with the 
political context in the nation of origin. Thus, I will rely again upon the construct of pre-
adult “imported socialization.”33 However, given these initial expectations, I will use both 
a linear and a squared term of the construct throughout the empirical tests.  
The dependent variable in this portion of the analysis defines political 
participation as a self-reported count of political activities in which respondents engaged 
during the last calendar year. The NSL 2004 contains five items concerning political 
participation beyond the act of voting, which were used for the construction of this first 
dependent variable. Specifically, the five items asked respondents regarding their own 
engagement in the following political activities during the past calendar year: 1) whether 
respondents have contacted government officials; 2) contributed money to campaigns; 3) 
worked for political candidates; 4) attended public meetings or demonstrations; and 5) 
attended political party meetings. Table 4.1 displays the descriptive statistics for the five 
political activities in which first generation immigrants engaged in the last year prior to 
the survey. Note that from the total number of self-reported activities (425), 56.7 percent 
(241) of them are either “attending a public demonstration” or “attending a party 
meeting.” These two activities may drive the results presented later, thus, the more 
                                                 
33 Again, for a full description of the construction of this measurement, please see the 
corresponding section in the preceding chapter. Also, see Appendix B for more details regarding 
the distribution of the imported socialization scores by country of origin and by dataset utilized in 
this study. Table 2, in the Appendix, contains the information on the NSL 2004.  
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important it becomes to test whether immigrants coming from authoritarian contexts also 
become politically active in the United States given that these types of activities are not 
unusual practices even under single-party systems. 
A factor analysis was used to determine whether all of the five items could be 
used to build an index of political participation. Indeed, all items loaded on a single 
factor, with a minimum factor loading of 0.44; the items combine to form a reliable scale 
with an alpha of 0.68.34 For simplicity in the interpretation of results, a simple additive 
index was then constructed, adopting a minimum value of zero and a maximum of five, 
with each value representing the count of activities in which respondents engaged in the 
past calendar year. Table 4.2 displays the distribution of cases for the political 
participation index, comparing the observed count of activities among Latinos that were 
born in the United States with the observed count of activities among first generation 
immigrants. Not surprisingly, first generation immigrant Latinos are less likely to engage 
in all of these political activities than Latinos who were born already in the United States. 
However, we know that participation in politics generally is characterized by lower levels 
of engagement, meaning that a preponderance of cases coded “0” and “1” should be 
expected. Latino immigrants are no exception to this general pattern. Moreover, my main 
goal here it is not to test the levels of immigrants’ political engagement in and of 
themselves, but rather how much of political engagement among these individuals is 
driven by pre-migration political experiences.  
                                                 
34 Both the minimum factor loading and the alpha are somewhat low. Thus, I considered the 
possibility that a more reliable scale could be constructed using only four of the five items. 
Toward this end, reliability analysis was performed on all of the different four-item subsets of the 
five items. The highest value of alpha was in fact reached when all of the five items were 
included.  
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The chief independent variable in the following models is the construct of 
“imported socialization.” The construct of imported socialization35 used here is the same 
as the one in the preceding chapters. Here, I also define the immigrant’s prior political 
context in terms of gradations of democracy, by taking advantage of the Polity IV dataset. 
Recall that in order to reflect the pre-adult socialization effects, the measure takes into 
consideration only up to the first 18 years of life of the respondents. This variable ranges 
from a conceptual minimum value of zero (most authoritarian) to a maximum of 20 (most 
democratic), however the actual observed values in these data range from 1 to 20. Again, 
given my mixed expectations, a squared term of this construct is incorporated into the 
analyses. 
In addition to those tests concerning the core of this chapter’s empirical 
expectations, a round of tests is incorporated to estimate whether the effects of pre-
migration political experiences are any stronger among immigrants with lower levels of 
education and whether the imported socialization effects, in general, attenuate as time 
goes by. To consider the former possibility, models three and four in Table 4.4 
incorporate the interaction between the imported socialization measure and education. To 
test the latter possibility, the final model (four) in Table 4.4 includes not only the count of 
years spent in the United States, but also the interaction between this count and the 
imported socialization construct.  
Again, in an effort to keep the models across this dissertation’s empirical chapters 
comparable, other variables included in the models are efficacy, age upon arrival, 
                                                 
35 For a full description of the construction of this measurement, please see the corresponding 
section in the preceding chapter. Also, see Appendix B for more details regarding the distribution 
of the imported socialization scores by country of origin and by dataset utilized in this study. 
Table 2, in the Appendix, contains the information on the NSL 2004. Table 3 contains the details 
regarding the LNS 2006.  
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indicators of language skills, income, education, and frequency of attendance at religious 
services. Efficacy was measured with an item through which respondents were asked to 
assess whether citizens can have an influence on government by engaging in different 
political activities. Income reflects estimates of respondents’ household income in 
thousand of dollars per year using the mid point of the range of every category for every 
respondent. In the case of education, the variable values reflect the number of completed 
school years by every respondent. Religious attendance was also recoded to produce a 
measure which provides with an estimate number of days attended per year for every 
respondent. In order to account for language skills two indicator variables were 
operationalized, bilingual and English dominant at home, where the reference category is 
Spanish dominant at home. 
Table 4.3 presents the results of the estimated Poisson regression models where 
the dependent variable is the count of political activities in which the respondent has 
engaged during the last calendar year, and independent variables include the series of 
individual-level controls described above, plus the respondent-specific measure of 
imported socialization and its squared term. In models one and two the coefficient of the 
key independent variable does not reach statistical significance under either of the first 
two specifications. In other words, neither the linear nor the squared specification of the 
imported socialization measure reaches statistical significance. However, in model 3 in 
Table 4.4 both coefficients attain statistical significance along with the interaction term 
involving education. For simplicity purposes on the interpretation, the results of model 3 
in Table 4.4 are summarized graphically in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, where I report predicted 
probabilities of political participation in terms of engagement in a number of political 
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activities in one given year. The vertical axis in each case is the expected count of 
activities and the horizontal is the respondent-specific Polity-based measure of imported 
socialization. In both figures, all other variables are held constant at their mean or at their 
modal category in the case of indicator variables. In Figure 4.2, though, education levels 
are varied to represent relatively low (9 years of schooling) and relatively high levels (13 
years) of education.   
Figure 4.1 suggests that, all else equal, immigrants who come from more 
democratic contexts are slightly less likely than their counterparts who come from more 
authoritarian ones to become engaged in political activities following migration. Figure 
4.2 provides a nuanced reading to this story. Contrary to my expectations, the pattern just 
described above is sharper for immigrants with relatively high levels of education than 
for those with relatively low levels of education/sophistication. In other words, 
immigrants with low levels of education display a constantly medium-low propensity to 
engage in politics regardless of the context under which they were politicized, whereas 
immigrants with relatively high levels of education who come from more authoritarian 
contexts are slightly more likely to engage in politics following migration than their 
counterparts who come from more democratic contexts. Although caution is warranted 
regarding the conclusions one can draw from these results, one can speculate that these 
results suggest that among the best educated there might be two different patterns of 
immigration. Among this category, those who were socialized under more authoritarian 
contexts might have indeed migrated to America for political reasons, thus pursuing the 
freedom to participate, whereas for those who were socialized under more democratic 
conditions, and that presumably are not seeking political freedom, the motivation to 
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migrate might be a rather economic one. In short, utilizing Almond and Verba’s (1963) 
terms, it is plausible that among those immigrants who have better educational resources, 
some participant citizens may still emerge from authoritarian contexts of socialization. 
 The interaction terms between age upon arrival and the imported socialization 
terms never attain statistical significance under any specification, thus suggesting that 
regardless of their age upon arrival in their new home, immigrants’ political suitcases are 
relevant to understand their proclivity to engage or not in political activities following 
migration. By the same token, in model four in Table 4.4, neither of the coefficients of 
the interaction terms between years spent in the United States and the imported 
socialization terms (linear and squared) reach statistical significance, suggesting again 
that the effect of prior socialization might actually endure the passage of time. 
Immigrants’ Political Suitcases at the Polls 
Thus far, the analyses on political participation have focused on activities that can 
be performed long before immigrants are enfranchised through the process of 
naturalization. However, it remains to be tested whether pre-migration political 
experiences may have an effect on these individuals’ propensity to show at the polls on 
Election Day once they have become citizens of their new home. In order to test this 
latter possibility, the analyses in this section rely upon the Latino National Survey 2006 
(LNS 2006). The dependent variable in the following section of the analyses defines 
political participation as a self-reported account of having voted in the 2004 presidential 
election in the United States. The analyses hereafter are thus restricted to the sub-sample 
of respondents who claim to be naturalized citizens of the U.S. In other words, instead of 
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analyzing the 5,653 original cases of immigrants available in the sample, the focus is on 
those 1,875 individuals who self-report already holding citizenship in their new home.  
The dependent variable uses a binary scale where 1 denotes having reported 
voting in the 2004 election (63.3 percent) and 0 denotes otherwise. The main independent 
variable again is the construct of imported socialization. Recall that although this variable 
has a conceptual minimum value of zero and a maximum of 20, the actual observed 
values range from 1 to 20. Given my mixed expectations, a squared term of this construct 
again is included in the models. 
Following the same structure of the preceding section, I first offer tests 
concerning the impact of imported socialization on levels of electoral participation. Next, 
the analyses incorporate tests to estimate whether the effects of pre-migration political 
experiences are any stronger among immigrants with lower levels of 
education/sophistication and whether the content of these immigrants’ political suitcases 
wane with the passage of time. Models three and four in Table 4.6 incorporate the 
interaction terms between the imported socialization measure (both linear and squared 
terms) and education to assess the first possibility, whereas the fourth and final model 
also includes the interaction between the count of years spent in the United States with 
the imported socialization construct to assess the second possibility.  
The other variables included in these models are again efficacy, age upon arrival, 
indicators of language skills, income, education, and frequency of attendance at religious 
services. Efficacy was measured with an item in which respondents were asked to assess 
whether citizens can have an influence on government by engaging in different political 
activities. Income reflects estimates of respondents’ household income in thousand of 
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dollars per year using the mid point of the range of every category for every respondent. 
In the case of education, the variable values reflect the number of completed school years 
by every respondent. Religious attendance was again recoded to produce a measure of an 
estimate number of days attended per year for every respondent. In order to account for 
language skills two indicator variables were operationalized, bilingual and English 
dominant at home, where the reference category is Spanish dominant at home.  
Table 4.5 presents the results of the logistic regression models where the 
dependent variable is the indicator variable accounting for respondent’s self-reported 
participation in the 2004 election, and the independent variables include the series of 
individual-level controls described above, in addition to the respondent-specific measure 
of imported socialization and its squared term. In model one in this table the coefficient 
of imported socialization is positive and attains statistical significance. In other words, 
this result suggests that, all else being equal, immigrants whose pre-migration political 
experiences were nurtured by more democratic contexts are indeed more likely to vote in 
American elections once they have become naturalized citizens of their new home than 
their counterparts whose experiences were nurtured by more authoritarian contexts. 
Model two in Table 4.5 offers a slightly modified version of the original one, 
where the only difference is the inclusion of the squared term of the imported 
socialization measure. As it can be seen, both coefficients fall short of reaching statistical 
significance. Therefore, one can conclude that when it comes to voting, democratic 
contexts appear to equip individuals in a better fashion than do authoritarian ones. Again, 
these results should be considered in context. While the negative slope in the preceding 
section of this chapter refers to immigrants in general, regardless of their migratory status 
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in the United States, the positive slope in this section of the chapter refers to only those 
immigrants who have become citizens to the new host nation. For instance, the average 
length of stay among immigrants in general is 17 years, whereas the average years spent 
in the United States for those individuals who have become citizens is 27 years.  
The results of model one in table 4.5 are summarized graphically in Figure 4.3, 
where I report predicted probabilities of having voted in the 2004 U.S. presidential 
election. The vertical axis is the predicted probability of the respondent reporting having 
voted in such election and the horizontal axis is the respondent-specific Polity-based 
measure of imported socialization. All other variables are held constant at their mean or 
at their modal category in the case of indicator variables. The estimates provide strong 
corroboration of the core expectation. In very simple terms, immigrants who were 
exposed to more democratic contexts during their pre-adult socialization years are more 
likely to vote in American elections than their counterparts who grew up under more 
authoritarian conditions.  
Note that once the squared term of the imported socialization measure is 
incorporated, the measure never attains statistical significance under any other 
specification, suggesting the presence of only direct and linear effects. The interaction 
terms between age upon arrival and the imported socialization terms never attain 
statistical significance under any specification. Also, in model four in Table 4.6, neither 
of the coefficients of the interaction terms between years spent in the United States and 
the imported socialization terms (linear and squared) reach statistical significance, 
suggesting one last time that the effect of prior socialization might actually endure in 
these individuals’ political hearts and minds as their new civic lives unfold in their new 
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home. This latter finding is unsurprising in the present case, given, as noted above, that 
immigrants who are eligible to vote have resided in the United States for an average of 27 
years. 
Conclusions 
Both illustrations offered at the beginning of the introductory chapter should be 
recalled as we have come full circle to the final section of the final empirical chapter of 
this study. Both the massive public demonstrations by Latino immigrants and their 
sometimes “early” identification with one of the two major American parties should 
stress the fact that political engagement (both psychological and physical) among first 
generation immigrants takes place regardless of how little time they have lived in the 
United States and regardless of their legal status. In fact, as shown throughout this 
dissertation’s pages, these individuals can and do become engaged in political activities 
long before they are enfranchised through the naturalization process once in the United 
States. Consequentially, and perhaps more importantly, immigrants’ political behavior 
can be better understood by peeking into immigrants’ political suitcases. This is to say, 
we gain important new insight by acknowledging the presence of an imported 
socialization process and by incorporating immigrants’ pre-migration political 
experiences into our models. 
This study has focused on the intensity and directionality of engagement by 
looking at the effect of both “contextual” and “individual” forces that shape the size and 
content of immigrants’ political suitcases. Given the different tests and the recurrence of 
some findings across the different datasets, this study’s findings and core conclusions are 
believed to stand upon solid ground. Immigrants should not be treated as political blank 
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slates. These individuals come to the United States with political suitcases, which are 
important, if not fundamental, components of their political behavior. Admittedly, further 
research is still required to determine the specific weight of such suitcases on particular 
political activities and whether this study’s findings can be extended to immigrants from 
other regions of the world. However, after three empirical chapters, several dependent 
variables and two very different ways to approach the imported socialization 
phenomenon, I feel comfortable to say that this theory was laid out to generate “as many 
observable implications as possible,” which allowed to “put the theory at risk of being 
falsified more times” (King et al 1994: 19). Now, building on all of these findings, let me 
turn our attention to some final considerations both in terms of the next research steps to 
follow and certain policy consequences that may be derived from this study’s findings. 
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CHAPTER 5 
“EL OTRO LADO”36 OF IMMIGRANTS’ POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 
 
 The final paragraphs of Isabel Allende’s De Amor y de Sombra37 describe the 
struggles faced by the main characters of the story as they are leaving their country of 
origin. Francisco Leal and Irene Beltrán are forced to flee their home country given their 
involvement in a chain of events that revealed the authoritarian regime’s efforts to 
suppress political opposition using all means imaginable. As they prepare to leave 
everything behind to seek refuge in a new host nation, the young journalists stand in the 
midst of a valley in between two nations. The image could not be any more appropriate to 
illustrate the core thesis of this dissertation. Their last words before leaving their 
homeland suggest they have hope they will be able to return one day, but the dialogue 
also conveys their sense of fear, uncertainty and nostalgia. Those feelings, of course, do 
not vanish once Francisco and Irene cross the border. The byproducts of their political 
experiences in their home country--political attitudes, beliefs and behaviors—stay with 
expatriates.  
This dissertation is a study of political attitudes and behaviors of Latino 
immigrants to the United States. It offers an innovative approach both conceptually and 
methodologically to the study of one key facet of American political behavior. The 
project brings an important comparative flavor and offers potential contributions to the 
vast literatures on political socialization, political attitudes toward democratic 
institutions, partisanship, and political participation. In the following pages I offer a brief 
overview of this study’s main findings, its conceptual implications as well as some 
                                                 
36 The Spanish phrase “El otro lado” translates into the English phrase “The other side.”  
37 The Spanish phrase “De amor y de sombra” translates into the English phrase “Of love and 
shadow.” 
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potential policy consequences, and some ideas concerning the path I envision to further 
advance this research project in the years to come. Accordingly, the chapter is divided 
into three main sections. The first one offers the review of main findings. It is an effort to 
summarize the results and to go beyond them by discussing them in light of how the logic 
of  imported socialization lead us to a better understanding of fundamental concepts of 
political behavior. Next, the second section is devoted to laying out the steps to follow up 
on this research project. Finally, the third section incorporates some potential policy 
implications of my findings into the overall discussion. A case is made that this 
dissertation’s findings may come to alter how political actors in the United States should 
think of and approach the political incorporation of immigrants to this nation. 
Immigrants’ Political Suitcases Do Clear Customs 
In spite of the fact that the United States has led the world in the total number of 
immigrants received for the past two centuries (Ueda 2007), political science efforts to 
provide a systematic account regarding how these individuals use their prior political 
experiences to navigate and adapt to the new political context in which they land have 
been scant.  My dissertation addresses this important question by examining the political 
attitudes, beliefs and behavior of immigrants to the United States, with attention to both 
whether immigrants become politically engaged in their new home and the direction of 
their political engagement. Just as individuals are not blank slates when they come into 
this world (Alford et al. 2005; Mondak 2010), I contend that immigrants are far from 
being political blank slates when they step foot in the United States. To the contrary, my 
research provides evidence that immigrants’ experiences in the nation of origin shape 
behavior across the border.   
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The major contributions of this research project are two-fold. Substantively, 
building upon Lippmann’s (1922) concept of pseudo-environments,38 I show that 
immigrants’ pseudo-environments before migration help these individuals understand the 
political world with which they are presented after migration. The results hold for a wide 
range of dependent variables and across different datasets, strengthening the confidence 
in my findings. By testing the effects of imported socialization on trust in the U.S. 
government on political predispositions (including both intensity and directionality) and 
on political participation, this dissertation is among the first works to shed light on the 
subject matter. My treatment of these issues certainly is the most comprehensive and 
multi-faceted to date.  
Equally important are the methodological contributions of this project. The major 
obstacle to conducting this kind of study in the past has been the absence of pre- and 
post-migration panel data. To overcome this, my general strategy entailed a basic two-
step process. First, I depicted these immigrants’ social and political experiences, or 
related attitudes and behaviors, in the nation of origin. Then, I use these indicators as 
predictors of political activity in the U.S. 
Throughout the empirical tests offered in this dissertation, I have operationalized 
imported socialization in two very different ways, and yet both sets of tests yielded 
strong evidence that past experiences bring enduring effects. Hence, I contend that any 
serious effort to devise a comprehensive account of immigrants’ political behavior needs 
                                                 
38 Recall that Lippmann (1922) posited that, when thinking of the political world, 
individuals would form a “picture in their heads” to which he referred as pseudo-
environments. The concept of pseudo-environment implies that, if at all, individuals will 
experience the political world only in an indirect manner and that their perception of 
reality is what drives these individuals’ assessments of political reality.  
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to contemplate their prior political experiences. Immigrants’ political experiences in their 
countries of origin play a key role in defining their political behavior once in the United 
States.  
Imported Trust 
Chapter Two offers evidence that even before migration, holding the highest level 
of trust in the Mexican government makes individuals more likely than their counterparts 
with the lower level of trust in the Mexican government to display any kind of trust in the 
U.S. government. This pattern is also found among Mexican immigrants who are living 
in the United States. Immigrants who express trust in the government of their country of 
origin are more likely to express trust in their new nation’s political institutions following 
migration. In fact, as trust in the Mexican government increases from its lowest to its 
highest levels, the predicted trust in government in the United States increases by more 
than one full point on a nine-point scale. However, contrary to my expectations, I found 
neither evidence that this effect diminishes over time nor that the effects of imported 
political trust are any stronger for immigrants with relatively low levels of education 
when contrasted with their counterparts who hold higher levels of education.   
When imported socialization is captured with the Polity-based individual-specific 
construct, results show that individuals who are politicized under more democratic 
contexts are indeed more likely to display relatively lower levels of trust in the U.S. 
government than their counterparts who are politicized under more authoritarian 
conditions. However, under this approach, I found evidence of attenuation of effects over 
time. Among those individuals who have spent one year or less in the United States and 
who were exposed to the most democratic conditions during their pre-adult socialization 
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years, the expected level of trust in the U.S. government is lower than the level of trust in 
the U.S. government among those individuals who were politicized under the most 
authoritarian conditions. The story reads a bit differently when those immigrants who 
have spent an average of 17 years in America. Although the pattern remains the same, the 
gap between expected levels of trust for immigrants who were politicized under the most 
democratic conditions versus those who were politicized under the most authoritarian 
conditions narrows considerably. It remains a matter for further inquiry why that it is 
immigrants who have democratic backgrounds and not those with authoritarian 
backgrounds who experience adjustment in their levels of trust toward the U.S. 
government with the passage of time. 
Imported Partisanship 
Chapter Three offers empirical evidence to support that Mexicans who are 
engaged in politics in Mexico to a sufficient extent that they hold partisan attachments are 
indeed relatively more likely to display a clear preference for either of the two major 
political parties in the United States. This relationship observed before migration is 
observed as well among Mexicans after migration to the United States. Holding a 
partisan attachment in one’s home country predicts post-migration political engagement. 
Moreover, again, there is no evidence that this effect vanishes over time. Nor is there 
evidence that this process operates only among immigrants with low levels of 
education/sophistication. In other words, the process of imported socialization by which 
immigrants establish a cognitive link between their old and new political worlds seems 
relevant for any given individual regardless of the person’s levels of 
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education/sophistication, and the said link between old and new political worlds will 
accompany these individuals throughout their civic lives in their new host nation.    
Under a different methodological approach by which imported socialization is 
measured with the Polity-based individual-specific scores, the core finding remains: pre-
migration political experiences matter for post-migration political predispositions. 
Immigrants who were exposed to more democratic contexts during their pre-adult 
socialization years are more likely to become partisans in the United States than their 
counterparts who grew up under more authoritarian conditions. This effect is found in the 
analyses conducted using two different datasets. Also, although present in only one of the 
datasets, there is one finding that deserves one’s attention. When it comes to partisan 
attachments, it seems to be the case that among those immigrants with relatively lower 
levels of education, those who were exposed to more democratic conditions during their 
pre-adult socialization years are almost twice more likely to be engaged politically as 
their counterparts who were exposed to the most authoritarian conditions during the same 
periods of their lives.   
Concerning the possibility of attenuation of effects over time, I found no evidence 
whatsoever in either of the datasets available for this portion of the analyses. Under the 
corresponding specifications, the coefficients on the interaction terms between the 
imported socialization construct and the count of years spent in the United States do not 
reach statistical significance in either of the two datasets, thus providing further 
corroboration of enduring effects of prior political socialization. 
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Imported Ideology 
Chapter Three also offers empirical evidence to support that Mexican non-
ideologues are less likely than Mexican ideologues, in general, to express a preference for 
either of the two American parties before migration. In fact, ideologues outnumber non-
ideologues, in a ratio of at least two to one, when it comes to probabilities of indicating a 
preference for either of the main two American parties. The story remains the same 
following migration. Mexicans living in the United States display the same pattern 
described above. Mexican immigrant non-ideologues are less likely than their ideologue 
counterparts, in general, to display partisan attachments toward the two main American 
parties once in the United States. Among Mexican ideologues, immigrants on the center 
right and right of the spectrum are more likely to engage politically in terms of the 
formation of partisan attachments. 
Imported Participation 
 Due to data availability, Chapter Four does not offer any empirical tests devoted 
to the before migration side of the story. Analyses concerning political participation are 
divided in two sections. The first one deals with political activities open to all residents of 
the United States, regardless of immigration status in the country. The second one tests 
the effects of imported socialization on the prospects that naturalized citizens will vote in 
American elections following migration.  
The tests offered in the first section described above are less comprehensive, and 
yield less compelling results, than those reported elsewhere in this dissertation. However, 
even here there is some evidence that the core expectation also holds for political 
participation when this concept is measured as a count of political acts. Pre-migration 
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political experiences account, at least in part, for post-migration political behavior. If one 
asks the question, “can immigrants bring democracy along?” the results shyly whisper a 
negative answer. Results in the first section of Chapter Four suggest that immigrants who 
come from more democratic contexts are slightly less (and not more) likely than their 
counterparts who come from more authoritarian ones to become engaged in political 
activities following migration.  
Also, contrary to my expectations, the said pattern is sharper for immigrants with 
relatively high levels of education than for those with relatively low levels of 
education/sophistication. More specifically, immigrants with low levels of education 
display a constantly medium-low propensity to engage in politics regardless of the 
context under which they were politicized, whereas immigrants with relatively high 
levels of education who come from more authoritarian contexts are slightly more likely to 
engage in politics following migration than their counterparts who come from more 
democratic contexts. It is yet to be tested whether those immigrants with authoritarian 
pre-migration experiences, and who presumably migrated to America for political 
reasons, are systematically pursuing the freedom to participate. In other words, are 
immigrants with authoritarian backgrounds relatively more likely to engage in certain 
political activities than their counterparts with more democratic backgrounds because the 
latter individuals might have migrated to America for economic rather than for political 
reasons? Finally, the effects of imported socialization on political participation do not 
fade as years go by. 
Does the patterns described above hold when the effects of imported socialization 
on the probability of an immigrant engaging in American elections are considered? If one 
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has to ask the question again, “can immigrants bring democracy along?,” the answer is 
straightforward. All else being equal, immigrants who were exposed to more democratic 
contexts during their pre-adult socialization years, and presumably were nurtured by such 
political experiences, are more likely to vote in American elections once they have 
become naturalized citizens of their new home than their counterparts whose experiences 
were nurtured by more authoritarian contexts. This latter finding highlights again the 
enduring nature of the imported socialization process as immigrants who are eligible to 
vote (in the dataset available for this analyses) have resided in the United States for an 
average of 27 years. Also, this effect is present indistinctively among individuals with 
relatively low and relatively high levels of education/sophistication. 
The incorporation of the concept of imported socialization into our understanding 
of Latino immigrants’ political behavior in the United States substantially strengthens our 
understanding of one core facet of American political behavior. In my view, imported 
socialization is a term that has been absent (and was much needed) in our 
conceptualizations and models of immigrants’ behavior. It provides us with “the other 
side” of these individuals’ stories. It helps us account for those pre-migration political 
experiences, which shape in an important manner the attitudes, beliefs and behaviors of 
these individuals after they cross nations’ borders. The concept of imported socialization 
should call our attention to the fact that immigrants do bring political suitcases when they 
enter the United States. Moreover, the content of these suitcases yield effects that 
resonate just the same in the beginning of these individuals’ lives in America as many 
years later, following the passage of time—and presumably following first-hand 
experience with U.S. politics. 
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Although the obstacles inherent in studying the effects of prior political 
socialization are sizeable, the content of this dissertation provides an important first step 
in establishing clear links between views of immigrants’ old and new political worlds or 
pseudo-environments (Lippmann 1922). Of course, the development of a full account of 
how immigrants’ past experiences influence political behavior in the United States 
requires a multi-method (perhaps even an interdisciplinary) approach and multiple 
complementary studies. Although the present dissertation is but one among the very 
many efforts required for the task at hand, the following section is an effort to provide 
some potential avenues to keep building upon and to further enhance this study’s 
findings.  
Looking Ahead 
I have called attention to a new constellation of forces possibly operating to 
influence political behavior. Thus, a great deal remains to be done. Certainly the work 
will extend beyond this dissertation project. So far, I have discussed the effects of pre-
migration political experiences on immigrants’ political attitudes, predispositions and 
participation after migration. Down the road, greater work will be needed to uncover the 
processes that give rise to enduring effects. Beyond the education interaction tested 
throughout the empirical analyses here, many more questions exist regarding possible 
situational variance, including identification of for which people and under which 
conditions pre-migration experiences are most consequential. 
For instance, in a related paper, co-author Tom Rudolph and I (Wals and Rudolph 
2008) delve into the question of situational variance. We show that the effects of 
acculturation on attitudes toward government are moderated by both income and the level 
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of democracy in one’s country of origin. The negative effects of acculturation on trust in 
government are attenuated and, in some cases, reversed among the affluent and among 
those who originated from more democratic regimes. These results hold across the three 
different levels of government, namely, local, state and federal. This is but one 
illustration regarding the myriad possibilities yet to be explored on this subject matter. 
The following two sections of this chapter address the question of situational variance in 
further depth and from different perspectives. 
Imported Socialization and Fundamental Differences 
Concerning the effects of imported trust on attitudes toward the U.S. government, 
my argument is that this importation process occurs because the effects of prior 
socialization experiences are rather enduring ones, not be erased by the mere act of 
migration. However, as laid out earlier, an alternate possibility is that trust is partly 
rooted in forces apart from socialization, such as personality or even genetics. Numerous 
recent studies have examined the impact of biology (e.g., Alford et al. 2005; Fowler and 
Dawes 2008) and personality (e.g., Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak 2010) on 
political attitudes and behavior. These influences therefore also might contribute to the 
stability I have observed in immigrants’ political orientations as they move from one 
nation to the next. That is, it may be that fundamental orientations present at birth provide 
structure that persists irrespective of national context. 
In the analyses conducted here, I controlled for interpersonal trust in an effort to 
address this issue. The preferred alternative would be to obtain data that include 
information on the variables needed for my analyses while also including personality 
indicators, or, better yet, to use twin studies—the preferred data source for students of 
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biology and politics. But these alternates understandably are not presently available for 
research on the political behavior of immigrants. 
If intrinsic forces such as biology or personality influence the political behavior of 
immigrants, what would the implications be for my thesis? A two-fold answer is needed. 
First, such influences would stand as alternatives to socialization. From this perspective, 
pre-migration political predispositions would not be entirely learned, but instead would 
trace at least partly to factors present at birth. But second, the fundamental point would 
remain that immigrants are not blank slates upon arrival in the United States. Thus, the 
importance of attending to pre-migration experiences would still hold.  
Because I view it as important that future research parse out the effects of various 
factors that contribute to immigrants’ political orientations, follow-up work that accounts 
for enduring influences is to be encouraged. For instance, I would be interested in 
incorporating the “Big Five”39 framework (as suggested by Mondak 2010) into my 
analyses of immigrants’ political behavior. The idea of this incorporation is two-fold. 
First, as posited earlier, the incorporation of such framework should allow me to 
disentangle the effects of personality trait factors from socialization-driven forces on 
individuals’ attitudes and behaviors after migration. Second, but not less importantly, this 
framework should allow me to approach situational variance from a new angle. For 
instance, it might be the case that the imported socialization process operates differently 
on individuals due to their personality traits rather than due to their 
education/sophistication levels. In the following paragraphs, I elaborate a bit further on 
this point.  
                                                 
39 The “Big Five” are: openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and 
emotional stability. 
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Depending on which I approach I use to test the effects of imported socialization 
on immigrants’ levels of trust in the U.S. government, I find opposite results regarding 
over-time attenuation of these effects. This result might strictly be explained by the fact 
that the two different approaches I utilized to measure prior political experiences are 
starkly different in nature, which in turn might produce diverging effects on longevity. 
Nonetheless, this difference of results led me to consider other potential avenues for 
further empirical tests regarding alternate processes. As a result, I cannot but wonder 
whether different personality traits may lead certain individuals to carry over political 
suitcases with content that is heavier and longer lasting than those of other immigrants. 
For example, an argument could be made that individuals who score high in openness to 
experience are more likely to display over-time attenuation. In other words, if an 
individual is “by nature” more open to experience, this individual may be more willing to 
update perceptions of the new political world in its own terms and rights, relying less and 
less on prior views of the old political pseudo-environment as time goes by. By the same 
token, more conscientious individuals might feel the need to understand the new political 
world in light of new information as time goes by, which in turn should make these 
individuals more likely than their less conscientious counterparts to experience imported 
socialization effects that fade with the passage of time. 
Concerning agreeableness, first, I argue that individuals who score low on this 
dimension are more likely to display imported negative orientations toward the political 
institutions of the new host country than their counterparts who are considered 
“agreeable.” The rationale behind this expectation is very straightforward. All else 
constant, “disagreeable” people should be more likely than their “agreeable” counterparts 
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to develop negative affective and evaluative orientations toward political institutions in 
general. If for no other reason, this pattern will emerge because “disagreeable” people 
should be prone to develop adversity toward government’s policies and outcomes on a 
wider range of issues than “agreeable” people will do. This pattern, I contend, should 
emerge regardless of the context to which these individuals were exposed during their 
pre-adult socialization years. Second, and perhaps more importantly, disagreeable people 
should be less likely than their agreeable counterparts to reverse these negative 
orientations with the passage of time. 
From a psychological perspective, the immigration process involves the constant 
interaction of dual realities (Mahalingam 2006) as well as loss and transformation of 
identity (Akhtar 1999). One can argue that individuals who score high on emotional 
stability might be better equipped to handle these stressful and life-altering situations 
surrounding the immigration process. If that is indeed the case, one can speculate that, all 
else constant, the imported socialization effects should be stronger among immigrants 
who score low on emotional stability. Why? Because these individual will be less likely 
to deal with a “true” interaction of the dual realities and/or the loss of their cultural 
identities, thus relying more on a direct importation of attitudes and behaviors by which 
these individuals will be linking the old and the new worlds more heavily.    
Finally, another possibility of situational variance rooted in personality traits 
might be found related to extraversion. It might be the case that extraverts, in general, are 
more likely to engage in political activities such as joining a public demonstration both 
before and after migration. However, it is not hard to imagine that an individual who 
scores high on extraversion and who was exposed to an authoritarian regime during this 
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individual’s pre-adult socialization years would probably value more the opportunities 
offered by a new (and more democratic) context than a person who scores low in 
extraversion and who would have not engaged in certain political activities even if the 
political system has provided with such rights and freedoms.   
One final point is worth considering concerning the possibility that personality is 
linked to the decision to migrate itself. If it is the case that individuals who score high on 
extraversion and openness to experience are indeed more likely to migrate, then this 
would mean that the people who come to the U.S. are not a random draw in terms of 
personality. This latter situation could have political implications. For instance, if people 
who are extraverts are more likely to migrate, that would have a positive effect on levels 
of political participation. Also, if individuals who score high in openness tend to migrate, 
that would mean that immigrants would lean toward ideologically liberal. 
Traveling Cognitive Frameworks?   
The results offered in Chapter Three regarding the effects of pre-migration 
partisan attachments and ideological predispositions on the directionality of political 
engagement following migration call for further research. Recall that my findings suggest 
that, though to varying degrees, all of the three main partisan identifications in Mexico 
provide an important baseline to become engaged with either of the two main political 
parties in the United States. This result is also present among Mexicans in the before 
migration portion of my analyses in that chapter. These two sets of results imply that 
translation of partisan attachments from one’s country of origin to the new host country 
are rather complex, thus new studies are in order to better capture the underpinnings of 
such a translation process. The same can be said regarding the translation of ideological 
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predispositions from the old political world to the new political world. The possibility of 
two interrelated follow-up studies comes to mind. 
The first one of these follow-up studies would require additional data gathering 
utilizing Implicit Association Tests (IATs). The second one entails additional data 
gathering by very different means, namely, focus groups. Let me offer a general overview 
of both of them in the following two sub-sections. Recall here my core expectations 
about imported partisan attachments and imported ideology. More specifically, recall 
that, in terms of directionality, I predict that both the partisan and the ideologue in one 
nation will gravitate toward a party espousing similar views following migration. At first 
glance, my results do not find corroboration for this expectation. However, I argue that 
this may be because the data available to me do not allow me to test the extent to which 
the “views” of the old world actually correspond with the “views” of the new world. In 
other words, I need a different set of tools to peek inside these immigrants’ political 
suitcases. Both the IATs and the focus groups should allow me to do so.  
The Immigrants’ IAT Follow-Up Study 
An Implicit Association Test (IAT) is an experimental method first introduced by 
social psychologists (Greenwald et al 1998; for an example of related work in political 
science, see Lodge and Taber 2005). The IAT is designed to provide the researcher with 
measures of the strength of association between mental representations of objects 
(concepts) in an individual’s memory. Specifically, the IAT provides measures of 
strength of “automatic” association between “target concepts” and a list of attributes. On 
a standard IAT, the individual is required to categorize various stimulus or target objects, 
such that easier pairings of these objects with attributes (and thus faster responses) are 
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interpreted as being more strongly associated in memory than more difficult pairings of 
object-attributes (with slower responses). The task, of course, ought to be performed as 
quickly as possible by the individuals who decide to participate in the experimental 
setting. One of the interesting properties of the IAT is that the data collected through this 
method is resistant to individual’s self-presentation strategies such as those driven by 
social desirability bias (Kim 2003; but see Greenwald et al 1998). Another main 
advantage of this type of study is that, due to the experimental nature of this method, 
small number of participants can still provide for reliable and systematic evidence.    
This type of study would have two main goals. First, the researcher could gather 
data that could be of use to more effectively examine the content of immigrants’ political 
suitcases. By this I mean, the data that would allow me or others working in this area to 
explore and understand the content of the old political worldviews and the extent to 
which this content is linked to the views of the new political world. In other words, this 
kind of test would allow approaching the nature of the cognitive links between the 
pseudo-environment in the country of origin and the pseudo-environment in the new 
home. For instance, what does it mean for an immigrant to be on the “left” of the political 
spectrum in the country of origin? What does it mean for that same individual to be on 
the “left” in the new host country? Second, this additional data gathering effort should 
also allow further tests regarding the enduring nature of the imported socialization 
process.  
The strategy to pursue the longitudinal component of the study would entail two 
different stages. Ideally I would have access to data with as much variance as possible 
regarding length of stay in the United States among the participants of the first wave of 
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the study, which leads me to the second key element of this follow-up project. The goal 
would be to persuade participants who have spent one year or less in the United States to 
come back to the lab to perform at least one other IAT after a certain period of time, most 
likely in between one or two years. The first part of the strategy would allow me to 
readily draw comparisons of the structure of cognitive frameworks across individuals by 
length of stay in the new host country. The second part of the strategy would allow me to 
test whether and the extent to which cognitive frameworks of the old and new worlds 
experience change over time within individuals. If the findings included in this 
dissertation that suggest that all of the three main partisan attachments provide important 
bases for attachments after migration to both of the main American parties were 
corroborated under the IAT study, these results would have potentially very relevant 
political implications for the American parties’ strategies of reaching out to the 
immigrant population and seeking to engage this community in a more active political 
life in America. A few speculations on this latter point are offered in the concluding 
section of this chapter. 
The Immigrants’ Focus Group Follow-Up Study 
As argued elsewhere throughout the pages of this dissertation, the main 
expectation of this study seems to stand upon solid ground. The nuances of the story, 
though, have left many questions open and waiting for answers. One method which may 
allow me to capture nuances and insights regarding the process of imported socialization 
would involve the use of focus groups. The main goal would be to capture as much detail 
as possible regarding situational variance in immigrants’ own words, in order to 
complement and inform the formal statistical analyses –both present and future. One of 
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the greatest advantages of this method is that it would allow me to gather relatively large 
amounts of qualitative data at a relatively low cost. More importantly, the insights 
provided by focus group participants might suggest interpretations and hypotheses that 
would add nuance to presently-available survey-based analyses, and also generate 
information about possible additional issues that could be probed in future surveys. 
A Panel Study with Mexican Immigrants 
Of course, this study would benefit immensely from a three-wave panel survey as 
suggested earlier in this dissertation. The key challenge is in identifying and gathering 
data from the same individuals both prior to and following migration. Potentially, 
building upon the construct of likelihood of migration, this study could be plausible. If 
the self-assessed item regarding likelihood of migration is incorporated into enough 
surveys administered to random national samples of the Mexican public, the possibility 
would open for such a study to be conducted. The ideal dataset would be built by 
gathering the responses of those individuals who are “very likely” to migrate to the 
United States in the following years. Thus, the first wave would be conducted among 
those individuals in Mexico who are “very likely” to migrate to the United States in the 
near future. The second wave should be conducted on a rolling basis, thus taking place 
one year after the respondent was first contacted and following migration to the United 
States. Potentially, the second round can be conducted from Mexico if the respondent is 
willing to answer the survey questionnaire over the phone and if such means of 
communication are available to the immigrant in the individuals’ new home in the United 
States. Of course, depending upon availability of funds and attrition rates, ideally the 
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study would continue with yet a third and final wave, which would take place two or 
more years after the respondent was contacted for the first time. 
Some people may raise the question whether this study’s findings are specific 
only to first generation Latinos (and particularly Mexicans) in the United States. In my 
view, even if this is the case, these findings are academically and politically 
consequential. However, I have no reason to believe that the same patterns would not be 
found among other immigrant groups here in the United States. Both the IAT study and 
the focus group study could incorporate in their original designs immigrants from 
countries other than Mexico. Yet another possibility would be to replicate the present 
study with Mexicans who have migrated to other host countries such as Canada or Spain 
to determine whether the destination nation matters for the types of effects observed in 
research on imported socialization. 
The idea to potentially expand my research within (by incorporating other 
immigrant groups) and beyond (by incorporating other host nations) the United States 
borders is not a capricious one. After all, in order to provide support for broad 
conclusions, “it is necessary to include a wide range of contextual variations in a 
comprehensive research plan” (Abelson 1995: 12). As an emerging scholar, my research 
agenda is driven by overarching questions. One of main goals, for instance, is to provide 
insights into how democracy (or the lack thereof) affects individual political behavior. Is 
it the case that individuals who are socialized under less favorable contexts, namely 
authoritarian ones, are ill equipped to deal with the works of democracy once a 
democratic transition takes place in their home countries or if they decide to migrate to a 
more democratic setting such as the one the United States provide? This dissertation, I 
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believe, offers my first tangible contributions on the topic. The idea of expanding my 
research as noted above should generate even further insight on these issues. 
Should Imported Socialization Influence the American Political Arena? 
As noted in the introductory chapter of this dissertation, immigrants represent an 
increasing group of recruits (DeSipio 1996) for the American polity. These individuals 
are “prospective citizens” who will decide either to engage or to ignore the ebb and flow 
of the political tide in their new home. The latter statement has two components. The first 
one stems from the potential citizen status of these individuals. The second one deals 
with these individuals’ decisions to engage in any manner in the political affairs of their 
new host country. Regarding the potential for citizenship, evidence suggests that 
naturalization rates are on the rise (Lee and Rytina 2009), especially among more recent 
cohorts (Baker 2009). As for the potential for political engagement among these 
individuals, this study’s findings have steadily corroborated throughout numerous 
empirical tests that immigrants’ levels of engagement in politics once in the United States 
do not, in fact, activate only once these individuals are enfranchised following navigation 
of the naturalization process. To the contrary, both psychological attachments and 
physical engagement in political acts can occur quite rapidly following migration. 
On the Current Trends of Political Participation 
As highlighted in Chapter Three and Four, immigrants whose pre-adult 
socialization experiences were nurtured by relatively more democratic contexts are more 
likely to engage in politics–both in terms of partisan attachments and self-reported levels 
of turnout during the 2004 presidential election--once in the United States than are their 
counterparts who were exposed to more authoritarian contexts before migration.  If these 
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results were to be further corroborated, one important implication follows. Past cohorts of 
first generation Latin American immigrants were more likely to have been exposed and 
nurtured by more authoritarian regimes. In other words, more recent immigrant cohorts 
from this region of the world–and the largest one for the past four decades--are providing 
the United States with “prospective citizens” or “recruits” who are more likely to 
participate in politics than were their older cohort counterparts. Although the trend is 
certainly not necessarily irreversible, recent cohorts have experienced more democratic 
contexts during their pre-adult socialization years. Thus, following the logic of imported 
socialization that I have articulated in this study, I predict increasing levels of political 
engagement, turnout levels included, among first generation Latino immigrants in the 
years to come. 
On Political Parties’ Outreach and Mobilization Efforts 
Relevant to this topic, again, my findings suggest that, though to varying degrees, 
identifications with any of the three main Mexican parties provide an important baseline 
to become engaged with either the Democrats or with the Republicans. Also, my findings 
suggest that “ideologues” from all across the spectrum have the potential to develop a 
psychological attachment with either of the two main American parties. Whereas it is true 
that even among Mexicans in the before migration portion of my analyses preference for 
Democrats outnumbers preference for Republicans by a ratio of two to one, there is no 
single rationale inherent in my results that this assymetrical pattern could not be altered if 
the Republican party were to succeed in implementing more effective means to reach out 
and engage this segment of the population. This latter possibility becomes even more 
apparent if one considers that among ideologues, immigrants on the center right and right 
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of the spectrum are more likely to engage politically once in America. This speculation 
based upon my findings could be a reason for hope among the Republican camp and a 
fable with a feel of warning for the Democratic Party. 
On Political Incorporation and Naturalization Policy 
The core thesis advanced in this dissertation is that immigrants’ political suitcases 
(views on the political world of their countries of origin) will influence post-migration 
political predispositions and behaviors once these individuals have crossed nations’ 
borders. If one decides to ignore the existence of the imported socialization process by 
which those views of the old political world are linked to the views of the new political 
world, one’s understanding of post-migration political engagement necessarily will be 
incomplete. When immigrants are treated as political blank slates, we completely 
overlook these important components of political behavior. By the same token, if policy-
makers ignore “el otro lado” of immigrants’ political behavior, their policy choices will 
be myopic, at best. For one, when treated as blank slates, immigrants may be required to 
fulfill unnecessarily long residency requirements before applying for citizenship. 
Although current policies are designed to ensure political incorporation, an incomplete 
understanding of immigrants’ behavior may have actually led to flawed policies, which 
deter rather than encourage political assimilation. 
It is my expectation that the potential implications of my findings outlined above 
may be of interest to academics, activists, journalists, politicians and policy-makers alike. 
The United States is a nation whose greatness has been nurtured in significant part by 
large-scale waves of immigration. Academic attention to immigrants’ prior political 
experiences and the impact of those experiences on post-migration political incorporation 
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has been rather scant. It is fundamental to acknowledge that immigrants are not political 
blank slates if one is interested in developing comprehensive accounts of their behaviors, 
and if one is interested in incorporating them into the American polity in a more efficient 
fashion. To the extent that engagement in the American political arena is something that 
we generally value, it is vital that we identify the factors contributing to such 
engagement. It is my hope that these pages have fulfilled the mission of taking an initial 
and yet critical first step in this direction. 
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
Figure 1.1. Expected Probability of Mr. Mitote’s Political Engagement in U.S. Politics given 
Pre-Migration Political Experiences 
 
Probability of becoming 
politically engaged in the U.S.
0 1
Authoritarian DemocraticMr. Mitote
Immigrant who came 
from an authoritarian 
nation
Immigrant who came 
from a democratic 
nation
 
Note: This figure represents the predicted post-migration political behavior for three hypothetical 
immigrants to the United States. The first came to the U.S. from an authoritarian nation. This 
person is projected to have a low likelihood of engagement once in the U.S. The second person is 
Mr. Mitote, who came from a relatively more democratic context than the first person, thus Mr. 
Mitote is expected to have relatively higher likelihood of political engagement than the first 
hypothetical immigrant given their diverging pre-migration political experiences. Finally, the 
third person came from a democratic nation. Hence, this third person is the one expected to have 
the highest likelihood of engagement in politics following migration to the United States.  
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Figure 1.2. Unpacking Political Suitcases: A Visual Representation 
Left Right
IssuesSocial
Immigrant’s
Stance
 
Note: This figure illustrates in a visual manner the statements from the common immigrant from 
Urbana-Champaign. On the bottom, one can see the three logos of the three main parties in 
Mexico (the country of origin). The logos are lined up from left to right according to this 
immigrant’s perception of these parties placement along the left-right continuum of social issues. 
The immigrant ideological own stance on the same continuum is denoted with a yellow star, right 
above the PRD logo, which is the party of his preference regarding Mexican politics. 
Bidirectional red arrows are drawn from both the PRI logo to the Democratic Party logo from the 
PAN logo to the Republican Party logo accounting for the analogies offered by the immigrant to 
make sense of the American political arena. 
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Table 2.1. Observed Trust in the U.S. Government among the Mexican Public by 
Levels of Trust in the Mexican Government 
 
      
Trust in the U.S. Government 
 
Trust in Mexican 
Government 
None at all Not very 
much 
Somewhat A great deal  Total 
None at all 67.7 19.8 10.8 1.7 100.0 
  (356) (104) (57) (9)  (526) 
Not very much 36.8 48.6 12.4 2.2 100.0 
 (315) (416) (106) (19) (856) 
Somewhat 35.5 29.6 31.2 3.7 100.0 
 (238) (198) (209) (25) (670) 
A great deal  31.7 28.2 22.3 17.8  100.0 
   (64) (57) (45) (36)  (202) 
N     2,254 
 
Source: Mexican Values Survey 2003  
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Table 2.2. Observed levels of Trust in the Mexican Government  
among the Mexican Public 
 
Variable  N  Mean S.D. Min Max  
Trust in Federal Government  2,347 1.240 0.917 0 3 
Trust in State Government  2,339 1.230 0.922 0 3 
Trust in Local Government  2,347 1.200 0.917 0 3 
 
Source: Mexican Values Survey 2003 
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Table 2.3. The Impact of Trust in the Mexican Government 
on Trust in the U.S. Government before Migration 
 
      
Trust in the U.S. Government  
   
Trust in the Mexican Government           0.202 *** 
  (0.051)  
Attentiveness to the News            0.114  ***  
  (0.028)  
Trust in the Mex. Govt. × Attentiveness to the News          -0.000  
           (0.006)  
Interpersonal Trust          -0.202  
           (0.144)  
Efficacy           0.174  
           (0.049)  
Age          -0.008 ** 
  (0.003)  
Religious Attendance           -0.001   
  (0.001)  
Education          -0.017  
           (0.012)  
Income            0.056 *** 
           (0.011)  
Threshold (D.V. = 0)            1.324  *** 
      (0.288)  
Threshold (D.V. = 1)            3.037 *** 
   (0.294)  
Threshold (D.V. = 2)           5.088  *** 
  (0.312)  
N 1,987  
LR χ
2
(14)  266.93 
Prob>χ
2
 0.000  
pseudo R
2 0.126  
Ordered Logit Regression 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
# p <0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Figure 2.1. Predicted probabilities of Trust in the U.S. Government  
among the Mexican Public by Levels of Trust in the Mexican Government 
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M
m
 
153 
Table 2.4. Observed levels of Trust in Mexican Political Institutions 
among the Mexican Public 
 
Variable  N  Mean S.D.  Min  Max 
Trust in the Supreme Court   1,431 1.500 0.945 0  3
Trust in the Senate  1,422 1.130 0.908 0  3
Trust in the Chamber of Deputies 1,427 1.080 0.920 0 3
Trust in the Federal Institute of Elections (IFE) 1,463 1.610 1.002 0 3
Trust in political parties 1,454 0.980 0.909 0  3
 
Source: Reforma 2007 
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Table 2.5. The Impact of Trust in Mexican Political Institutions 
on Mexicans’ Opinion of President Bush 
 
      
Opinion of President Bush   
   
Likelihood of Migration (Very likely)                    0.243  
  (0.274)  
Likelihood of Migration (Somewhat Likely)                   -0.013  
                    (0.851)  
Likelihood of Migration (Not Very Likely)                    0.308  
                    (0.247)  
Trust in the Mexican Government                    0.216 *** 
  (0.032)  
Attentiveness to the News                   -0.028  
 (0.047)  
Trust in Mex. Govt. × Attentiveness to the News                   0.000  
                    (0.003)  
Presidential Approval (President Calderón)                   0.241 *** 
                    (0.061)  
Age                   -0.001  
 (0.005)  
Religious Attendance                     0.004  # 
 (0.002)  
Education                   -0.054  * 
 (0.021)  
Income                   -0.019  
 (0.027)  
Constant                      2.284  *** 
 (0.412)  
N 1,315  
F(10, 1304)  18.23 
Prob>F 0.000  
Adjusted R
2 0.116  
OLS Regression 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
# p <0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Figure 2.2. Expected Opinion of President Bush among the Mexican Public  
by Levels of Trust in Mexican Political Institutions 
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Note: Predicted probabilities were computed using the model in Table 2.5. Levels of trust in 
Mexican political institutions were varied for this calculation. The rest of the predictors were held 
at their mean values or at their modal category in the case of indicator variables. 
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Table 2.6. Mexican Immigrants’ Trust in the U.S. Government 
 
Variable  N  Mean S.D. Min Max  
Trust in Federal Government  391 2.990 0.874 1 4 
Trust in State Government  394 2.934 0.880 1 4 
Trust in Local Government  393 2.842 0.875 1 4 
 
Source: Mexican Values Survey 2003 
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Table 2.7. The Impact of Trust in the Mexican Government on Trust in the U.S. Government 
   Model I.  
Without 
Interactions 
Model II. Including 
Interactions with 
Education 
Trust in Mexican Government (A Great Deal)     1.303 ***            0.975   
 (0.384)  (0.976)  
Trust in Mexican Government (Somewhat)     0.714 *          -0.486   
 (0.355)  (0.963)  
Trust in Mexican Government (Not Very Much)     0.606 #            0.826   
   (0.368)  (1.132)  
Interpersonal Trust    -0.358           -0.349  
 (0.304)  (0.304)  
Efficacy     0.381 *            0.364 * 
  (0.161)  (0.161)  
Years in the U.S.      0.028  *           0.030  * 
 (0.014)  (0.014)  
Trust in M.G. (A Great Deal) × Education          ---- ----             0.134  
          ---- ----  (0.099)  
Trust in M.G. (Somewhat) × Education          ---- ----             0.127  
          ---- ----  (0.099)  
Trust in M.G. (Not Very Much) × Education          ---- ----           -0.016  
          ---- ----  (0.107)  
Age Upon Arrival     0.049 ***            0.049 *** 
 (0.013)  (0.013)  
Bilingual     -0.826            -0.839   
 (0.530)  (0.530)  
English      0.118             0.107   
 (0.375)  (0.377)  
Religious Attendance       0.003              0.003   
 (0.003)  (0.003)  
Education    -0.001             -0.075  
  (0.035)  (0.074)  
Income      0.004              0.006   
 (0.007)  (0.007)  
Constant      2.705  ***            3.394  *** 
 (0.713)  (0.932)  
N 376   N 376
F(12, 363) 3.92   F(15, 360) 3.41
Prob>F 0.000   Prob>F 0.000
Adjusted R
2 0.085    Adjusted R
2 0.088
OLS regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. #p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Table 2.8. The Impact of Trust in the Mexican Government on Trust in the U.S. Government 
(Longitudinal Attenuation) 
   Trust in the U.S. 
Government 
Trust in Mexican Government (A Great Deal)           0.855   
 (0.720)  
Trust in Mexican Government (Somewhat)           0.120   
 (0.698)  
Trust in Mexican Government (Not Very Much)           0.357   
 (0.705)  
Interpersonal Trust          -0.365  
 (0.305)  
Efficacy           0.393 * 
 (0.162)  
Years in the U.S.            0.005   
 (0.031)  
Trust in M.G. (A Great Deal) × Years in U.S.           0.028  
 (0.037)  
Trust in M.G. (Somewhat) × Years in U.S.           0.036  
 (0.037)  
Trust in M.G. (Not Very Much) × Years in U.S.           0.016  
 (0.036)  
Age Upon Arrival           0.048 *** 
 (0.013)  
Bilingual           -0.868   
 (0.533)  
English            0.109   
 (0.377)  
Religious Attendance             0.003   
 (0.003)  
Education            0.001   
 (0.035)  
Income            0.004   
 (0.007)  
Constant            3.056  *** 
 (0.837)  
N 376 
F(15, 360) 3.19 
Prob>F 0.000 
Adjusted R
2 0.081 
OLS regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. #p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Figure 2.3. Expected Levels of Trust in the U.S. Government 
by Levels of Trust in the Mexican Government and Years in the U.S. 
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Note: Predicted probabilities were computed using the longitudinal attenuation model in Table 
2.8. The following predictors were varied for this calculation: a) the set of indicator variables 
regarding respondents’ levels of trust in Mexican Government; b) the number of years spent in 
the U.S., with values of either 1 (New Arrivals) or 17 (Average); and c) the corresponding 
interactions between these terms. The rest of the predictors were held at their mean values or at 
their modal category in the case of indicator variables. 
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Table 2.9. The Impact of Imported Socialization (Authoritarian vs. Democratic) 
on Trust in the U.S. Government 
 
 Model I.  
IS w/o 
interactions 
Model II. 
Longitudinal 
Attenuation 
 
Imported Socialization (IS) -0.027 -0.088** 
 (0.021) (0.034) 
Years in the U.S.  0.027* -0.003***  
 (0.011) (0.017) 
IS × Years in the U.S. -----  0.004* 
 ----- (0.002) 
Interpersonal Trust  0.127  0.145 
 (0.231) (0.230) 
Efficacy  0.708***  0.701*** 
 (0.118) (0.118) 
Age upon Arrival  0.034***  0.033***  
 (0.009) (0.008) 
Bilingual -0.707 -0.695  
 (0.487) (0.485) 
English -0.439# -0.442# 
 (0.259) (0.258) 
Religious Attendance  0.002  0.002 
 (0.003) (0.002) 
Education -0.024 -0.023 
 (0.025) (0.025) 
Income -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant   3.383*** -3.937***  
 (0.544) (0.597) 
N 621 621 
F (10, 610); F(11, 609) 8.73 8.43  
Prob>F  0.000 0.000  
Adjusted R
2 0.111 0.116 
OLS Regression 
Standard errors are into parentheses.  
# p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Figure 2.4. Expected Levels of Trust in the U.S. Government 
by Imported Socialization and Years in the U.S. 
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Note: Predicted probabilities were computed using the longitudinal attenuation model in Table 
2.9. The imported socialization predictor was varied for this calculation. It was assigned values 
ranging from 0 (Authoritarian) to 20 (Democratic). The rest of the predictors were held at their 
mean values or at their modal category in the case of indicator variables. 
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Table 3.1. Observed Preferences for Political Parties in the U.S. among the Mexican 
Public by Partisan Status in Mexico 
 
      
Preference among U.S. Political Parties 
Mexican 
Partisan Status 
No Preference Democrat Republican  Total 
Non-Partisan  49.7 35.3 15.0 100.0 
  (304) (216) (92)  (612) 
Partisan  41.5 36.5 21.9  100.0 
   (373) (328) (197)  (898) 
N    1,510 
 
Source: Reforma 2007  
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Table 3.2. The Impact of Partisan Attachments and Ideology in Mexico 
on Intensity of Expected Political Engagement with U.S. Parties 
     Expected U.S. Partisan   
Likelihood of Migration (Very Likely)            0.158  
 (0.214)  
Likelihood of Migration (Somewhat)          -1.246  
            (0.592)  
Likelihood of Migration (Not Very)          -0.101  
           (0.191)  
Mexican Partisan            0.715 ** 
 (0.259)  
Non-Ideologue          -1.086 *** 
 (0.184)  
Extreme Left           0.827 ** 
           (0.304)  
Center Left           0.319  
           (0.200)  
Center Right           0.344 * 
           (0.154)  
Extreme Right           0.126  
           (0.193)  
Attentiveness to the News            0.170  ***  
 (0.031)  
Mexican Partisan × Attentiveness to the News          -0.078 * 
           (0.038)  
Age          -0.012 ** 
 (0.004)  
Religious Attendance           -0.001   
 (0.002)  
Education          -0.004   
 (0.017)  
Income           0.038  
 (0.021)  
Constant          -0.533  # 
 (0.312)  
N 1,466  
LR χ
2
(15)  220.86 
Prob>χ
2
 0.000  
pseudo R
2 0.140  
Logistic Regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. #p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01;***p<0.001 
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Figure 3.1. Expected Intensity of Political Engagement in the U.S. 
by Partisan Status in Mexico and Ideology 
 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
 E
xp
ec
te
d 
 U
.S
. P
ar
tie
s
Non-
Ideologue
Extreme
Left
Center Left Center Center Right Extreme
Right
Ideology
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
Pr
ob
ab
ili
tie
s 
of
Po
lit
ic
al
 E
ng
ag
em
en
t w
ith
Mexican Non-Partisan Mexican Partisan
 
Note: Predicted probabilities were computed using the model in Table 3.2. Partisanship status in 
Mexico was assigned values of either 0 (Non-Partisan) or 1 (Partisan). The rest of the predictors 
were held at their mean values or at their modal category in the case of indicator variables, except 
for the indicators of ideological predisposition. 
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Table 3.3. Observed Preferences for Political Parties in the U.S. 
among the Mexican Public by Partisan Attachments in Mexico 
 
      
Preference among U.S. Political Parties 
Mexican 
Partisan 
Attachment 
No Preference Democrat Republican  Total 
Non-Partisan  49.7 35.3 15.0 100.0 
  (304) (216) (92)  (612) 
PRD  35.0 47.0 18.0 100.0 
 (70) (94) (36) (200) 
PRI 46.7 28.0 25.3 100.0 
 (157) (94) (85) (336) 
PAN 40.3 38.7 21.0  100.0 
   (146) (140) (76)  (362) 
N    1,510 
 
Source: Reforma 2007  
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Table 3.4. The Impact of Partisan Attachments and Ideology in Mexico 
on Directionality of Political Engagement with U.S. Parties 
   Democrat Republican 
Likelihood of Migration (Very Likely)         0.032           0.383   
  (0.243)  (0.259)  
Likelihood of Migration (Somewhat)      -1.150         -1.454  
         (0.658)          (1.054)  
Likelihood of Migration (Not Very)        0.000        -0.193  
        (0.209)         (0.257)  
PRD Partisan         0.509 **         0.418 # 
 (0.197)  (0.252)  
PRI Partisan         -0.187           0.551 ** 
   (0.175)  (0.199)  
PAN Partisan         0.164            0.427  * 
 (0.165)           (0.203)  
Non-Ideologue        -0.968 ***        -1.250  
 (0.207)  (0.288)  
Extreme Left         0.881 **         0.538  
         (0.321)          (0.403)  
Center Left        0.294          0.390  
         (0.220)          (0.259)  
Center Right        0.339 *         0.435 * 
         (0.170)          (0.201)  
Extreme Right        0.179          0.173  
         (0.215)          (0.258)  
Attentiveness to the News         0.121  ***          0.127  *** 
         (0.022)  (0.027)  
Age       -0.007          -0.021  *** 
        (0.005)  (0.006)  
Religious Attendance         -0.001           0.001   
 (0.002)   (0.003)  
Education          0.002          -0.013   
 (0.018)  (0.023)  
Income         0.044 #         0.027  
 (0.023)  (0.028)  
Constant          -0.901 ***         -1.068  ** 
 (0.316)  (0.387)  
N 1,466 LR χ
2
(32) 252.81
Prob>χ
2
 0.000 pseudo R
2 0.158
Multinomial Logistic Regression. Reference Category: Expected Non-Partisan in the U.S. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. # p <0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001   
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Figure 3.2. Expected Directionality of Political Engagement in the U.S. 
by Mexican Partisan Attachments 
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Figure 3.2. Expected Directionality of Political Engagement in the U.S. 
by Mexican Partisan Attachments (cont’d) 
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Note: Predicted probabilities were computed using the model in Table 3.4. Partisanship 
attachment in Mexico was assigned values of either 0 or 1, depending upon the specific party, 
namely the PRD, the PRI, or the PAN. The rest of the predictors were held at their mean values or 
at their modal category in the case of indicator variables, except for the indicators of ideological 
predisposition. 
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Table 3.5. Immigrants’ Expected Electoral Participation in the U.S. 
by Partisan Status in Mexico 
 
      
Expected Electoral Participation in the U.S. 
 
Mexican 
Partisan 
Status 
Projected 
U.S. Non Voter 
Projected  
U.S. Voter  
Total 
Mexican Non-Partisan 57.1  42.9 100.0 
  (97)  (73)  (170) 
Mexican Partisan  19.2  80.8  100.0 
   (44)  (185)  (229) 
N   399 
 
Source: Mexican Values Survey 2003  
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Table 3.6. The Impact of Pre-Migration Partisan Attachments and Ideology 
on Intensity of Post-Migration Political Engagement 
   Model I. Expected Electoral 
Participation 
  Model II. Longitudinal 
Attenuation 
Mexican PID          2.550 ***          2.499  ** 
 (0.770)  (0.937)  
Non-Ideologue        -0.973 *        -2.118 * 
 (0.456)  (0.975)  
Extreme Left         0.136         -1.350  
         (0.690)           (1.349)  
Center Left          0.492          0.374  
         (0.436)          (0.862)  
Center Right         1.025 **         1.297 # 
         (0.346)           (0.689)  
Extreme Right          1.429  **         3.458 ** 
         (0.478)           (1.157)  
Years in the U.S.           0.040 **           0.032   
 (0.015)  (0.023)  
Mexican PID × Years in the U.S.           ----  ----           0.013   
          ----  ----  (0.028)  
Non-Ideologue × Years in the U.S.          ----  ----          0.068  
          ----  ----          (0.050)  
Extreme Left × Years in the U.S.          ----  ----         0.109  
          ----  ----         (0.086)  
Center Left × Years in the U.S.          ----  ----         0.006  
          ----  ----          (0.040)  
Center Right × Years in the U.S.          ----  ----        -0.017  
          ----  ----          (0.035)  
Extreme Right × Years in the U.S.          ----  ----        -0.126 * 
          ----  ----         (0.059)  
Age Upon Arrival          0.012           0.011  
 (0.014)  (0.014)  
Bilingual           0.163            0.327   
 (0.603)  (0.617)  
English           0.569            0.645  # 
 (0.391)  (0.402)  
Religious Attendance            0.006 #          0.007  # 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  
Education           0.030           0.031   
 (0.051)  (0.051)  
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Table 3.6. The Impact of Pre-Migration Partisan Attachments and Ideology 
on Intensity of Post-Migration Political Engagement 
   Model I. Expected Electoral 
Participation 
  Model II. Longitudinal 
Attenuation 
Mexican PID × Education        -0.075         -0.089  
         (0.073)          (0.075)  
Income           0.017  *           0.017  * 
 (0.008)  (0.008)  
Constant          -2.651  ***         -2.543  ** 
 (0.723)  (0.805)  
N 394 N  394 
 LR χ
2
(14)  119.87 LR χ
2
(20)  130.80 
 Prob>χ
2
 0.000 Prob>χ
2
  0.000 
pseudo R
2 0.262 pseudo R
2 0.283 
Logistic Regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. #p <0.10;*p<0.05;**p<0.01;***p<0.001 
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Figure 3.3. Expected Electoral Participation in the U.S.  
by Partisanship Status and Ideology in Mexico and Years in the U.S. 
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Note: Predicted probabilities were computed using the longitudinal attenuation model in Table 
3.6. The following predictors were varied for this calculation: a) partisanship status in Mexico, 
which was assigned values of either 0 (Non-Partisan) or 1 (Partisan); b) the number of years spent 
in the U.S., with values of either 1 (New Arrivals) or 17 (Average Stay); and c) the corresponding 
interaction between these two terms. The rest of the predictors were held at their mean values or 
at their modal category in the case of indicator variables. 
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Figure 3.4. Expected Electoral Participation in the U.S. 
by Partisanship Status and Levels of Education 
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Note: Predicted probabilities were computed using the longitudinal attenuation model in Table 
3.6. The following predictors were varied for this calculation: a) partisanship status in Mexico, 
which was assigned values of either 0 (Non-Partisan) or 1 (Partisan); b) education coded as the 
number of years of formal education, with values of either 7 (Low) or 11 (High); and c) the 
corresponding interaction between these two terms. The rest of the predictors were held at their 
mean values or at their modal category in the case of indicator variables. 
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Table 3.7. The Impact of Imported Socialization (Authoritarian vs. Democratic) 
on Intensity of Post-Migration Political Engagement 
   Model I.  
IS w/o interactions 
Model II. 
IS with interactions 
 NSL  
2004 
LNS 
2006 
NSL 
2004 
LNS 
2006 
Imported Socialization (IS)  0.068**  0.020*  0.286**  0.090* 
 (0.025) (0.009) (0.096) (0.040) 
Years in the U.S.  0.048***  0.049***  0.053***  0.051*** 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) 
IS × Years in the U.S. ----- ----- ----- ----- 
     
Age upon Arrival  0.019**  0.022***  0.030*  0.034*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.015) (0.007) 
IS × Age upon Arrival ----- ----- -0.001 -0.001* 
   (0.002) (0.000) 
Bilingual  0.265  0.227**  0.286  0.224** 
 (0.210) (0.077) (0.212) (0.077) 
English  0.821  0.377***  0.793  0.373*** 
 (0.652) (0.106) (0.659) (0.106) 
Religious Attendance -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
Education  0.085***  0.069***  0.195***  0.091*** 
 (0.019) (0.010) (0.045) (0.021) 
IS × Education   ----- ----- -0.017** -0.003 
   (0.006) (0.003) 
Income  0.007#  0.011***  0.006  0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Constant  -2.009*** -3.139*** -3.536*** -3.718*** 
 (0.389) (0.183) (0.802) (0.362) 
N 978 4,828 978 4,828 
LR χ
2
(8); (11) 112.46 596.55 120.10 601.12 
Prob>χ
2
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
pseudo R
2 0.092 0.093 0.098 0.094 
Logistic Regression.  
Standard errors are into parentheses. # p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Table 3.7. The Impact of Imported Socialization (Authoritarian vs. Democratic) 
on Intensity of Post-Migration Political Engagement (cont’d) 
   Model III. 
Longitudinal 
Attenuation 
 NSL  
2004 
LNS  
2006 
Imported Socialization (IS)  0.346***   0.090* 
 (0.105) (0.044) 
Years in the U.S.  0.073***   0.051*** 
 (0.017) (0.006) 
IS × Years in the U.S. -0.003  0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
Age upon Arrival  0.036*   0.034*** 
 (0.016) (0.007) 
IS × Age upon Arrival -0.002 -0.001* 
 (0.002) (0.000) 
Bilingual  0.286   0.224** 
 (0.212) (0.077) 
English  0.736  0.373*** 
 (0.661) (0.106) 
Religious Attendance -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
Education  0.206***  0.091*** 
 (0.046) (0.021) 
IS × Education   -0.018** -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.003) 
Income  0.005  0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) 
Constant  -4.090***  -3.715*** 
 (0.902) (0.401) 
N 978 4,828 
LR χ
2
(12)  121.98  601.12 
Prob>χ
2
 0.000  0.000 
pseudo R
2 0.100  0.094  
Logistic Regression.  
Standard errors are into parentheses. # p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Figure 3.5. Predicted Probabilities of Partisan Attachments in the U.S.  
by Imported Socialization 
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Note: Predicted probabilities were computed using the longitudinal attenuation model in Table 
3.7. The imported socialization predictor was varied for this calculation. It was assigned values 
ranging from 0 (Authoritarian) to 20 (Democratic). The rest of the predictors were held at their 
mean values or at their modal category in the case of indicator variables. 
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Figure 3.6. Predicted Probabilities of Partisan Attachments in the U.S.  
by Imported Socialization and Levels of Education 
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Note: Predicted probabilities wer ng the longitudinal attenuation model in
3.7. The ng predictors were d for this calc n: a) importe alization w
assigned values ranging from 0 (Authoritarian) to 20 ( atic); b) education coded as
number of y education, with values of either 9 (Low) or 13 (High); and c) t
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Table 3.8. Immigrants’ Expected Directionality o ctoral Partic  in the U
Partisan Attachments in Mexico 
 
pected Preference among U.S. Political Parties 
 
f Ele ipation .S. by 
      
Ex
Mexican 
Partisan 
Attachment 
Expected 
Non Partisan in 
the U.S.  
Expected  
Democrat  
Voter 
Expected  
Republican 
Voter 
Total 
Non Partisan 56.8  32.4 10.8 100.0 
  (100)  (57) (19)  (176) 
PRD 12.5  62.5 25.0  100.0 
 (4) (20) (8) (32) 
PRI 23.5 48.5 28.0 100.0 
 (16) (33) (19) (68) 
PAN 17.1 55.3 27.6 100.0 
   (21)  (68) (34)  (123) 
N    399 
 
Source: Mexican Values Survey 2003  
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Table 3.9. The Impact of Pre-Migration Partisan Attachments and Ideology 
on Directionality of Post-Migration Political Engagement 
   Expected 
Democrat Voter 
  Expected  
Republican Voter 
PRD Partisan          4.154 #          6.951  ** 
 (2.200)  (2.530)  
PRI Partisan          1.188           2.608 * 
 (1.056)  (1.225)  
PAN Partisan          2.338 *          4.194 *** 
 (1.066)  (1.251)  
Non-Ideologue        -0.752 ***        -1.773 * 
 (0.489)  (0.819)  
Extreme Left         0.324         -0.632  
 (0.734)  (0.975)  
Center Left         0.859 #        -0.114  
 (0.457)  (0.588)  
Center Right          1.156 **         0.601  
 (0.365)  (0.449)  
Extreme Right          1.651 ***         1.016 # 
 (0.500)  (0.584)  
Years in the U.S.           0.037  *           0.041  * 
 (0.016)  (0.019)  
Age Upon Arrival          0.012           0.008  
 (0.015)  (0.019)  
Bilingual           0.434          -0.664   
 (0.607)  (0.942)  
English           0.352            1.226  * 
 (0.418)  (0.507)  
Religious Attendance            0.009 *         0.006   
 (0.004)  (0.005)  
Education           0.041          -0.019   
 (0.054)  (0.079)  
PRD Partisan × Education        -0.220         -0.459 # 
 (0.188)  (0.239)  
PRI Partisan × Education          0.011         -0.035  
 (0.105)  (0.125)  
PAN Partisan × Education        -0.052        -0.159  
 (0.098)         (0.121)  
Income           0.017  #          0.021  * 
 (0.009)  (0.010)  
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Table 3.9. The Impact of Pre-Migration Partisan Attachments and Ideology 
on Directionality of Post-Migration Political Engagement 
   Expected 
Democrat Voter 
  Expected  
Republican Voter 
Constant          -3.075  ***         -3.723  *** 
 (0.771)  (1.018)  
N 394  
LR χ
2
(36)  157.99  
Prob>χ
2
 0.000  
pseudo R
2 0.330   
Multinomial Logistic Regression 
Reference Category: Expected Non-Partisan in the U.S. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
# p <0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
181 
 
Table 3.10. The Impact of Pre-Migration Partisan Attachments and Ideology 
on Post-Migration Directionality of Political Engagement 
(Longitudinal Attenuation) 
   Expected Democrat Voter Expected Republican Voter 
PRD Partisan          5.257 *          8.446  ** 
 (2.420)  (2.943)  
PRI Partisan          1.219           2.512 # 
 (1.311)  (1.522)  
PAN Partisan          1.938           3.838 ** 
 (1.278)  (1.505)  
Non-Ideologue         -2.417 *        -0.895 * 
 (1.129)  (1.762)  
Extreme Left         -1.468         -3.126 * 
 (1.512)  (2.441)  
Center Left          0.726         -0.284 * 
 (0.920)  (1.247)  
Center Right          1.177 #         1.630 # 
 (0.732)          (0.893)  
Extreme Right          3.762 **         3.244 * 
 (1.222)  (1.418)  
Years in the U.S.           0.023             0.044  * 
 (0.025)  (0.031)  
PRD × Years in the U.S.         -0.053         -0.079  
         (0.061)  (0.084)  
PRI × Years in the U.S.         0.001         -0.005  
         (0.040)  (0.047)  
PAN × Years in the U.S.        0.050           0.039  
        (0.041)  (0.045)  
Non-Ideologue × Years in the U.S.        0.091 #         0.045  
        (0.055)  (0.047)  
Extreme Left × Years in the U.S.         0.127         -0.065  
        (0.093)  (0.126)  
Center Left × Years in the U.S.        0.004          0.168  
        (0.043)  (0.131)  
Center Right × Years in the U.S.       -0.003          -0.057  
        (0.037)  (0.045)  
Extreme Right × Years in the U.S.       -0.137 *        -0.139 # 
        (0.065)  (0.077)  
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Table 3.10. The Impact of Pre-Migration Partisan Attachments and Ideology 
on Post-Migration Directionality of Political Engagement 
(Longitudinal Attenuation) 
   Expected Democrat Voter Expected Republican Voter 
Age Upon Arrival          0.009           0.006  
 (0.015)  (0.019)  
Bilingual           0.633           -0.416   
 (0.636)  (0.973)  
English           0.402            1.341  ** 
 (0.433)  (0.527)  
Religious Attendance            0.009  *          0.006   
 (0.004)  (0.005)  
Education           0.046           -0.032   
 (0.055)  (0.079)  
PRD × Education         -0.246         -0.482 # 
         (0.204)  (0.256)  
PRI × Education         0.002         -0.015  
         (0.110)  (0.129)  
PAN × Education        -0.073          -0.175  
         (0.104)  (0.125)  
Income           0.017  #          0.022  * 
 (0.009)  (0.010)  
Constant          -2.852  ***         -3.732  *** 
 (0.865)  (1.128)  
N 394 Prob>χ
2 0.000
LR χ
2
(52)  177.94 pseudo R
2 0.363
Multinomial Logistic Regression. Reference Category: Expected Non-Partisan in the U.S. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. # p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Figure 3.7. Expected Directionality in Electoral Participation in the U.S. 
 by Partisan Attachments and Ideology in Mexico and Years in the U.S. 
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Figure 3.7. Expected Directionality in Electoral Participation in the U.S. 
 by Partisan Attachments and Ideology in Mexico and Years in the U.S. (cont’d) 
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Note: Predicted probabilities were computed using the model in Table 3.10. The following 
predictors were varied for this calculation: a) partisan attachment in Mexico, which was set to 
account for affiliation with the PRD, or the PRI, or the PAN; b) the number of years spent in the 
U.S., with values of either 1 (New Arrivals) or 17 (Average Stay); and c) the corresponding 
interaction between these terms. The rest of the predictors were held at their mean values or at 
their modal category in the case of indicator variables, except for the indicators of ideological 
predisposition. 
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Table 4.1. Political Activities among First Generation Immigrants (N=1,068)  
 Contacted 
any elected 
official 
Contributed 
money to a 
candidate 
Worked for 
a political 
candidate 
Attended a 
public 
demonstration 
Attended a 
party 
meeting 
Yes 8.05% 
(86) 
5.71% 
(61) 
3.46% 
(37) 
15.07% 
(161) 
7.49% 
(80) 
Mode 0 0 0 0 0 
S.D. .272 .232 .183 .358 .263 
 
Source: National Survey of Latinos 2004 
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Table 4.2. Political Participation: U.S.-Born Latinos vs. First Generation Immigrants 
 U.S.-Born Sub-Sample Immigrants Sub-Sample 
0 = None of the activities 56.97% 
(568) 
77.06% 
(823) 
1 20.76% 
(207) 
12.92% 
(138) 
2 11.33% 
(113) 
5.81% 
(62) 
3 6.12% 
(61) 
2.34% 
(25) 
4 2.81% 
(28) 
1.12% 
(12) 
5 = All of the activities 2.01% 
(20) 
0.75% 
(8) 
 N = 997 N = 1,068 
 
Source: National Survey of Latinos 2004 
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Table 4.3. The Impact of Imported Socialization 
on Post-Migration Political Participation 
   Political Participation 
 Model I: 
IS Only 
Model II: 
IS and IS2
Efficacy   0.182**  0.186** 
 (0.068) (0.068) 
Imported Socialization (IS)  0.007  0.127 
 (0.017) (0.089) 
IS2 (Squared Term) ----- -0.008 
  (0.006) 
Years in the U.S.  0.025***  0.026*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
IS × Years in the U.S. ----- ----- 
   
IS2 × Years in the U.S. ----- ----- 
   
Age upon Arrival  0.006  0.007  
 (0.005) (0.005) 
IS × Age upon Arrival ----- ----- 
   
IS2 × Age upon Arrival ----- ----- 
   
Bilingual  0.636***  0.651*** 
 (0.142) (0.142) 
English  0.854***  0.889*** 
 (0.243) (0.244) 
Religious Attendance  0.004*  0.004* 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Education  0.026#  0.026# 
 (0.016) (0.016) 
IS × Education   ----- ----- 
   
IS2 × Education   ----- ----- 
   
Income  0.006***  0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant  -3.237*** -3.695*** 
 (0.337) (0.477) 
N 924 924 
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Table 4.3. The Impact of Imported Socialization 
on Post-Migration Political Participation 
   Political Participation 
 Model I: 
IS Only 
Model II: 
IS and IS2
LR χ
2
(9, Model I; 10, Model II)  219.89 221.84 
Prob>χ
2
 0.000 0.000 
pseudo R
2 0.132 0.133 
Goodness-of-fit χ
2
 944.67 942.72 
Prob>χ
2
 (914, Model I; 913, MII) 0.234 0.241 
Poisson Regression 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
# p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Table 4.4. The Impact of Imported Socialization 
on Post-Migration Political Participation 
   Political Participation 
 Model III:  
IS and IS2 
w/Interactions 
Model IV: 
Longitudinal 
Attenuation 
Efficacy   0.186**  0.183** 
 (0.068) (0.068) 
Imported Socialization (IS) -0.666# -0.449 
 (0.385) (0.426) 
IS2 (Squared Term)  0.047*  0.037 
 (0.023) (0.025) 
Years in the U.S.  0.027***  0.048* 
 (0.004) (0.024) 
IS × Years in the U.S. ----- -0.004 
  (0.006) 
IS2 × Years in the U.S. -----  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Age upon Arrival -0.005  0.011  
 (0.025) (0.028) 
IS × Age upon Arrival  0.005  0.002 
 (0.007) (0.008) 
IS2 × Age upon Arrival -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Bilingual  0.664***  0.676*** 
 (0.144) (0.145) 
English  0.915***  0.946*** 
 (0.248) (0.249) 
Religious Attendance  0.003*  0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Education -0.133 -0.114 
 (0.087) (0.089) 
IS × Education    0.055*  0.051 
 (0.025) (0.026) 
IS2 × Education   -0.004* -0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Income  0.006***  0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant  -1.471 -2.532*** 
 (1.407) (1.655) 
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Table 4.4. The Impact of Imported Socialization 
on Post-Migration Political Participation 
   Political Participation 
 Model III:  
IS and IS2 
w/Interactions 
Model IV: 
Longitudinal 
Attenuation 
N 924 924 
LR χ
2
(14, Model III; 16, MIV)  229.76 231.49 
Prob>χ
2
 0.000 0.000 
pseudo R
2 0.138 0.139 
Goodness-of-fit χ
2
 934.80 933.07 
Prob>χ
2
 (909, Model III; 907, MIV) 0.269 0.267 
Poisson Regression 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
# p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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 Figure 4.1. Predicted Count of Political Activities in the U.S.  
by Imported Socialization  
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Note: Predictions were computed using model III in Table 4.4. The imported socialization 
predictor was varied for this calculation. It was assigned values ranging from 0 (Authoritarian) to 
20 (Democratic). The rest of the predictors were held at their mean values or at their modal 
category in the case of indicator variables. 
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Figure 4.2. Predicted Count of Political Activities in the U.S.  
by Imported Socialization and Education levels 
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Note: Predictions were computed using model III in Table 4.4. The following predictors were 
varied for this calculation: a) imported socialization was assigned values ranging from 0 
(Authoritarian) to 20 (Democratic); b) education coded as the number of years of formal 
education, with values of either 9 (Low) or 13 (High); and c) the corresponding interaction 
between these two terms. The rest of the predictors were held at their mean values or at their 
modal category in the case of indicator variables. 
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Table 4.5. The Impact of Imported Socialization 
on Post-Migration Electoral Participation 
 
   Electoral Participation 
 Model I: 
IS Only 
Model II: 
IS and IS2
Efficacy   0.085#  0.084# 
 (0.046) (0.046) 
Imported Socialization (IS)  0.049**  0.007 
 (0.017) (0.066) 
IS2 (Squared Term) -----  0.002 
  (0.003) 
Years in the U.S.  0.080***  0.079*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
IS × Years in the U.S. ----- ----- 
   
IS2 × Years in the U.S. ----- ----- 
   
Age upon Arrival  0.043***  0.042***  
 (0.006) (0.006) 
IS × Age upon Arrival ----- ----- 
   
IS2 × Age upon Arrival ----- ----- 
   
Bilingual  0.168  0.168 
 (0.140) (0.140) 
English  0.280#  0.272 
 (0.171) (0.171) 
Religious Attendance -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Education  0.121***  0.120*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) 
IS × Education   ----- ----- 
   
IS2 × Education   ----- ----- 
   
Income  0.010***  0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant  -4.593*** -4.397*** 
 (0.391) (0.486) 
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Table 4.5. The Impact of Imported Socialization 
on Post-Migration Electoral Participation 
 
   Electoral Participation 
 Model I: 
IS Only 
Model II: 
IS and IS2
N 1,582 1,582 
LR χ
2
(9, Model I; 10, Model II)  329.13 329.59 
Prob>χ
2
 0.000 0.000 
pseudo R
2 0.160 0.160 
Logistic Regression 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
# p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Table 4.6. The Impact of Imported Socialization 
on Post-Migration Electoral Participation 
   Electoral Participation 
 Model III:  
IS and IS2 
w/Interactions 
Model IV: 
Longitudinal 
Attenuation 
Efficacy   0.082#  0.083# 
 (0.046) (0.047) 
Imported Socialization (IS)  0.073 -0.079 
 (0.332) (0.417) 
IS2 (Squared Term)  0.001  0.004 
 (0.018) (0.022) 
Years in the U.S.  0.080***  0.071** 
 (0.007) (0.026) 
IS × Years in the U.S. ----- -0.003 
  (0.007) 
IS2 × Years in the U.S. -----  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Age upon Arrival  0.067**  0.058*  
 (0.022) (0.023) 
IS × Age upon Arrival -0.008 -0.007 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
IS2 × Age upon Arrival  0.000  0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Bilingual  0.170  0.177 
 (0.139) (0.140) 
English  0.273  0.261 
 (0.171) (0.171) 
Religious Attendance -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
Education  0.113  0.077*** 
 (0.080) (0.084) 
IS × Education    0.005  0.014 
 (0.022) (0.022) 
IS2 × Education   -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Income  0.010***  0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant  -4.744*** -3.613* 
 (1.342) (1.717) 
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Table 4.6. The Impact of Imported Socialization 
on Post-Migration Electoral Participation 
   Electoral Participation 
 Model III:  
IS and IS2 
w/Interactions 
Model IV: 
Longitudinal 
Attenuation 
N 1,582 1,582 
LR χ
2
(14, Model III; 16, Model IV)  332.67 339.53 
Prob>χ
2
 0.000 0.000 
pseudo R
2 0.162 0.165 
Logistic Regression 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
# p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
197 
Figure 4.3. Predicted Probabilities of Voting in the U.S. 2004 Election 
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Note: Predicted probabilities were computed using model I in Table 4.5. The imported 
socialization predictor was varied for this calculation. It was assigned values ranging from 0 
(Authoritarian) to 20 (Democratic). The rest of the predictors were held at their mean values or at 
their modal category in the case of indicator variables. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE CONSTRUCT OF LIKELIHOOD OF MIGRATION 
 
 In order to capture the likelihood of Mexican individuals migrating to the 
United States, I had the opportunity to incorporate a few questions in a national survey 
conducted in November of 2007 by Reforma newspaper. One key item asked respondents 
“how likely” it was that they would “migrate to the United States in the following two or 
three years.” Other items asked respondents about usual predictors of migration to the 
United States among Mexican individuals. Specifically, these other items asked 
respondents whether they have family living in the United States; whether these family 
members send them money on a regular basis; whether they have visited the United 
States recently; and whether or not they have a particular host location within the United 
States in mind. Also, occupational status, as well as education and income levels were 
available for the analysis. The main idea was to determine if individuals’ self-assessment 
of likelihood of migration could be incorporated in the before migration portions of my 
analyses. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of the likelihood of migration among the 
Mexican population. As can be seen, only 7.1 percent indicate that they are very likely to 
migrate in the following two or three years. Roughly 15 percent indicate that they are 
either somewhat or very likely to migrate.  
 Table 1 displays an ordered logit model where likelihood of migration is the 
dependent variable and the main explanatory variables are the following. A couple of 
indicator variables account for whether the respondent’s family sends money from the 
U.S. The reference category is “no family in the United States.” Another couple of 
indicator variables account for whether the respondent has visited the United States 
within the past three years or farther back in time. The reference category here is “have 
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never visited the United States.” Yet another indicator variable accounts for whether the 
respondent knows the specific location (city or state) to which the individuals would be 
arriving in the United States. Finally, a set of indicator variables account for respondents’ 
occupational status: employed part time, employed occasionally, or unemployed; where 
the reference category is employed full time. Education is measured in number of 
schooling years (upper-cap range values). Income is measured in thousand of Mexican 
pesos per month (mid-range).  
Figure 1. Distribution of Mexicans’ Self-Assessment of Likelihood of Migration 
 to the United States 
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Self-assessed Likelihood of Migration
 
 The key result from the model in Table 1, below, is that individuals’ self-
assessment of likelihood of migration is far from random. To the contrary, the key 
predictors of migration seem to account for the individual’s self-assessment, thus 
boosting my confidence in incorporating this survey item into the before migration 
portions of the analyses included in this dissertation.  
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Table 1. Explaining Mexicans’ Self-Assessment of Likelihood of Migration 
 
      
Likelihood of Migration   
   
R’s Family does NOT send Money from the U.S.          -0.352 * 
           (0.168)  
R’s Family does send Money from the U.S.           0.504 ** 
  (0.161)  
R has NOT visited the U.S. within the last 3 years           0.239   
  (0.206)  
R has visited the U.S. within the last 3 years           1.094 *** 
           (0.180)  
R does know which location in the U.S.           1.442 *** 
           (0.142)  
Part Time Employment           0.113  
           (0.223)  
Occasional Employment           0.388 # 
  (0.228)  
Unemployed           0.330  * 
  (0.151)  
Education           0.007  
           (0.017)  
Income           -0.010  
           (0.024)  
Threshold (D.V. = 0)            2.117  *** 
      (0.228)  
Threshold (D.V. = 1)            2.869 *** 
   (0.235)  
Threshold (D.V. = 2)           3.820  *** 
  (0.249)  
N 1,495  
LR χ
2
(10)  243.26 
Prob>χ
2
 0.000  
pseudo R
2 0.150  
Ordered Logit Regression 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
# p <0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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APPENDIX B 
THE CONSTRUCT OF IMPORTED SOCIALIZATION  
 
Table 1. Imported Socialization scores distribution  
by Country of Origin – MVS 2003 
 
 N Mean Lowest Highest S.D. 
Argentina 5 17.44 15.61 18.00 1.04
Bolivia 1 17.94 17.94 17.94 --
Chile 1 4.00 4.00 4.00 --
Colombia 41 16.72 10.22 18.22 2.33
Costa Rica 4 20.00 20.00 20.00 0.00
Cuba 96 4.51 1.00 13.94 3.11
Dominican Republic 24 14.05 5.44 16.71 3.63
Ecuador 13 15.42 9.33 19.00 3.81
El Salvador 13 11.23 8.56 17.00 3.11
Guatemala 10 7.73 4.20 9.39 1.37
Honduras 9 13.37 5.72 15.81 4.00
Mexico 399 6.20 4.00 12.82 1.99
Nicaragua 12 7.17 2.00 14.56 4.56
Panama 5 6.07 3.75 12.61 3.69
Paraguay 1 2.00 2.00 2.00 --
Peru 9 9.42 3.00 17.00 5.05
Spain 9 10.76 3.00 20.00 8.35
Uruguay 1 3.00 3.00 3.00 --
Venezuela 17 18.77 18.06 19.00 0.32
Total  670 7.89 1.00 20.00 4.79
 
Sources: MVS 2003/Polity IV. Score calculations by the author. Imported socialization 
scores were calculated according respondents’ age upon and year of arrival in the US. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Imported Socialization scores distribution  
by Country of Origin – NSL 2004 
  
 N Mean Lowest Highest S.D. 
Cuba 335 7.04 1.00 13.94 4.16
Dominican Republic 50 9.21 1.00 16.33 3.98
El Salvador 37 9.63 1.00 16.50 3.86
Mexico 597 6.22 4.00 13.11 2.19
Spain 7 7.40 3.00 20.00 6.29
Total  1,026 3.28 1.00 20.00 6.77
 
Sources: NSL 2004/Polity IV. Score calculations by the author. Imported socialization 
scores were calculated according respondents’ age upon and year of arrival in the US. 
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Table 3. Imported Socialization scores distribution  
by Country of Origin – LNS 2006 
 
 N Mean Lowest Highest S.D. 
Argentina 29 8.45 3.89 18.00 4.26
Bolivia 35 8.82 4.50 19.00 4.45
Chile 17 10.98 3.00 15.67 3.94
Colombia 113 15.88 9.62 18.38 2.62
Costa Rica 29 20.00 20.00 20.00 0.00
Cuba 326 7.58 1.00 13.00 4.23
Dominican Republic 278 8.99 1.00 16.86 5.15
Ecuador 74 13.16 8.11 18.92 3.46
El Salvador 344 10.23 1.33 17.89 3.66
Guatemala 135 9.40 5.00 15.67 2.35
Honduras 80 11.66 7.67 16.29 2.70
Mexico 3,612 6.61 4.00 14.59 2.60
Nicaragua 45 4.37 2.00 16.67 4.01
Panama 8 9.74 3.71 14.00 3.76
Paraguay 4 4.32 1.89 10.28 4.01
Peru 56 11.09 6.43 17.00 2.62
Spain 15 6.18 3.00 14.50 4.27
Uruguay 7 14.09 6.89 19.00 5.08
Venezuela 28 16.00 9.00 19.00 3.77
Total  5,235 7.68 1.00 20.00 3.79
 
Sources: LNS 2006/Polity IV. Score calculations by the author. Imported socialization 
scores were calculated according respondents’ age upon and year of arrival in the US. 
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APPENDIX C 
THE EXPERIMENT ON IMPORTED IDEOLOGY  
 
 In order to test whether “ideology” is indeed imported, I had the opportunity to 
embed an experiment in a telephone survey. The survey research project is led by 
Professor James McCann at Purdue University. This is a survey of Mexican immigrants, 
which consists of two sampling sites. One is the north-central region of the state of 
Indiana and the other one is the San Antonio metropolitan area in Texas. About 500 
interviews were conducted in each location (500 in Indiana and 522 in Texas). 
 Interviewing Services of America (a firm based in Van Nuys, CA), which specializes in 
polling within the Latino community, administered the surveys.  Nearly all of the 
interviews took place during September of 2008.  
 The experiment consisted in asking every respondent two questions regarding 
their ideological self-placement on a country-specific basis. In other words, every 
respondent was asked about “ideology” when thinking both of Mexican politics and of 
American politics. Questions 51 and 52 were assigned for these two items in the original 
questionnaire. The order of these items, though, was randomized. The exact question 
wording of these items and its proper translation to English are listed below. A few 
additional demographic items were also available to me to conduct the following 
analyses.  
Question Wording 
 
Spanish Version 
 
1) En política EN MEXICO, generalmente se habla de "izquierda" y "derecha". En una 
escala del 1 al 10 donde 1 es "izquierda" y 10 es  "derecha", en donde se ubicaría usted? 
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2) En política EN LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS, generalmente se habla de "izquierda" y 
"derecha". En una escala del 1 al 10 donde 1 es "izquierda" y 10 es "derecha", en donde 
se ubicaría usted? 
 
English Version 
 
1) In political matters IN MEXICO, people talk of "the left" and of "the right". On a scale 
that ranges from 1 to 10, where 1 is "left" and 10 is "right", where would you place 
yourself? 
 
2) In political matters IN THE UNITED STATES, people talk of "the left" and of "the 
right". On a scale that ranges from 1 to 10, where 1 is "left" and 10 is "right", where 
would you place yourself? 
 
Imported Ideology 
 
As Figure 1 illustrates, the proportion of “non-ideologues” vs. “ideologues” is 
substantively the same. The vertical axis is on percentual scale. At first glance, Mexican 
immigrants to the United States do not seem to differentiate between the two political 
contexts or pseudo-environments in ideological terms. More precisely, these individuals 
seem to import ideology at least in terms of “intensity.” When asked about Mexico, 720 
respondents (72.4 percent) place themselves on the ideological continuum whereas 282 
respondents (27.6 percent) do not place themselves. The proportions are strikingly similar 
when respondents are asked about U.S. politics: 733 respondents (73.7 percent) place 
themselves on the ideological continuum whereas 269 respondents (26.3 percent) do not 
place themselves. 
Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of the ideologues along the left-right 
continuum. The vertical axis represents the raw number of respondents that indicated 
considering themselves belonging to every category along the ideological continuum. As 
can be seen, the two distributions are substantively the same.  
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Figure 1. Proportion of Ideologues vs. Non-Ideologues 
regarding both the Mexican and the American Contexts 
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Figure 2. Distribution of Ideologues along the Left-Right Continuum  
regarding both the Mexican and the American Contexts 
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Again, at least at first glance, it can be argued that individuals do not distinguish 
between the contexts of the country of origin and that of the new host nation. However, a 
closer look at these data is in order. If the individual’s placement concerning Mexican 
politics is considered the “original” position, nearly 7 out of 10 of these individuals (68.1 
percent) in fact, place themselves in the same spot along the ideological continuum 
regardless once they are faced with the new host nation’s context. Of those, who actually 
shift their position, roughly half of them (46.7 percent) adjust their placement to the left 
whereas the other half (53.3 percent) adjusts their position to the right. Also, a majority 
(roughly 60 percent) of those “ideological” adjustments are within the three-point range 
in a ten point scale. Thus, evidence seems to strongly suggest that “ideology” in the 
country of origin is imported and serves as an anchor for the ideological range from 
which the individual will choose to adjust (if at all) one’s self-placement following 
migration.   
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APPENDIX D 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
Before Migration 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Mexican Values Survey 2003 (in Mexico) 
 
Variable  N  Mean  S.D.  Min Max  
Dependent            
Trust in the U.S. Government 2,269 0.83 0.86 0 3
Independent            
Trust in the Mexican Government (Additive Index) 2,331 3.67 2.56 0 9
Trust in Mex. Gov. × Attentiveness to the News 2,324 28.63 24.67 0 108
Interpersonal Trust 2,360 0.10 0.29 0 1
Efficacy 2,330 1.99 0.89 1 4
Attentiveness to the News 2,370 7.48 2.78 0 12
Age 2,380 37.48 15.07 18 99
Religious Attendance (in number of days per year) 2,342 31.63 31.12 0 104
Education (in number of years) 2,375 8.35 4.42 0 17
Income (in thousands of Mexican pesos per month) 2,160 4.19 4.27 1.25 32.50
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for the Reforma Survey 2007 
 
Variable  N  Mean  S.D.  Min Max  
Dependent            
Opinion on President Bush 1,530 4.03 2.78 0 10
Expected U.S. Partisan 1,530 0.55 0.49 0 1
Independent            
Likelihood of Migration (Very Likely) 1,530 0.08 0.27 0 1
Likelihood of Migration (Somewhat Likely) 1,530 0.02 0.13 0 1
Likelihood of Migration (Not Very Likely) 1,530 0.10 0.30 0 1
Trust in the Mexican Government (Additive Index) 1,338 6.32 3.59 0 15
Trust in Mex. Gov. × Attentiveness to the News 1,324 40.16 33.41 0 225
Mexican Partisan 1,510 0.59 0.49 0 1
Mexican Partisan × Attentiveness to the News 1,479 3.59 3.88 0 15
PRD Partisan 1,510 0.13 0.34 0 1
PRI Partisan 1,510 0.22 0.42 0 1
PAN Partisan 1,510 0.24 0.43 0 1
PRD Partisan × Attentiveness to the News 1,506 0.82 2.41 0 15
PRI Partisan × Attentiveness to the News 1,499 1.27 2.85 0 15
PAN Partisan × Attentiveness to the News 1,494 1.45 3.04 0 15
Non-Ideologue 1,530 0.19 0.39 0 1
Extreme Left 1,530 0.05 0.21 0 1
Center Left 1,530 0.11 0.31 0 1
Center Right 1,530 0.26 0.44 0 1
Extreme Right 1,530 0.13 0.34 0 1
Presidential Approval (President Calderon) 1,530 3.47 1.27 1 5
Age 1,529 40.62 15.69 18 91
Religious Attendance (in number of days per year) 1,530 26.03 31.26 0 104
Education (in number of years) 1,530 9.47 4.36 0 19
Income (in thousands of Mexican pesos per month) 1,530 4.19 2.99 0.65 11.90
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After Migration 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for the Mexican Values Survey 2003 (in the U.S.) 
 
Variable  N  Mean  S.D.  Min Max 
Dependent            
Trust in U.S. Government Additive Index  388 5.80 2.39 0 9
Expected Electoral Participation 399 0.66 0.47 0 1
Independent            
Trust in Mexican Government (A Great Deal) 392 0.22 0.41 0 1
Trust in Mexican Government (Somewhat) 392 0.34 0.47 0 1
Trust in Mexican Government (Not Very Much) 392 0.26 0.44 0 1
Trust in Mex. Gov. (Great) × Education  389 1.84 3.89 0 17
Trust in Mex. Gov. (Somewhat) × Education 389 3.14 4.85 0 17
Trust in Mex. Gov. (Not Very Much) × Education 389 2.65 4.75 0 17
Trust in Mex. Gov. (Great) × Years in U.S.  392 3.80 8.81 0 47
Trust in Mex. Gov. (Somewhat) × Years in U.S. 392 5.75 9.74 0 49
Trust in Mex. Gov. (Not Very Much) × Years U.S. 392 4.56 9.67 0 55
Mexican Partisan  399 0.57 0.49 0 1
Mexican Partisan × Education 395 5.58 5.54 0 17
Mexican Partisan × Years in the U.S. 399 8.81 10.59 0 51
PRD Partisan 399 0.08 0.27 0 1
PRI Partisan 399 0.17 0.38 0 1
PAN Partisan 399 0.31 0.46 0 1
PRD Partisan × Education 395 0.81 2.90 0 17
PRI Partisan × Education 395 1.55 3.77 0 17
PAN Partisan × Education 395 3.10 5.07 0 17
PRD Partisan × Years in the U.S. 399 1.22 4.82 0 40
PRI Partisan × Years in the U.S. 399 2.66 7.32 0 45
PAN Partisan × Years in the U.S. 399 4.68 8.84 0 51
Non-Ideologue 399 0.11 0.31 0 1
Extreme Left 399 0.03 0.18 0 1
Center Left 399 0.10 0.30 0 1
Center Right 399 0.22 0.41 0 1
Extreme Right 399 0.13 0.34 0 1
Non-Ideologue × Years in the U.S. 399 1.58 5.79 0 55
Extreme Left × Years in the U.S. 399 0.51 3.19 0 28
Center Left × Years in the U.S. 399 2.03 6.86 0 52
Center Right × Years in the U.S. 399 3.93 8.60 0 42
Extreme Right × Years in the U.S. 399 1.94 5.67 0 37
Efficacy  390 2.66 0.77 1 4
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for the Mexican Values Survey 2003 (in the U.S.) 
 
Variable  N  Mean  S.D.  Min Max 
Interpersonal Trust 399 0.20 0.40 0 1
Years in the U.S.  399 17.18 10.47 1 55
Age Upon Arrival  399 15.24 12.56 0 57
Religious Attendance (in number of days per year) 399 34.77 35.36 0 104
Bilingual   399 0.05 0.23 0 1
English  399 0.21 0.41 0 1
Education (in number of schooling years) 395 9.45 3.59 0 17
Income (in thousands of dollars per year) 398 34.27 18.02 7.5 125
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for the National Latino Survey 2004 
 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Dependent      
Partisanship 1,068 0.68 0.47 0 1
Political Participation 1,068 0.40 0.88 0 5
Independent   
Efficacy 1,003 3.31 0.86 1 4
Imported Socialization (IS) 1,026 6.77 3.28 1 20
IS Squared Term (IS2) 1,026 56.52 53.35 1 400
Years in the U.S. 1,049 18.33 13.82 0 72
IS × Years in the U.S. 1,026 121.91 131.40 0 871.9
IS2 × Years in the U.S. 1,026 1,033.81 1,673.42 0 10,558.9
Age Upon Arrival 1,026 24.44 13.99 0 88
IS × Age Upon Arrival 1,026 173.86 161.72 0 1,134.3
IS2 × Age upon Arrival 1,026 1,538.88 2,161.78 0 14,621.4
Religious Attendance 1,044 31.41 31.53 0 104
Bilingual 1,068 0.26 0.44 0 1
English 1,068 0.03 0.17 0 1
Education 1,045 10.73 4.12 4 18
IS × Education 1,023 72.64 47.38 4 288
IS2 × Education 1,023 609.37 676.71 4 5,600
Income 1,003 33.15 27.21 2.5 200
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for the Latino National Survey 2006 
(Full Sample of Foreign-Born) 
 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Dependent      
Partisanship 5,653 0.37 0.48 0 1
Independent   
Efficacy 5,653 2.01 1.32 0 4
Imported Socialization (IS) 5,235 7.68 3.79 1 20
Years in the U.S. 5,256 17.75 12.51 0 85
IS × Years in the U.S. 4,930 120.55 104.77 0 920.0
Age Upon Arrival 4,962 21.63 10.95 0 73
IS × Age Upon Arrival 4,928 160.43 113.91 1 895.7
Religious Attendance 5,567 41.02 35.24 0 104
Bilingual 5,600 0.24 0.43 0 1
English 5,600 0.12 0.33 0 1
Education 5,653 11.04 3.53 0 18
IS × Education 5,235 87.26 56.08 0 360
Income 5,653 22.79 20.67 0 70
 
213 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics for the Latino National Survey 2006 
(Only Naturalized Citizens) 
 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Dependent      
Reported Voting in 2004 1,846 0.63 0.48 0 1
Independent   
Efficacy 1,875 2.15 1.31 0 4
Imported Socialization (IS) 1,743 7.15 3.98 1 20
IS Squared Term (IS2) 1,743 66.95 76.68 1 400
Years in the U.S. 1,752 27.12 12.67 0 85
IS × Years in the U.S. 1,647 182.51 138.15 0 920.0
IS2 × Years in the U.S. 1,647 1,652.13 2228.01 0 18,400
Age Upon Arrival 1,663 18.87 11.57 0 69
IS × Age Upon Arrival 1,645 135.31 126.96 0 858.4
IS2 × Age upon Arrival 1,645 1,282.16 1,878.75 0 14,400
Religious Attendance 1,842 42.91 36.30 0 104
Bilingual 1,852 0.32 0.46 0 1
English 1,852 0.24 0.43 0 1
Education 1,875 12.15 3.43 0 18
IS × Education 1,743 89.58 60.87 0 360
IS2 × Education 1,743 862.03 1,100.01 0 7,200
Income 1,875 30.87 23.63 0 70
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